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Abstract 
 
Transcendental claims offer necessary, universal, and a priori conditions for the 
possibility of various phenomena (cognition, perception, language etc.). The current 
discussion in epistemology takes transcendental arguments, specifically, to serve as 
refutations of skepticism. However, despite the critical intentions with which they are 
deployed, transcendental arguments run into problems centering on undeclared 
metaphysical presuppositions. The aim of this thesis is to challenge these dogmatic 
presuppositions and to liberate the transcendental from its narrow and problem-ridden 
focus in epistemology by turning to transcendental themes in the descriptive 
philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. While anti-skeptical transcendental 
accounts in epistemology are forced to posit strong and metaphysically charged 
conditions in order to refute the skeptic decisively, this thesis argues that Merleau-Ponty 
and Wittgenstein, by transforming the notions operative in transcendental claims – 
necessity, universality, and apriority – offer a non-metaphysical orientation for 
transcendental claims.  In order to restore the critical impulse Kant once sought in 
transcendental considerations, this thesis details the basic elements of a pluralist and 
non-dogmatic transcendental perspective. 
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Introduction 
 
“There is room for words on subjects other than last words.” 
(Nozick 1999, xii) 
 
Transcendental considerations aim to reveal the background of what we uncritically 
take at face value. It is thus often observed that the transcendental and the critical are 
inseparable (e.g., Apel 1980; Mohanty 1985; Sacks 2000). Kant famously contended 
that the transcendental is opposed to dogmatism due to its convergence with the 
critical.1 While dogmatic positions refrain from questioning their basic principles, 
critical reflection flags overambitious reasoning and unjustified items of belief. In 
Kant’s hands, criticizing overambitious reasoning, for instance, means to point to the 
limits of objective thought, that is, to set constraints on possible knowledge. In recent 
interpretations, the transcendental has gained prominence as an argument that is anti-
skeptical. Transcendental arguments reveal to the skeptic her own uncritical attitude by 
demonstrating that what she denies or doubts is a condition for the possibility of what 
she accepts. As such, the transcendental is an important philosophical tool, one of the 
available methods of critical self-reflection. Ironically, however, recent discussions 
                                                
1   The transcendental and the critical arguably precede Kant’s critical philosophy. Descartes’ 
ontological proof and Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction are, according to some, 
examples of transcendental argumentation (Bardon 2005). Scholasticism disputed the 
different question whether transcendentals like “true,” “good,” or “one” were necessary 
umbrella terms to put ontology on a sound footing. Similarly, it is fair to say that from very 
early on, philosophy is wedded to the process of considered opinion-formation, that is, to 
the activity of judging and distinguishing which Plato’s Socrates calls “krinein” and which 
is opposed to blindly accepted views, to doxa (Plato 1992). While the latter approach may 
be considered critical without being specifically transcendental, the Scholastic concern 
with transcendentals is not specifically critical. 
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have accused the transcendental, especially in its epistemological use as a 
transcendental argument, of collapsing into various forms of dogmatism (Kuusela 
2008b; Westerlund 2014). One unexpected outcome of this discussion is that the 
transcendental and the critical can come apart after all.  
 The aim of this thesis is to recover the connection between the transcendental 
and the critical. I will begin with a diagnosis of the problems that plague transcendental 
arguments by examining the characteristic terms that are operative in a transcendental 
claim – necessity, universality, and apriority2 – and offer an alternative transcendental 
approach that follows insights from the descriptive philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein. What I call descriptive philosophy is committed to an approach that does 
justice to our everyday experience instead of retreating to metaphysical constructions. 
On the one hand, my characterization of the descriptive follows Strawson’s usage in 
Individuals in that Merleau-Ponty’s and Wittgenstein’s perspectives are not revisionist 
(1959, 9). On the other hand, by calling their approaches “descriptive,” I want to 
highlight that their approaches are not argumentative in the classical philosophical 
sense. Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, each in their own way, try to do justice to the 
diversity and plurality of our everyday experiences and practices instead of presenting 
non-revisionist metaphysical arguments as Strawson does. Of particular importance to 
my thesis is the alternative (and critical) perspective on the central notions of necessity, 
universality, and apriority that these descriptive approaches open up. 
 I will begin on a critical note and argue that as things stand in the prevailing 
epistemological discussion, the problems of dogmatism that beset transcendental 
                                                
2  The validity of each of these philosophical notions and their combination has been 
questioned, especially, the relation between necessity and a priority (Kripke 1980). 
Presenting an account of these terms independently of the transcendental is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Therefore criticisms and responses with respect to these terms will be 
raised only within the context of the transcendental claims. I will not offer a separate 
defense or critique of these terms.   
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arguments can be traced to a metaphysical understanding of the operative concepts of 
necessity, universality, and apriority. After examining various criticisms leveled against 
these notions, and demonstrating that standard responses have failed to provide 
workable alternatives, I will turn to Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. As will emerge, 
the criticisms advanced against transcendental arguments, especially the charge of 
dogmatism, can be met by Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein’s descriptive treatment of 
the transcendental. This treatment restores the critical impulse to transcendental claims 
that drops out of view in the epistemological debate.  
 Although it is a common assumption that transcendental arguments originate in 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, it is important to note that Kant himself never referred 
to any of his arguments as “transcendental arguments.” Rather, the notion of 
transcendental arguments first came to prominence in the analytic tradition, in particular 
the work of Strawson (1966). Strawson held that the real merit of Kant's Critique was 
not its comprehensive metaphysical aspiration but its so-called analytic facet: those 
arguments that give us conditions for the possibility of thought and experience. The 
ensuing discussion associated transcendental arguments and their prospects firmly with 
their anti-skeptical use in epistemology (Stroud 1968; Strawson 1985; Stern 1999, 2000; 
Sacks 2000). Thus, the notion of transcendental arguments is the product of a selective 
reading of Kant, which rejects dogmatic aspects of his metaphysics like his 
transcendental idealism and his reliance on 18th century faculty psychology yet retains 
central motives of his philosophical strategy (Strawson 1966). 
 If this selective reading of Kant is followed through, at least in intention, 
transcendental arguments are putatively metaphysically parsimonious. They are 
deductive arguments that begin with an uncontroversial premise to which the skeptic 
agrees (e.g., the fact of self-consciousness)3 and argue that what the skeptic doubts (e.g., 
                                                
3   Subjects are conscious of the experiences they undergo as their own experiences, or they 
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the existence of external world objects) is a necessary condition for the possibility of the 
uncontroversial premise. What distinguishes these arguments from just any argument 
that supplies necessary conditions is the second, modalized or transcendental, premise. 
The second premise that carries anti-skeptical force is a priori, necessary, and universal, 
and serves the role of constituting or enabling the first premise.4  
 Even in the more recent literature, transcendental arguments have been 
predominantly characterized as anti-skeptical arguments of modus ponens form (Stern 
1999, 27). This anti-skeptical framework places various constraints on transcendental 
arguments.  As anti-skeptical, they must be advanced as presuppositionless arguments 
that rely exclusively on the strength of their deductive force. An argument that rests on 
a set of background commitments in order to succeed will not refute the skeptic, 
because the skeptic is free to reject any particular background commitment on which 
such an argument might depend.5 For this reason, an anti-skeptical transcendental 
argument must begin with a slender premise, such as the mere fact of self-
consciousness, without assuming philosophical commitments the skeptic could deny. 
The prevalent description of transcendental arguments as a modus ponens structure 
reflects their putative simplicity; transcendental arguments are supposed to be “error-
                                                                                                                                          
are conscious of the beliefs they hold as their own beliefs. 
4 For Kant, necessity and universality are two criteria that any judgment must fulfill if it is to 
be considered a priori. Throughout the Critique Kant draws our attention to the intimate 
connection between necessity, universality, and apriority, contrasting these features with 
contingent, comparative/relative, and a posteriori designations (e.g., CPR B4-B5, B25; See 
Chapter 2, Section 1). 
5  For instance, to take an example from Kant (the Refutation of Idealism), proving the reality 
of physical objects to a Cartesian (external world) skeptic by appealing to objects in 
empirical reality, as constituted by pure forms of intuition and the categories, will not be 
sufficient to meet the skeptic’s challenge. The concepts governing such an account, and 
thus constituting its framework, would presuppose the truth of transcendental idealism, so 
that it would be a metaphysical position, which the skeptic is free to dispute, that would do 
the anti-skeptical work. 
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proof” arguments that “force” the skeptic to accept an anti-skeptical conclusion.6 If the 
skeptic accepts the first premise, but denies the conclusion, the skeptic can be charged 
with self-incoherence, since the conclusion is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
what the skeptic accepts.  
 If they succeed, it is clear why transcendental arguments might be a powerful 
resource against skepticism. As they begin with what the skeptic accepts, they do not 
bring any philosophical baggage with them. Thus one could characterize such 
arguments as undogmatic and non-authoritarian. Dogmatism can be defined as the 
attempt to “impose on someone a philosophical dogma to which this person is not 
committed by anything she says or thinks, and so on” (Kuusela 2008, 62).7 Because 
transcendental arguments begin with what the skeptic accepts, its proponents could be 
thought to be sensitive to the problem of dogmatism and implicit coercion by offering a 
common starting point.  
If we take another look, however, the argumentative strategy that transcendental 
arguments embody seems at odds with their non-dogmatic and non-authoritarian intent. 
                                                
6 “If the transcendental argument can be made to work […] it has the advantage of being a 
deductive strategy, and thus error-proof – where it can be taken for granted that a skeptic 
who questions our reliance on the laws of logic has taken a step too far, even for a skeptic” 
(Stern 2007, 149). Transcendental arguments are supposed to be error proof due to their 
logical form; if the premises are true, it is logically impossible that the conclusion is false.   
7  It is interesting that Kuusela's conception of dogmatism echoes Nozick’s observations 
about the rational coercion philosophical arguments exert: “A philosophical argument is an 
attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants to believe it or not” and its 
coercive features are characterized strikingly in terms of “power,” and “force,” as well as 
the terms “knockdown” and “carrying punch” (1981, 4). While it is common to refer to 
those who reject rational arguments as dogmatic, it is worth questioning whether reasons or 
deductive proofs are, indeed, non-dogmatic and can be coercive in their own way. By tying 
truth to reason alone, an emphasis on rationality dogmatically denigrates other sources of 
conviction or motivation. 
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They claim to “force” the skeptic to accept the desired anti-skeptical conclusion by 
showing her something necessary about her own position. We may think that their 
impact on the skeptic can be reconciled with the non-dogmatic or non-authoritarian 
requirement by the Habermasian idea of the “forceless force of the better argument” 
(1975, 108). Better arguments convince hearers because they make sense of a proposed 
course of reasoning without resorting to indirect techniques of persuasion or implicit 
pressures that ask for a non-literal understanding of the argument. Habermas argues, 
however, that for the latter to prevail, further conditions must be met. For example, each 
participant in the argument must be equal insofar as each has “the capacity to raise and 
challenge validity claims” (Dryzek 2000, 70; Habermas 1990, 87). In order to have this 
capacity, participants are required to make the premises and presuppositions of their 
contributions transparent. If an argument brings in latent presuppositions, or a string of 
hidden premises, then it cannot retain its claim to being non-dogmatic, because it 
impairs the capacity of participants to raise and challenge validity claims. 
 Transcendental arguments, however, despite their non-dogmatic appearance, 
carry implicit and undeclared commitments that have long been a source of criticism 
(e.g., Stroud 1968, Körner 1967, Kuusela 2008, Westerlund 2014). These commitments 
are not fully available to the skeptic, because the notions that are distinctive of 
transcendental arguments – necessity, universality and apriority – are taken for granted. 
It is, of course, not always necessary to justify our basic philosophical notions. In the 
context of transcendental arguments and their putative non-dogmatism, however, it is 
not enough to claim that transcendental arguments begin with a starting point that is 
shared by the skeptic, which critics contend they do not supply anyway (Kuusela 2008). 
It is essential that the philosophically substantive concepts involved in the modalized 
premise  – necessity, universality and apriority – on which the argument turns, are 
acceptable to the skeptic. The transcendental becomes uncritical and dogmatic, because 
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it fails to reflect on precisely these presuppositions. These presuppositions are all the 
more problematic given that metaphysics itself is a form of dogmatism. The principal 
target of Kant’s critical philosophy was traditional metaphysics, which attempted to 
derive knowledge from pure a priori principles through reason, but fell into dogmatism 
because it lacked “an antecedent critique of its own capacity” (CPR Bxxxv). However, 
Kant’s own attempt was to secure metaphysics by laying out the subjective principles of 
knowledge and cognition, which give us constraints on cognition and knowledge. There 
is, however, a type of dogmatism in asserting one final truth, as metaphysics – in 
general -- aims to, and closing off the possibility of plural ways of understanding 
experience or seeing phenomena. Metaphysics is dogmatic because it claims authority 
over what is true and what must be the case, and thus invalidates any alternative 
position on a given subject matter. Both these forms of dogmatism, first the dogmatism 
of tacit presuppositions and second the dogmatism of metaphysics, come together in 
transcendental arguments.  
 Therefore, it is especially hard for anti-skeptical transcendental arguments to 
shake off dogmatism. As I will argue in the first part of this thesis, their inherent 
dogmatism can be traced to their assigned epistemological purpose of undermining or 
refuting skepticism once and for all. In order to do so, they are forced to give strong 
metaphysically charged conditions.  Barry Stroud’s (1968) seminal criticism of what 
came to be known as ambitious transcendental arguments, which attempt to refute 
skepticism about the external world, highlights that they are flawed due to their 
unwarranted reliance on an inference from facts about us to metaphysical reality This 
unwarranted inference is all the more problematic, because, as we will see in detail, it is 
backed by an unexplained notion of necessity that the skeptic may reject.  
This criticism prompted reformulations of transcendental arguments that came to 
be known as modest transcendental arguments, which target types of skepticism that 
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raise doubts about whether we are licensed to extend existing epistemic norms 
(inference, perception, etc.) to particular beliefs (that there are mind-independent objects 
or that there are other minds) (Stern 1999, 2000). In order to accommodate Stroud’s 
criticism, such arguments only make inferences between facts about us. However, 
despite the wide variety of uses to which transcendental claims are put, little work has 
been devoted to examining the concepts distinctive of a transcendental claim – an 
appeal to necessity, universality, and a priority – in light of the problems and prospects 
of transcendental arguments. It is assumed that while ambitious transcendental 
arguments need to refute skepticism by making metaphysical claims concerning the 
existence of, for instance, external world objects, modest arguments only need to point 
out that certain beliefs are licensed by our epistemic norms. A modest transcendental 
argument does not need to prove what we believe exists, because the skepticism it 
targets concerns whether our beliefs are justified or aligned with epistemic norms. If it 
can be shown that they are, the skeptic has been refuted. In other words, ambitious 
transcendental arguments are world-directed, since they attempt to prove what exists. 
Modest transcendental arguments, on the other hand, are self-directed, as they attempt 
to prove how we must believe. As I will argue, however, the metaphysics involved in 
transcendental arguments and claims renders the transcendental dogmatic even in the 
modest case, because it holds that truths about us or how we must believe can be 
established once and for all. Such a claim is dogmatic, because it rules out alternative 
ways of understanding our experiences and ourselves and is, in that sense, opposed to a 
critical philosophical spirit. The future of the transcendental lies, as I will argue, in a 
post-metaphysical direction that takes contingency as well as plurality seriously instead 
of favoring static metaphysics over our dynamic and lived situation. 
 The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part aims at diagnosing the 
problems associated with transcendental arguments and the second attempts to provide a 
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reformulation of transcendental claims. In Chapter 1, I will argue that anti-skeptical 
renditions of transcendental arguments, which claim to carry no implicit background 
commitments that the skeptic can find problematic, make, in both the ambitious and 
modest case, a substantive and ultimately indefensible claim to necessity. I will argue 
that once we examine the operative notions of the modalized premise, it turns out that 
because of their strength, modest transcendental arguments are as metaphysically 
charged as ambitious transcendental argument. Because the necessity of transcendental 
claims remains unrevised in its modest construal, it retains its original metaphysical 
strength. It is, as I hope to show, a faulty assumption to hold that truths about us are less 
metaphysical than truths about reality, as the distinction between world-directed and 
self-directed transcendental arguments attempts to assert. Kant’s idealistic metaphysics, 
for example, can be understood as self-directed since it gives us the necessary subjective 
framework of experience, but it is still a form of metaphysics and has dogmatic 
problems of its own for that reason (Strawson 1966). The arguments of Chapter 1 will 
lead to the conclusion that transcendental arguments do not in fact stand on the strength 
of their deductive force and that a broader examination of their necessity, universality, 
and apriority is unavoidable.  
 Chapter 2 will take up this point and begin by analyzing Kant’s own definition 
of the transcendental, which provides us with a detailed account of the transcendental 
and the inseparable relation of necessity, universality, apriority as well as the notion of 
“conditions of possibility,” i.e., the enabling role of transcendental conditions. I will 
then examine a seminal criticism of transcendental universality, which is scarcely 
discussed in the literature, Stephan Körner’s uniqueness argument. Körner argues that 
universality (as well as necessity and apriority) implies that a set of conditions uniquely 
organizes experience, such that the possibility of all experience of that kind depends on 
one encompassing conceptual scheme. As Körner shows, however, this claim to 
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uniqueness is impossible to justify. Transcendental arguments need to supply unique 
conditions in order to retain anti-skeptical force; if it is conceded that other conditions 
can render skeptical doubts possible, then the skeptic can reject the condition carrying 
anti-skeptical force in favor of alternatives. The anti-skeptical context, thus, rules out 
reformulations of the notion of necessity and universality.  I will conclude the chapter 
by introducing the notion of descriptive philosophy, which, as I will argue in Chapters 
3-5, can revise the meaning of the transcendental more liberally since it is not 
committed to the anti-skeptical task, common to both ambitious and modest 
transcendental arguments, of legitimizing or validating knowledge claims.  
 The second part of the thesis – Chapters 3, 4, and 5 – will turn to prospects for 
the transcendental outside the standard epistemological focus on skeptical issues. I will 
argue that the descriptive philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein can give 
renewed impetus to the transcendental. The transcendental, in this new sense supplies 
conditions of possibility that aim to remain faithful to the openness and dynamism of 
lived experience. Once the dogmatism of metaphysical commitments alongside illicit 
claims to uniqueness is expunged, the transcendental, I will argue, can be made critical.   
 Chapter 3 will take up the connection between the transcendental a priori and 
transcendental idealism. If the a priori is interpreted according to Kant’s original 
definition, according to which the a priori is absolutely independent of experience and 
has its genesis in the subject, the transcendental is inexorably tied to some form of 
transcendental idealism.8 In other words, the usual perception is that because 
transcendental claims usually invoke subject-involving experiences or conceptual 
capacities, they express commitments to a form of idealism. The relation between 
transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism is significant, because the 
                                                
8  The view that we constitute and organize experience unilaterally, and thus, we do not 
experience the world as it is in itself, but only through our own epistemic conditions.  
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possibility of a non-metaphysical interpretation of the transcendental turns on our ability 
to dissociate the transcendental from transcendental idealism, which, after all, is a 
metaphysical doctrine. I will address this issue through a critique of two opposed 
readings of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, one that argues there is ultimately no 
room for the a priori in his account of embodied experience (Smith 2005; Inkpin 2017; 
Reynolds 2017) and another that connects Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori 
with transcendental idealism (Zahavi 2008; Baldwin 2013; Gardner 2015). We will see 
that both readings miss a crucial aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s take on transcendental 
themes. Contrary to them, I defend the view that Merleau-Ponty, while relying on a 
priori insights, holds that the world is co-constitutive for embodied experience. That is, 
he does not place its origin in the subject alone and therefore does not endorse 
transcendental idealism. Because this move indexes constitution to the situation of the 
body-subject in the world, that is, to facticity, it opens the transcendental to a special 
kind of contingency that Heidegger described as the fact that we are “always already” 
there. This perspective, however, does not entail that there is no room for necessity in 
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental account. Rather, necessity is grounded on contingency, 
so that the dynamism and openness to change of this new conception of the 
transcendental is at no loss to its function as a condition of possibility. 
  Similar motives which suggest a transformed transcendental can be made out in 
Wittgenstein’s late work. Hence Chapter 4 will develop a Wittgensteinian account of 
the transcendental. In his last work On Certainty, Wittgenstein takes issue with the 
usual epistemic understanding of certainties as indubitable knowledge claims which 
serve as the foundation of other, contingent, knowledge claims. He challenges this usual 
understanding by interpreting certainties as non-epistemic statements, which are exempt 
from questions of truth or justification. As I will argue, Wittgenstein conceives of 
certainties at the same time as a background for knowledge so that certainties can be 
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interpreted as non-epistemic conditions for the possibility of knowledge claims. 
Significantly, Wittgenstein offers further avenues to understanding the transcendental in 
a non-dogmatic way by indexing the transcendental to a mode of representation (one 
way among others of seeing or representing the object of our inquiry) in order to clarify 
philosophical confusions. If we follow this methodological insight through, the 
transcendental can be understood as the feature of a philosophical model. As a result, 
the necessity, universality, and apriority of transcendental conditions is not an 
ontological or metaphysical feature of the phenomenon we are describing, but belongs a 
philosophical model which aims to clarify the dispute between the skeptic and her 
interlocutor by providing an alternative way of understanding the nature and relation of 
certainty and knowledge.  
 Bringing together insights of the previous chapters, Chapter 5 will return to the 
problems facing transcendental arguments in order to assess whether Merleau-Ponty 
and Wittgenstein’s accounts can circumvent the challenges laid out in Chapter 1 and 2. I 
will argue that because neither Merleau-Ponty nor Wittgenstein attempt to make 
inferences from facts about us to facts about reality, whether of the world or the self, in 
different ways, and because the necessity operative in their account is indexed in 
Merleau-Ponty’s case to the phenomenal field and in Wittgenstein’s case to 
philosophical problems, they do not ontologize transcendental conditions. Further, since 
neither upholds the scheme/content distinction, they do not succumb to a view of 
universality that claims to uniquely organize the contents of experience. Instead, they 
both hold that various ways of understanding phenomena are possible, though some 
ways lead to difficulties or have shortcomings.  Finally, because for Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein the a priori does not have a subjective genesis, their transcendental account 
is not committed to a form of transcendental idealism. The chapter will conclude with 
an account of the new transcendental, namely, transcendental description, while 
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attempting to resolve tensions between the transcendental and the descriptive. 
According to Westerlund (2014), for instance, transcendental conditions are essentialist 
in such a way that they cannot be made compatible with description, for it is not clear 
how descriptions of particular cases can yield general conclusions. Furthermore, the 
subjectivist (or idealist) tendencies of transcendental thought entail, according to 
Westerlund, a dogmatic privileging of subjective acts of constitution over objective 
experience. As I will argue the multiple indexing examined in Chapter 3 and 4, show us 
that the generality of transcendental claims is not absolute and therefore not essentialist. 
According to Kuusela (2008), transcendental claims turn on a particular way of 
understanding what unifies concepts, by holding that Y is necessary to all instances of 
X. As Kuusela argues, this position is not defensible, because there are many other ways 
that the unity of concepts can be understood. As I will contend in return, the indexing of 
transcendental conditions in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein successfully 
meets this objection, by remaining open to the plurality of understanding phenomena. 
Understanding the transcendental in this non-metaphysical way opens up new critical 
possibilities for the transcendental that recent literature has neglected. As I hope this 
thesis will show, the transcendental, once modified, is a critical tool worth retaining in 
the philosopher’s toolkit. 
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Part I 
Transcendental Arguments 
 
Chapter 1 
Transcendental Arguments in Epistemology: Ambitious and Modest 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine influential instances of transcendental arguments, 
to understand some of their underlying motivations, and to provide an account of one of 
the most persistent criticisms directed against them. In the first section, I will examine 
an ambitious transcendental argument, Strawson’s reading of Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction. Ambitious transcendental arguments attempt to refute strong forms of 
skepticism, such as skepticism about the external world and other minds by establishing 
the truth of external reality or other minds. In the second section, I will turn to a critical 
assessment of ambitious transcendental arguments. Critics like Stroud (1968), in his 
seminal paper “Transcendental Arguments,” contend that ambitious transcendental 
arguments, including Strawson’s interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, are 
defective because of three interrelated reasons. They involve: a) unwarranted inferences 
to reality, b) a problematic notion of necessity, and c) inevitably become redundant 
once a resolution to these problems is attempted.9 In the third section of the chapter, I 
                                                
9  I will add an additional criticism to the existing ones in future chapters: (d) transcendental 
arguments work with an unexplained notion of apriority. This point is generally overlooked 
due to the proximity of necessity and apriority. It will become obvious as the argument 
unfolds why distinguishing points (b) and (d) is relevant. 
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will evaluate modest transcendental arguments that aim to overcome these criticisms by 
targeting a different form of skepticism, one that contends our methods for justifying 
certain beliefs are incorrect or do not align with accepted epistemic norms (induction, 
perception etc.). The resultant modest argument only needs to show that our methods of 
justification are correct or aligned with our epistemic norms, and, thus, does not need to 
establish the truth of what we believe. As I will show, however, Stroud’s criticism 
cannot be overcome by modest approaches, because they leave unrevised the notion of 
necessity that implicitly carries an inference to reality, this time the reality of our own 
constitution. Ultimately, both ambitious and modest transcendental arguments depend 
on an unwarranted inference from facts about us to facts about the metaphysical reality 
of the world and the self respectively.  
 
1. Ambitious Transcendental Arguments  
Let us first begin with a paradigmatic example of transcendental arguments, Strawson’s 
reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Strawson presents Kant’s position in the 
Transcendental Deduction (CPR B129-169) as an argument to the effect that self-
consciousness presupposes the existence of external objects, a proof that he takes to be 
independent of and salvageable from Kant’s broader philosophical program.  
 Kant’s Transcendental Deduction belongs to the Transcendental Analytic where 
Kant gives an account of the concepts of the understanding, such as causality, 
substance, possibility etc. Kant distinguishes between two questions that can be raised 
with regards to concepts. The first is concerned with the fact (quid facti) of our use of 
concepts, the second with their justification (quid juris) (CPR B116).  The former takes 
for granted that we employ certain concepts in experience and merely elucidates how 
we come to have them. Locke’s theory of ideas, as Kant points out, exemplifies the 
attempt to answer the question of fact, showing how beginning with individual 
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perceptions we come to have general concepts (CPR B119).  
The question of fact is distinguished from the question as to whether these 
concepts are legitimate. Giving a justification of our possession of empirical concepts 
amounts to conducting an empirical deduction: showing how concepts are acquired 
from perceptions (CPR B117). For instance, we have concepts such as “fate” or 
“fortune;” an empirical deduction would ask whether such a concept is factually 
justified, whether we are factually entitled to it (CPR B116). Raising this question of 
justification, we come to realize that the concept of fate is suspect, because it does not 
have the grounds we expect justified concepts to possess, namely a sound basis in 
experience. 
 While the Metaphysical Deduction in Kant’s Transcendental Analytic 
establishes the fact of our use of concepts, the Transcendental Deduction is an attempt 
to answer the question of their legitimacy. The concepts of the understanding are a 
priori, that is to say their source is the understanding of the subject and not empirical or 
sensory experience (CPR B93; Strawson 1966, 88). For this reason, an empirical 
deduction cannot tell us anything about their justification.10 Since these concepts are not 
derived from experience or abstracted from experience, it might seem “contradictory 
and impossible” that these concepts nonetheless relate to objects of experience (CPR 
A95). Kant puts this problem in the following way: how can subjective conditions of 
thought (a priori concepts of the understanding) have objective validity (apply to objects 
of experience) (CPR B112)? Kant endeavors to legitimate concepts of the understanding 
as having objective validity, i.e., applying to objects of experience, by laying out our 
necessary, universal, and a priori entitlement for the use of these concepts.11  
                                                
10   “To seek an empirical deduction of them would be entirely futile work, for what is 
distinctive in their nature is precisely that they are related to their objects without having 
borrowed anything from experience for their representation” (CPR B118). 
11  As Kant explains, an additional reason that we cannot appeal to empirical regularities in 
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There are two ways to read the Transcendental Deduction, progressive and 
regressive. 12 The transcendental argument that Strawson extracts from Kant is a 
progressive (and potentially anti-skeptical argument), because it rests on a thin premise 
about our experience (that it is self-consciousness), from which the possibility of 
objective knowledge (the existence of mind-independent objects) is deduced. A 
regressive argument, by contrast, moves from the fact of such knowledge to its 
preconditions in the mind (Ameriks 2003). According to regressive readings, if we 
accept the possibility of empirical knowledge, we must also accept what is necessary for 
it, i.e., the categories of understanding.  
 Strawson interprets the Metaphysical Deduction as stipulating the concepts that 
are employed in any thought about the world. On his view, the Transcendental 
Deduction effectively reaches the same conclusion. So as not to be redundant, Strawson 
argues, the Transcendental Deduction must give us different premises for the same 
conclusion (1966, 85-86). In other words, on Strawson’s reading, Kant must 
demonstrate that the concepts of the Metaphysical Deduction are necessary for the 
possibility of experience. More will be involved in advancing this thesis, crucially, the 
notion of self-consciousness and the existence of objects to which concepts correspond. 
On the whole, however, Strawson takes Kant’s conclusion to be that knowledge of 
objects is a necessary condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. As Strawson 
puts it, “A major part of the role of the Deduction will be to establish that experience 
necessarily involves knowledge of objects, in the weighty sense” (Strawson 1966, 88). 
What Strawson might mean by the remark “knowledge of objects, in the weighty sense” 
                                                                                                                                          
order to abstract concepts is because such an attempt will only give us contingent rules or 
concepts and never necessary and universal ones (CPR B123-125). 
12  Strawson, along with Jonathan Bennett (1966), and Robert Paul Wolff (1963) are 
considered to be the key proponents of a progressive reading of the Transcendental 
Deduction. Karl Ameriks (2003) is a proponent of the regressive reading.  
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will be discussed in what follows. 
 In order to analyze Strawson’s argument, let us begin with the requirement that 
our sensible representations, to which Kant refers as the “manifold of intuition,” have to 
be combined to give us experience. This is what Strawson calls “the fundamental 
premise” of the Transcendental Deduction, namely that “the diverse elements 
(intuitions) must somehow be united” (Strawson 1966, 87). In other words, empirical 
knowledge requires the subject to combine sense input into a unified experience, and 
the Transcendental Deduction will demonstrate that concepts figure among the 
necessary conditions for this unity. This combination is not given by the manifold of 
intuition itself, but “can only be executed by the subject” (CPR B130). Kant contends 
that a special kind of unity, higher than the categories, is required for this combination. 
He calls this unity the unity of apperception.  
The unity of apperception, or I think, which for Kant is synonymous with self-
consciousness, unites the manifold of intuition by bringing them under a rule or a 
concept, and, as Strawson explains, also lays the ground for what can count as possible 
experience. That the unity of apperception draws limits for possible experience can be 
clarified, as highlighted by Strawson, by reference to its tautological character: “The I 
think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would 
be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the 
representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me” 
(CPR B131-132). In other words, my representations must be my representations if they 
are to be anything to me; representations that belong to me must be ascribable to me. 
The tautology above (my representations must be mine) effectively sets a limit for 
possible experience:13 for an experience to be an experience for me, I must be able to 
                                                
13  Kant attributes various features to the unity of apperception. Apperception is “original” 
which is to say that there is only one “I think,” a presentation that is “one and the same in 
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reflect on my experience as my experience. 
In order to represent my experiences as mine, Strawson’s argument goes, I must 
be able to distinguish between how things appear to me (subjectively valid judgments) 
and how things are (objectively valid judgments). An objectively valid judgment, 
according to Strawson, gives us “experiences or awareness of objects” (1966, 98). 
Objects are to be understood as distinct from our awareness of them, and thus, as mind-
independent.14 To clarify how mind-independence and objectivity in judgments are 
related, Strawson says: “The possibility of objectively valid judgments implies that rule-
governed connectedness of perceptions which is reflected in our employment of 
empirical concepts of objects conceived of as possessing an order and arrangement of 
their own, distinct from the order and arrangement of the subject’s experiences of 
awareness of them” (1966, 98). This is to say, that the order and arrangement of objects, 
which is depicted in our use of judgments such as “the book is on the table” is distinct 
from the awareness itself. In other words, in an objectively valid judgment, I am 
making an objective claim about the world that is independent of my particular 
experiences of it. When I say, “Bodies are heavy” I am referring to the object 
“regardless of any difference in the condition of the subject” (CPR B142). The two 
representations that come together in the judgment “Bodies are heavy”, an extended 
body and heaviness, have no necessary connection (bodies are not always heavy, for 
                                                                                                                                          
all consciousness” (CPR B131-132). “Original” indicates the fact that the I think is 
precedes all other representations and is not accompanied by a further representation (CPR 
B132). It is transcendental, and not empirical, because it enables empirical apperception 
(determinate instances). The I think, additionally, belongs to spontaneity; as a priori it is 
not given to us in sensible experience, but is, as the source of combination which Kant 
sought at the outset of the Transcendental Deduction, an act of the understanding (CPR 
B132).  
14  Since Strawson’s reading of Kant does not involve any background commitments to 
transcendental idealism, mind-independence here does not suggest empirical reality, which 
is constituted by us, i.e., the pure forms of intuition and the categories. More below. 
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example in outer space). Granted this contingency, their unity is nonetheless necessary 
in another sense. The unity of apperception synthesizes the representations according to 
fixed rules or the concepts of the understanding.  A subjectively valid judgment, by 
contrast, is directed to my particular awareness, to a subjective seeming. When I say, to 
use Kant’s example “If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,” I do not attribute 
weight to the object, but to an awareness in me (CPR B142). Therefore, the two types of 
judgments enable a distinction between how things appear to me and how things are. 
But subjectively valid judgments are only possible because objectively valid judgments 
are possible. That is, in order to conceptualize an experience as my own, I must be able 
to distinguish my own experience from what is not my own experience. According to 
Strawson, it is the existence of mind-independent objects that allows me to make that 
distinction.  
We can summarize the argument in the following way:15 
(1)  Being self-conscious is the ability of ascribing experiences to 
myself consciously. 
(2)  In order to ascribe experiences to myself, I must be able to 
conceptualize my experiences as my own (in subjectively valid 
judgments). 
(3)     To be able to conceptualize my experiences as my own, I must be 
able to distinguish between what is my experience (how things 
appear to me) and what is not my experience (how things are). 
(4)  Only experiences of objects independent from me (mind-
independent) can allow for this distinction (objectively valid 
judgments). 
                                                
15  I take this proof from Stern’s summary of Strawson’s reading of the Transcendental 
Deduction, modifying some of the premises (2000, 139). 
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Therefore, 
(5)  Mind-independent objects exist. 
  Now, according to Strawson, since it is necessary for self-consciousness that I 
experience my experiences as mine, and since the latter is only possible if I can 
distinguish my experiences from what is not exhausted by my experiences, experience 
of objects is a necessary condition for self-consciousness.16 Strawson argues that if we 
conceive of experience as consisting exclusively of mental representations, then we 
cannot make room for the distinction between this is how things seem to me and this is 
how things are.  In Strawson’s view, when Kant attempts to demonstrate that concepts 
are objectively valid, he is not arguing for a weak objectivity requirement that we must 
merely believe that self-consciousness relies on the employment of certain objectivity 
concepts, independently of whether these concepts correspond to anything in reality.17 
Rather, according to Strawson, Kant argues for a strong objectivity requirement, 
according to which these concepts actually correspond to objects in mind-independent 
reality. Strawson’s notion of objects in the weighty sense, for this reason, can be 
                                                
16  Strawson counters various objections to the effect that self-consciousness or ascribing 
experiences to myself does not require experience of objects. Such experiences, which we 
can call “seemings” do not fulfill the mind-independence condition of objectivity, but are 
still experiences I ascribe to myself, suggesting that experiencing an experience as mine 
does not necessarily require an experience of objects.  Strawson’s response, in summary, is 
that all experiences presuppose a conceptual background, according to which seemings are 
distinguished from what is objectively the case, or in other words, this is how things seem 
to me is distinguished from this is how things are. Eventually Strawson argues that 
subjectively valid judgments are parasitical on objectively valid ones (1966, 108). 
However, these further considerations would take us too far afield.   
17 An even weaker objectivity condition would be that “for experience to be self-reflexive 
[self-conscious] one must at least understand the hypothesis of experience of objects 
capable of existing unperceived, even if one does not believe that one’s experience is of 
such objects” (Cassam 1995, 164).  This condition would concern the intelligibility 
conditions for objective thought. 
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understood as the actual existence, independently of my awareness, of objects. 
 What does the mind-independence of objects or what Strawson calls objects in 
the “weighty sense” amount to? If we consider the argument above from the perspective 
of transcendental idealism, Kant’s general project, the mind-independent existence of 
empirical objects means nothing more than their existence in empirical reality, that is, 
reality as constituted by a priori forms of intuition and the categories (CPR B34). 
However, crucially, Strawson views Kant’s critique as having two distinct and 
detachable facets. On the one hand there is the “analytic Kant,” who advances 
transcendental arguments in order to render the general structure of thought and 
experience intelligible. The Critique’s analytic side is concerned, as the title of 
Strawson’s book suggests, with the “limiting framework” of our thought about and 
experience of the world. According to Strawson, the Transcendental Deduction, 
properly understood, gives us just such a framework. On the other hand, is the 
traditional conception of Kant who advances transcendental idealism, the doctrine that 
distinguishes appearances, which constitute empirical reality, from things-in-
themselves, which belong to supersensible reality.18 Strawson believes that the doctrine 
of transcendental idealism is plagued with intractable difficulties and should be 
abandoned. According to Strawson, among other motives for abandoning transcendental 
                                                
18 There is, as with most of Kant’s Critique, controversy on how this distinction should be 
read; the so-called “two-standpoint” reading advanced most prominently by Henry Allison 
(2004), sees the distinction as epistemological, namely, the sensible (phenomenal) and the 
super-sensible (noumenal) give us two perspectives on the same class of numerically 
identical objects. That is, we can think of objects as constituted by certain epistemic 
conditions (pure forms of intuition and the categories) and we can think of “objects” in the 
absence of such epistemic conditions, that is, in abstraction from our constituting. The 
“two-world” reading takes Kant to be making a metaphysical claim regarding two classes 
of numerically distinct objects, objects in empirical reality and objects in supersensible 
reality. Proponents of variations on the two-standpoint view Allison (2004), Bird (2006), 
Langton (1999); and of the two-world view, Strawson (1966), Guyer (1987), Van Cleve 
(1999).  
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idealism is its proximity to Berkeleian idealism (very broadly, the view that the external 
world does not exist, but as a mental representation), which Kant is unwilling to 
acknowledge. Despite arguing for a mind-independent empirical reality in order to 
distance himself from full-blown idealism, Kant, as Strawson’s argument goes, does not 
adequately distinguish between mental states and physical objects. The notion that 
“material and mental constituents of the natural world are alike only appearances” 
seems to place more weight on the mental than the material (Strawson 1966, 21-22).19 
What Strawson sees as the real merit of Kant’s Critique is the former, analytic side, 
which gives us conditions for the possibility of thought and experience and can be, as he 
sees it, disentangled from Kant’s problematic metaphysical commitments.  The 
argument of the Transcendental Deduction, seen from the analytic angle, gives us a 
proof for the existence of mind-independent objects, unlike the empirical objects, 
constituted by the mind, which Kant’s transcendental idealism gives us.  
 
2. A Critique of Transcendental Modality 
Although, Strawson himself does not refer to his rendering of the Transcendental 
Deduction as serving anti-skeptical ends, it should be clear why the argument above 
might be deemed ideal for such purposes. Because Strawson’s interpretation of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction begins with the uncontroversial fact of self-consciousness, 
from which the existence of objects is deduced, his reading of Kant’s transcendental 
                                                
19 Strawson is a proponent of the two-world reading. Accordingly, in his view, things-in-
themselves in supersensible reality cause appearances in empirical reality through “a 
certain complex relation (or a class of cases of this relation), which we can speak of, on the 
model of a causal relation, in terms of ‘affection’ and ‘being affect by’” (Strawson 1966, 
236). However, because things-in-themselves are not conditioned by the categories, the 
latter applying only to appearances, it is not clear how Kant can describe the relation 
between things in themselves and appearances in terms of affectivity understood along 
causal lines. 
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argument has come to be conceived as progressively anti-skeptical. This makes it an 
ambitious transcendental argument. 
More generally, ambitious transcendental arguments are designed to refute 
external world skeptics. Usually, the skeptic presents “an argument from error”—one 
that points to a lack of certainty or the mere possibility of error—to show that our 
evidence for the existence of a mind-independent world of material objects is 
insufficient for knowledge. An ambitious transcendental argument attempts a refutation 
of the skeptic by demonstrating that something the skeptic denies is premised on an 
uncontroversial fact of experience the skeptic accepts. The ambitious transcendental 
argument then proceeds to show that accepting the uncontroversial fact in question does 
not allow the skeptic to maintain her position, but forces her to concede the anti-
skeptical conclusion. To bring this about, however, an ambitious transcendental 
argument cannot simply argue that we need certain concepts or beliefs to represent the 
world. It has to argue that there is a world to which such concepts and beliefs 
correspond. Accordingly, Strawson’s ambitious interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction holds that a necessary condition for self-consciousness is that concepts of the 
understanding apply or correspond to mind-independent objects.  
Despite their claim to being self-standing and presuppositionless, what 
transcendental arguments purport to do goes far beyond the simple structure of the 
argument. At closer inspection, these arguments are very peculiar. First of all, they 
involve an inference from facts about our mental life to facts about reality, in the case of 
the example above, from self-consciousness to external reality. Secondly, the modalized 
premise connects these facts by necessity: it is necessary that mind-independent objects 
exist if self-consciousness is possible. Yet it is not clear how such an inference from 
facts about us to facts about reality is maintained. What allows us to bridge the gap 
between two very different kinds of facts? Appealing to necessity as bridging this gap is 
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not any less problematic. What is the nature of this necessity that purports to serve as a 
bridge between our experiences to what exceeds these experiences?  
 Barry Stroud has raised compelling criticisms against transcendental arguments 
along these lines, which have set a standard for transcendental arguments in 
epistemology  (Stroud 1968). Stroud’s critique has dialectical force, because it confronts 
ambitious transcendental arguments with an irresolvable dilemma. According to Stroud, 
first, the inference from facts about us to facts about reality is unwarranted. Second, a 
satisfactory account of the source of necessity crucial to transcendental arguments is 
lacking. Third, ambitious transcendental arguments, in order to resolve their inherent 
tensions, must rely on verificationism or idealism. Once this implicit reliance has been 
exhibited, transcendental arguments become redundant, as it is a commitment to 
verificationism or idealism that does the anti-skeptical work. The dilemma can be put in 
the following way: either transcendental arguments depend on broader philosophical 
commitments for their force, or, given the problems associated with transcendental 
necessity, the most that these arguments can accomplish is that they can tell us merely 
how we must think or believe.20 The former renders these arguments superfluous, 
because it is the broader philosophical commitments that do the anti-skeptical work; and 
the latter fails to accomplish the goal of ambitious transcendental arguments in falling 
short of establishing that the thoughts and beliefs in question are true (Strawson 1985, 
10). In what follows, I will address each criticism in turn.  
Let me begin with the first criticism. As we have seen, Strawson claims that 
self-conscious experience requires the fulfillment of a strong objectivity condition, 
namely, that our objectivity-concepts correspond to objects in mind-independent reality. 
Such a claim moves from psychological facts about us to non-psychological facts about 
                                                
20  In Skepticism and Naturalism, Strawson accepts that Stroud’s dilemma cannot be 
circumvented unless we modify that goal of ambitious transcendental arguments (1985, 
10).  
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reality. It does so by suggesting that the actual existence of objects places constraints on 
what can count as self-conscious experience. For Stroud, as we have seen, this 
constitutes an unwarranted inference from facts about us to facts about reality. We can 
see why this inference is troubled if we imagine a weaker objectivity requirement than 
the one envisaged by Strawson. If consciousness were in a position to generate 
objectivity on its own,21 all necessary conditions would remain within the ambit of our 
experience and thus could be justified without involving extra-mental points of 
reference. In other words, this account of objectivity would not require us to take the 
problematic step from psychological facts about us to non-psychological ones about the 
world. At the same time, however, objectivity would be a phenomenon without the 
desired relation to a mind-independent domain that anti-skeptical transcendental 
arguments attempt to establish. 
If Strawson’s reading advanced a weaker objectivity condition, positing 
necessary conditions that remained within the ambit of our experience or beliefs, no 
such leap would have been made. It is the further step of basing the exigencies of what 
we must believe on reality that turns out to be unwarranted. That we believe certain 
things about ourselves, and must believe in certain others about the world for their 
possibility, does not take us outside the scope of what beliefs or structures are necessary 
for experience, that is to say, it does not take us all the way to features of mind-
                                                
21   As for example Husserlian phenomenology may be said to claim. Husserl states that unlike 
Kant, who posits the existence of things in themselves, his own transcendental idealism “is 
nothing more than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of a system 
egological science, an explication of my ego as a subject of every possible cognition, and 
indeed with respect of every sense of what exists” (Husserl 1999, 86) and elsewhere states 
“If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely 
– nonsense” (Husserl 1999, 84). Connecting the first remark with the second, Husserl’s 
phenomenology brackets the existence of objects in order to study the structure of 
consciousness; consciousness, as Husserl sees it, can be studied without positing objects 
that are mind-independent.  
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independent reality. As Stroud puts it, after all, the undeterred skeptic “can always very 
plausibly insist that it is enough we believe that S is true, or it looks for all the world as 
if it is, but that S needn’t be true” (1968, 255). For this reason, self-conscious 
experience can be made possible with a lot less than what Strawson deems necessary; 
the requirement that we apply objectivity-concepts could be met without it being 
necessary that these concepts correspond to anything in reality.22 If we can provide 
something weaker to explain the possibility of self-conscious experience (the 
application of objectivity-concepts), it is not clear why we should appeal to anything 
further (the actuality of such objects).  
We can express this concern with an unwarranted inference from facts about us 
to facts about reality by looking at the modality of transcendental arguments. 
Transcendental arguments claim that a certain condition is necessary for the possibility 
of a trivial, generally accepted, fact about our mental life, that, in the case above, 
experience of objects is necessary for the possibility of self-consciousness. From the 
necessity of the experience of objects for our mental life, ambitious transcendental 
arguments argue that such objects must exist. However, while it may be a priori true 
that self-consciousness requires the existence of objects, this argument does not show a 
priori that such objects exist. In Stroud's words: “It would seem that we must find, and 
cross, a bridge of necessity from the one to the other. That would be a truly remarkable 
feat, and some convincing explanation would surely be needed of how the whole thing 
is possible” (1994, 234; quoted by Stern 2000, 61 fn23). While arguing that certain 
features are necessary for the intelligibility of our experience may be acceptable, the 
                                                
22   Stroud gives the example of Strawson’s argument that objects continue to exist 
unperceived. As Stroud argues, our representational system may give us the ability to 
identify and reidentify objects; but this does not allow us to conclude that objects really 
continue unperceived (1968, 245-7). This objection extends to transcendental arguments of 
different kinds that aim to establish the existence or reality of X.  
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inferential leap that such features necessarily exist in mind-independent reality remains 
problematic. We, in other words, seem to make a claim from the necessity of our beliefs 
to a stronger necessity concerning the existence of what we believe – a move, one could 
say, from the doxastic to the metaphysical. Kant is able to circumvent this challenge, 
thanks to transcendental idealism, which remains within the ambit of “facts about us,” 
given that reality is constituted by us. 
This leaves us with the question of the kind of necessity that transcendental 
arguments involve. We will see that pinpointing and characterizing this necessity it is 
not entirely straightforward. The necessary conditions of transcendental arguments are 
not causal or natural.23 Instead of causal conditions, we refer to enabling conditions, 
which are a priori, and not, as in the case of causal and natural conditions derived from 
empirical observation, a posteriori. At the same time, rejecting necessary conditions 
posited by transcendental arguments does not result in logical contradiction, so the 
necessity involved in transcendental arguments is not logical either. Commonly, the 
necessity of transcendental arguments is conceived as metaphysical. A metaphysical 
necessity would be one which attempts to say something about the real nature of a given 
phenomenon or entity. It gives us necessary truths, for instance,  “nothing can be red 
and green all over,” “nothing can be in two different places at once.”24  
                                                
23 ”Of course we are familiar with the unremarkable fact that certain non-psychological things 
must be so in order for us to think and experience things as we do. We know that our brains 
and sense-organs must function appropriately, and that the things around us must have 
certain characteristics and must affect us in certain ways, if we are going to enjoy anything 
like human thought and experience as it is. But in those thoughts the ‘must’ is a causal 
‘must’, and it is known to hold, if it does, by empirical investigation. What is striking about 
the Kantian enterprise is that discoveries of apparently non-psychological conditions of 
thought are to be made purely a priori, independently of all experience” (Stroud 1994, 
232). 
24  Examples from Stern 2000, 59. A further distinction between de re and de dicto modality 
can be made, the former giving us modality that is language-independent and attaches to 
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How are metaphysical necessities established? Here the anti-skeptical 
framework of transcendental arguments poses a difficulty. If we claim to have modal 
intuitions that are metaphysically charged, that is to say, intuitions about the real nature 
of the world or external objects, we would stand accused of begging the question 
against the skeptic. In order for our transcendental argument to be satisfying it must rest 
on grounds that are less “epistemologically problematic” than what the skeptic doubts 
(Stern 2000, 59). For if the skeptic doubts our knowledge of the external world, the 
skeptic is just as likely to doubt strong modal intuitions that tell us something about 
reality by attempting to bridge the gap between experience and reality.  
Another option is to view the necessity operative in the inference as conceptual. 
Conceptual necessity does not concern the nature of reality; it gives us necessities by 
virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. Analytic truths such as “all bachelors are 
unmarried men” and “the moon is a satellite” involve conceptual necessity insofar as the 
term “bachelor” and “moon” are conceptually bounded up with “unmarried men” and 
“satellite” respectively. Denying that that bachelors are unmarried men or the moon is a 
satellite would contradict the concept of bachelor and moon respectively. But, as 
Gardner puts it, the necessity involved in the transcendental arguments is not conceptual 
(1999, 122). A transcendental argument, which involves conceptual necessity, would 
tell us, for instance, that the concept of self-consciousness necessarily involves the 
concept of external world objects, such that a denial of external world objects would 
consist of a contradiction in the concept of self-consciousness. Strawson, additionally, 
would deny such a move given that, as we have seen, he is aiming to fulfill the strong 
                                                                                                                                          
objects and the latter giving us modality that concerns our statements about objects. The 
anti-skeptical position of ambitious transcendental arguments, however, suggests that we 
are concerned not with statements about the external world, but the nature and existence of 
the external world as such, and therefore not with de dicto necessity but with de re 
necessity. 
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objectivity requirement: it is not only that we need to conceptually distinguish between 
“my experience” and “not my experience” to have self-consciousness, it is that the 
objects that belong under “not my experience” must actually be real, i.e., 
ontologically/metaphysically. In their ambitious formulation, transcendental arguments 
are not about conceptual necessity, but about proving the ontological point that external 
objects exist.25 
The notion of transcendental necessity does not suggest that the denial of 
necessary conditions implies logical or conceptual contradiction (analytic contradiction, 
because the subject concept should be contained in the predicate but is not contained in 
it), but that a denial is in some sense inconceivable. Appealing to inconceivability, to 
take our example, would suggest that self-consciousness is inconceivable without the 
existence of external objects. However, the notion of inconceivability fails to supply the 
strong necessity transcendental arguments must rest on in order to refute skepticism. 
After all, if we take inconceivability as a guide to necessity, what we take to be 
necessary could simply point to the limits of our understanding or of our ability to make 
our experience intelligible to ourselves (Stern 2000). Therefore, taking our “conceptual, 
representational, or experiential limitations” as a guide to necessity would be too weak 
to satisfy the Cartesian skeptic who argues that appealing to our conceptual limitations 
as requiring that external objects exist does not actually prove that such objects exist, 
merely that we must believe or assume that such objects exist (Stern 2000, 8). 
Additionally, if we did take inconceivability as a guide to necessity, arguing that 
external objects exist, because we cannot conceive of their inexistence, we would 
collapse once again into an unwarranted inference to reality: a leap, as seen above, from 
facts about us – in this case, the limits of our imagination – to facts about reality.  
                                                
25 Modest transcendental arguments that arguably remain within the conceptual ambit also 
end up making ontological leaps as we will see in what follows. 
 39 
Given the uncertain account of necessity that transcendental arguments seem to 
supply, the gap between facts about us and facts about reality cannot be spanned in a 
way that is acceptable to the skeptic. As I have mentioned above, Stroud points out that 
we need further background commitments, either to verificationism or idealism, to 
allow us to bridge the gap (1968, 251). Verificationism is a theory according to which a 
statement is meaningful only if it can be confirmed or disconfirmed through certain 
procedures (e.g., sensory evidence). The verificationist principle prevents a gap between 
how things appear to us and how things are from arising, because so long as how things 
appear to us can be confirmed by certain procedures, we have no grounds to doubt that 
they are not as they appear. If the verificationist principle is true, then skepticism is 
false, because what the skeptic denies, for example the existence of the external world, 
can be confirmed through, for example, sensory evidence (Stroud 1968, 247). Given 
their claim of being independent of philosophical background commitments, 
transcendental arguments aim to provide self-standing refutations of skepticism. 
However, if the success of transcendental arguments depends on the verificationist 
principle, the latter is enough to dissolve skepticism, making a transcendental argument 
to the same ends unnecessary. Similarly, according to transcendental idealism, in 
making claims about empirical reality, which is constituted by us, we are not making 
any unwarranted inferences from facts about us to facts about reality that is completely 
independent of us. Thus, if transcendental idealism is assumed, the problematic 
inference addressed above can be circumvented. However, as Stroud urges, such 
philosophical commitments would render transcendental arguments superfluous (1968, 
247, 256). Transcendental arguments would no longer be stand-alone arguments that 
can refute skepticism on the strength of their deductive force. They would require a 
commitment to idealism in order to hold up, in which case it would be this commitment 
that would do the real anti-skeptical work. Advancing a transcendental argument to the 
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same ends would, therefore, be redundant. 
Let us consider idealism in more detail because of its immediate relation with 
the transcendental. If idealist commitments are sufficient in their own right to dissolve 
skepticism, it is unclear why we should be required to give an additional argument 
based on questionable modal intuitions. Moreover, transcendental idealism itself has 
been characterized as skeptical in various ways, dissolving the gap between appearance 
and reality, treating talk of mind-independent reality as “elaborate appearance-talk” 
(Williams 1991, 20; quoted also in Stern 2000, 49 fn10). As has been pointed out by 
Gardner, Kant’s transcendental idealism “acknowledges and incorporates the truth of 
skepticism, namely that things in themselves are inaccessible to us” (Gardner 1999, 
195). More broadly, Kant certainly does not attempt a refutation of skepticism by 
accepting the skeptic’s conception of mind and world, and proving that there are objects 
in just such a world (presumably a transcendental realist conception). Instead, Kant’s 
metaphysics, which exceeds stand-alone transcendental arguments, modifies what is 
meant by appearance and reality, and any response he offers against skepticism turns on 
his modification of these notions.26 If a skeptic accepts the modification of these 
concepts, a transcendental argument to the same ends becomes unnecessary.27 
 
3. Kant and Ambitious Transcendental Arguments 
We have seen that ambitious transcendental arguments run aground for a number of 
                                                
26 Strawson’s reading of Kant can be conceived as an argument against Berkeleian idealism. 
Whether Kant’s transcendental deduction interpreted progressively succeeds or fails in 
light of Berkeleyian idealism is not entirely clear. Perhaps even under the framework of 
transcendental idealism, Kant cannot justifiably deduce features of empirical reality, that 
external objects exist; all he may be able to show is that we must believe, for our notion of 
self-consciousness to be intelligible, that such objects exist. 
27 I will return to the question as to whether transcendental arguments in general are 
committed to transcendental idealism in Chapter 3 and 4.  
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reasons. As transcendental arguments originate in an interpretation of Kant, it is worth 
asking whether Kant actually advocates the anti-skeptical strategy embodied by them. 
Of course, there is no immediate reason to remain loyal to the Kantian program. 
However, because of their Kantian background, it makes sense to examine whether anti-
skeptical arguments in modus ponens form can actually be attributed to Kant. If not, as I 
want to show in this section, this would compound the difficulties for ambitious 
transcendental arguments from an exegetical point of view.  
Stroud’s influential criticism of transcendental arguments is uncritically directed 
at Strawson’s reading of Kant. Therefore, Stroud takes Kant himself to account for the 
objective validity of his concepts by attempting to show that the categories relate to 
objects in external reality (Stroud 1968, 241-2). The latter is a strong objectivity 
requirement, like the one Cassam and Stroud attribute to Strawson’s ambitious 
transcendental arguments. As Stroud puts it: “I have taken this [objective validity] to 
mean that the concept ‘x’ has objective validity only if there are x’s and that 
demonstrating the objective validity of the concept is tantamount to demonstrating that 
x’s actually exist” (1968, 256). In this way, Stroud sees Kant as giving “a complete 
answer to the skeptic about the existence of things outside us” (1968, 242). For Stroud, 
then, in answering the question of the legitimacy of the use of our concepts, Kant is 
essentially justifying our knowledge of the external world, an argument, if we follow 
Strawson’s analytic Kant, that can be advanced without modifying the sense of the 
crucial terms (objective validity, external world) under a transcendental idealist 
framework. Stroud criticizes Kant for these bold claims as if these terms still had the 
dogmatic metaphysical meaning that Kant militated against in the first Critique. 
But this analytic interpretation, advanced by Strawson first and taken up by 
Stroud afterwards, has not gone uncontested (Allison 2004, Glock 2003). For example, 
Strawson objects that Kant reduces both the mental and the material to appearance and 
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is, therefore, unable to differentiate his transcendental idealism from Berkeleian 
idealism (Strawson 1966). On a more sympathetic, textually well-founded, reading, 
Kant’s Aesthetic is largely a response to Berkeley. Among other arguments, for Kant, 
Berkeley’s treatment of space as an empirical representation – an appearance – is 
problematic, precisely because it undermines the reality of our experiences. Contrary to 
Berkeley’s position that space is an empirical representation, Kant argues that space is 
an a priori form of intuition; that is, instead of an appearance, space is the very form in 
which anything can appear. By maintaining a distinction between the a priori forms of 
intuition and appearances, Kant is able to introduce a qualified conception of mind-
independence (Allison 2004). Kant’s empirical realism does not extend to things as they 
are in themselves, but things as they are constituted by us. Thus Kant attempts to 
negotiate the traditional dichotomy between empirical idealism and metaphysical 
realism by a third route: objects depend on universal subjective constitution – the forms 
of sensibility and the categories.  They are independent of us precisely in this sense, 
namely, through their dependence on fixed conditions, which do not depend on a 
subject’s particular states of awareness. Furthermore since Kant advocates the view that 
“appearances are grounded in thing in themselves,” he maintains an idealism with 
regards to how objects are constituted, but not with regards to the existence of objects 
(Gardner 1999, 177). In this sense, Kant does not renounce transcendental realism by 
arguing that there are no objects independent of our experience per se, but that 
transcendental realism is mistaken in taking our forms of sensibility and our conceptual 
framework to give us unconditioned features of reality. As Ameriks points out, in this 
way, Kant “undercuts not the reality of our experience itself but only the extravagant 
claim of a certain kind of interpretive inference beyond it” (2003, 39).  
Interpreting the Transcendental Deduction as proving the existence of objects, 
Strawson and Stroud turn the latter claim on its head. At the core of these readings is a 
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separation of Kant’s argument from his philosophical program. Examining Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction within the transcendental idealist framework, however, yields 
a different picture. As we saw, it is not enough to consider that we factually use certain 
concepts, those are quid facti questions. What Kant wanted to show us is that concepts 
of the understanding are legitimately applied to intuitions, by arguing that they are 
necessary in any experience of the world; this is a regressive reading of the 
Transcendental Deduction, but it is also more aligned with Kant’s Copernican Turn, 
namely, the view that we cannot have a priori knowledge of things in themselves, but 
only of how we constitute reality. In fact, as Glock has pointed out, insofar as the 
Critique as a whole is concerned, Kant’s principal target is neither Humean nor 
Cartesian skepticism, but “the more sensible skeptic who challenges the possibility of 
metaphysical knowledge, of a priori insights into the essence of reality,” a response to 
whom rests on more than anti-skeptical arguments (Glock 2003, 22). Glock holds 
Stroud responsible for the anti-skeptical fixation of the discussion around transcendental 
arguments. He attributes this fixation to a single-mindedly epistemological reception 
even of Strawson’s interpretation, an interpretation which Glock contests (Glock 2003, 
22). However, Strawson’s generally epistemological reading of the Critique, and his 
claim that transcendental arguments can supply proof of mind-independent reality, 
obviously invites an anti-skeptical reading. This reading simply follows out the 
consequences of Strawson’s selective interpretation of Kant according to which 
transcendental arguments can be excised from what Strawson and others after him take 
to be Kant’s dubious philosophical commitments, specifically transcendental 
psychology and transcendental idealism.28 Without the scaffolding of transcendental 
idealism, we get a remarkably different picture of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and 
                                                
28 Strawson views Kant’s transcendental psychology as “imaginary,” since in his view it is 
impossible to verify (1966, 57). 
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the systematic concerns it reflects. Most important of all, instead of mind-independence 
in Kant’s qualified sense of empirical realism, we are led to misunderstand Kant’s 
transcendental project as an attempt to deduce objects in a full-blown, unconditioned, 
ontological sense from the slender premise of self-conscious experience.  
 
4. Prospects for Modest Transcendental Arguments 
The anti-skeptical ambitions of transcendental arguments ultimately fail for three 
fundamental reasons. First, ambitious transcendental arguments uphold unwarranted 
inferences from facts about us to facts about reality. Second, they are unable to account 
for the kind of necessity that connects the premises of transcendental arguments. 
Metaphysical necessity turns out to be too strong to convince the skeptic and weaker 
necessity, understood in terms of inconceivability, proves to be too weak. Third, it may 
seem that the unwarranted inference to reality combined with a problematic notion of 
necessity can be resolved if transcendental arguments are advanced under an idealist 
framework; yet, if the skeptic accepts idealism, the transcendental argument becomes 
superfluous. Beyond this, we have seen some indications that Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy has systematic commitments that make it unlikely that Kant ever intended it 
as a straight refutation of Cartesian skepticism by means of transcendental arguments. A 
reassessment of transcendental arguments would have to respond to these difficulties.  
We can fundamentally think of two kinds of response. One option would be to 
abandon transcendental arguments in the sense of modus ponens refutations of 
skepticism altogether. Another option would be to keep the notion of a modus ponens 
argument and change the kind of skepticism against which transcendental arguments are 
directed (Stern 1999; Stroud 1994, 1999). Proponents of modest transcendental 
arguments go for the second option, contending that such arguments can give us 
necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, which do not exceed the domain 
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of experience or belief because they do not involve an inference to reality. Such an 
argument would not reach far enough to defeat a Cartesian skeptic, but could, for 
instance, “refute a radical conventionalism” along Humean lines, which holds that the 
necessity of our concepts is not grounded in reality, but in habit or custom, that is, on 
social convention (Stroud 1968, 256). Thus it makes sense to reevaluate transcendental 
arguments in accordance with their directedness. 
According to Cassam, ambitious transcendental arguments present a deductive 
argument that is world-directed: “They start with the assumption that there is thought or 
experience of some particular kind, and argue for thought or experience of this kind to 
be possible, the world in which these thoughts or experiences occur must be a certain 
way” (1999, 83). As we saw in some detail, these arguments take as their 
uncontroversial premise an aspect of our experience in order to deduce certain features 
of reality. So as to circumvent the tripartite Stroudian criticism against them, we have to 
exchange world-directed ambitious transcendental arguments for self-directed modest 
transcendental arguments (Stern 2000, 10-11). Self-directed transcendental arguments 
take as their uncontroversial premise a feature of our experience in order to deduce the 
necessary conditions “in the thinking or knowing self” (Cassam 1999, 85). In other 
words, they show that certain concepts or doxastic commitments must be in place for 
the possibility of, for instance, experience or self-consciousness. They do not, thereby, 
involve commitments to the truth of these conditions in metaphysical reality. The 
assumption is that they bypass the charge of inference to reality and the problem of 
necessity by dropping precisely these commitments.29  
                                                
29 A modest reading of the Transcendental Deduction would see it as a regressive argument. 
We have already examined the progressive, or ambitious, reading of the transcendental 
deduction, which starts with self-consciousness or the categories to make claims about the 
external world. The regressive interpretation, by contrast, would begin with the fact of our 
knowledge of the external world from which we infer certain necessary features of the 
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How do modest variations of transcendental arguments circumvent the 
challenges outlined above? In what follows, I will contend that merely changing the 
direction of such arguments does not render them immune to Stroud’s initial criticisms. 
However, before I advance my challenge, let us examine one anti-skeptical use of a 
modest transcendental argument that has been suggested in the recent literature: Stern’s 
argument against local justificatory skepticism.30 To begin with, Stern holds that no 
argument, including transcendental arguments, can furnish a satisfactory response to 
Cartesian skepticism. Such skepticism targets knowledge by making certainty necessary 
for our knowledge claims. That is, alongside justified and true, a belief must also be 
error-proof in order to count as knowledge. This is virtually impossible to achieve for 
any kind of knowledge. However, the impossible demand that appears to be the strength 
of this skeptical position is, according to Stern, its weakness. Conceding this victory to 
the Cartesian skeptic who, by taking certainty as a condition for knowledge, does not 
permit the mere possibility of doubt, leaves us “with little sense of loss,” because we 
can retain the conception of knowledge even if we cannot guarantee certainty (Stern 
2000, 16). Stern argues “that there is a weaker sense of ‘knowledge’ for us to fall back 
on, involving less than certainty” (2000, 17). In other words, we can claim that we do 
not have certainty, so our beliefs are not infallible, but we still have justified beliefs.  
Stern thinks in light of this that it is a local skeptic about justification who can be a 
reasonable target for transcendental arguments. A local skeptic about justification would 
                                                                                                                                          
mind, namely, the categories. In this way, Kant “[traces] synthetic a priori knowledge back 
to its "original germs" or "sources" in the human mind (CPR A97, A786, Ameriks 2003, 
53). 
30 Sacks rightly points out that Stern’s contrast between justificatory skepticism and epistemic 
skepticism is confusing. “Instead of contrasting justificatory and epistemic skepticism, it 
might have been more perspicuous to present the contrast as between doxastic and 
epistemic skepticism. It is the skeptic about the justification specifically of beliefs, i.e., the 
doxastic skeptic, who is the proper target here, as distinct from the skeptic about the 
justification of knowledge claims, the epistemic skeptic” (Sacks 1999, 72).   
 47 
argue, for instance, that certain beliefs (concerning the external world or other minds, 
for instance) are not licensed by the ordinary doxastic norms we employ to justify 
beliefs (induction, perception, memory etc.). In response, Stern offers a transcendental 
argument that takes a notion of perception, which gives us direct non-inferential 
grounds for belief, as its trivial starting point and concludes that we would not have the 
sort of experiences the skeptic must grant if we did not have the sorts of experiences the 
skeptic denies. Such an argument does not need to prove the existence of anything; it 
only has to show us that we can extend our doxastic norms to a set of beliefs the skeptic 
thinks are not licensed by such norms.  
The question is whether Stern’s modest transcendental argument can bypass the 
criticisms advanced against ambitious transcendental arguments. We saw that ambitious 
transcendental arguments run aground because they make unwarranted inferences to 
reality, involving a notion of necessity, which is unworkable given the anti-skeptical 
context. Strawson’s view that the existence of external objects is required for the 
possibility of self-consciousness involves strong necessity as it posits something 
exterior to the mind as placing a constraint on belief or experience. Strong, that is, 
metaphysical necessity was crucial to the ambitious anti-skeptical argument, and 
ultimately its downfall, because it was thought to allow us to draw an inference from the 
fact of self-consciousness to objects outside us. Additionally, once the tacit notion of 
necessity is made explicit, the skeptic is free to reject, as we saw, those conceptions of 
necessity that would make the argument anti-skeptical. In the different context of 
modest transcendental arguments, no inference is made from facts about us to facts 
about reality. As these arguments are self-directed, or in the case of Stern, belief-
directed, they do not exceed the scope of our mental life. Stern’s attempt at refuting the 
skeptic sees justification not as a matter of external, but of internal fit.31 In other words, 
                                                
31 I am using Sacks’ phrasing (Sacks 1999, 71). 
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we could get the world wrong by thinking that perception gives us warrant for belief in 
other minds; yet what we want to protect by means of our modest transcendental 
argument, justification, is not about whether other minds exist, but about whether we 
are applying our standards of justification correctly (Sacks 1999, 71).  
The question is whether such arguments operate on a more palatable conception 
of necessity. The only alternative conception of necessity that Stern advances, 
subsequent to his evaluation of the problematic conceptions of necessity at work in 
ambitious transcendental argument, is what he terms “indispensability.”32 Although 
Stern does not explain why he chooses to refer to necessity as indispensability, such a 
shift in terminology can be understood as an attempt to distance the modest account 
from problematic conceptions of necessity. We saw above that transcendental necessity 
is neither logical nor conceptual, but perhaps best characterized as metaphysical, even if 
such a characterization is problematic. That is, the necessity invoked by transcendental 
arguments seems to appeal to the nature of phenomena, not just to the concept of 
phenomena, for instance. We also saw that metaphysical necessity poses problems 
given the anti-skeptical framework of transcendental arguments, since the skeptic could 
deny that we could have modal intuitions about the essence of reality. If Stern’s 
conception of indispensability is to succeed, it must present us with an account of 
necessity that is more suitable, i.e., builds on modal intuitions the skeptic finds easier to 
accept, than the types of necessity we have seen above.  
Indispensability, according to Stern, is conceptual, absolute and universal (2000, 
81). It is conceptual and not psychological, that is, indispensability involves a priori 
conceptual investigation and is not the result of empirical investigation. On Stern’s 
                                                
32  Apart from Stern, Charles Taylor refers to the necessity operative in transcendental 
arguments as “indispensability” – according to his understanding, transcendental arguments 
consist of chains of indispensability claims, where he defines indispensability as apodictic, 
certain, and self-evident (Taylor 1979, 159). 
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understanding, conceptual necessity is not distinguished from metaphysical necessity, as 
on his view concepts pick out features of reality. As Stern points out, statements such as 
“nothing can be red and green all over” may be said to exhibit necessity on both 
metaphysical and conceptual grounds (2000, 9). This theoretical choice has implications 
for his understanding of indispensability. He treats indispensability as absolute instead 
of merely methodological. Our methods are contingent: they could be a certain way, but 
they could also be otherwise. As to Stern our concepts are metaphysically charged, 
indispensability is not the result of a pragmatic decision, or a consequence of practical 
exigencies to do with how we carry on, but rather a “constraint on belief or thought as 
such.”33 That is, even though our concern is with self-directed transcendental arguments, 
absolute indispensability is not contextual or indexed in any way. Relatedly, Stern’s 
indispensability is universal, applying to all believers or thinkers. Universality comes 
out of the fact that such indispensability goes to what is at the core of having a thought 
or belief at all, beyond merely psychological or methodological constraints. Given these 
features – a priori, conceptual, absolute, and universal – indispensability gives us strong 
constraints. These constraints, it is safe to say, are fixed and non-contingent since as a 
priori and absolute, they are beyond mutability of the kind that might be possible with 
regards to conditions which are psychological, natural, or methodological/practical.  
If indispensability is the notion of necessity that emerges in modest 
transcendental accounts, it is not entirely clear why it should be considered any less 
problematic. Perhaps the assumption is that modal claims about “reality” or “world” 
paradigmatic of ambitious transcendental accounts are more problematic than modal 
claims about “mind” or “belief” that modest transcendental arguments advance. 
However, such a position is worth contesting: why are modal claims about ourselves 
                                                
33  Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction would be an absolute indispensability “for 
anyone who wishes to say or think something meaningful” (Stern 2000, 82). 
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more tenable than modal claims about reality? Stern himself questions Stroud’s 
position, which suggests that modal intuitions about the self are less problematic than 
modal intuitions about the world (Stern 2000). The assumption guiding Stroud’s picture, 
according to Stern, turns on the notion that self-knowledge is somehow privileged, 
immediate, self-evident, or infallible (traditional criteria for epistemological certainty) 
in a way that knowledge of the world is not. Even if this is granted, however, 
transcendental arguments that are self-directed establish modal connections between, 
say, mental states or between beliefs. If self-knowledge is conceived as immediate, self-
evident, and thus as certain, the same need not be the case with the modal claims of self-
directed transcendental arguments. That is to say, establishing the necessary dependency 
between features of our experience involves a modal claim beyond immediate first-
person experience. And this calls into question the notion that introspection does the 
fundamental work in self-directed transcendental arguments. Instead of introspection, it 
seems when advancing modest transcendental arguments we still primarily rely on the 
force of our modal intuitions. Without addressing what these modal intuitions are and 
whether they are justified, we cannot rest assured that self-directed transcendental 
arguments are any less problematic than world-directed transcendental arguments. For a 
modest transcendental argument to offer a genuine alternative to ambitious 
transcendental arguments it must advance a conception of modality that is 
metaphysically neutral; especially since such arguments are conceived as anti-skeptical, 
they cannot, as we saw, posit necessary conditions that are metaphysically charged 
without first convincing the skeptic of the metaphysical position they imply. The local 
skeptic about justification, in this case, has to first accept the notion of necessity on 
which transcendental arguments turn; otherwise, transcendental arguments illicitly bring 
in concepts the skeptic might reject whilst claiming to be sensitive to a common starting 
point.  
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So there is good reason to question what Stern's conception of indispensability 
boils down to. It is principally a constraint on thought or belief. This constraint is not 
external to thought or belief, given the modest reformulation of transcendental 
arguments, which places these constraints within the domain of facts about us in order 
to jettison the criticism that such constraints involve unwarranted inferences to reality. 
If Stern is offering constraints on thought or belief that are fixed in the manner in which 
he suggests, that is, qua transcendental they are not psychological, methodological, or 
relative, he must give an account of the source of these constraints. What gives them the 
resilience they possess? If they are indeed genuine alternatives to the metaphysically 
charged constraints we saw in the previous section, then they cannot, for instance, 
involve modal intuitions about reality. We could say that these constraints are grounded 
empirically; however, on Stern’s understanding, indispensability is a priori, a result of 
conceptual investigation in which any appeal to empirical or psychological facts or 
practices is excluded (Stern 2000, 83). Another option is to argue that these constraints 
are grounded in something transcendental. Yet, as Mark Sacks points out, “grounding 
transcendental constraints by appeal to further transcendental constraints only defers the 
question back a stage,” opening up a regress problem (2000, 203). Furthermore, for 
Stern, indispensability belongs to the “metaphysics of belief” and extends universally to 
any entity that can believe or think, “not just for those sufficiently like us” (Stern 2000, 
83). The beliefs or thoughts that are taken to be indispensable, then, have to do with the 
nature of belief or thought. As we have seen above, other candidates for the sources of 
indispensability are conceptual or logical. However, since Stern takes conceptual 
necessity as tantamount to metaphysical necessity, this only leaves logical necessity as a 
contender. But the transcendental conditions operative in modest transcendental 
arguments, like in any transcendental argument, do not embody logical necessity 
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because their negation does not imply contradiction.34  
Once these other possibilities are ruled out, and given that Stern’s constraints 
involve fixed and non-contingent constraints, it is difficult not to see these constraints as 
grounded in something problematically metaphysical. As Sacks puts it, modest 
transcendental constraints “cannot avoid claims to something that exists independently 
of merely contingent structuring, and which determines the limits of our empirical 
experience” (2000, 203). In raising indispensability claims that impose constraints on 
experiences or beliefs, modest transcendental arguments are minimally committed to the 
view that there is a unique way the self must be so that it generates the constraints it 
does. The reason metaphysical commitments are problematic in this context is because 
transcendental arguments claim to be presuppositionless, relying on nothing more than a 
slender premise, whether it is the fact of experience or self-consciousness. However, 
despite this claim, transcendental arguments seem to trade in metaphysically charged 
notions of necessity and end up making an inference from facts about us to the 
metaphysical nature of belief. Such arguments ultimately fail to satisfy the skeptic who 
questions whether we are indeed entitled to make strong modal claims given that these 
claims involve what the skeptic doubts, ultimately that there is a way the world/self 
(including doxastic structures) is. With regards to the local justificatory skeptic, it 
would be open for her to argue that this necessity is nothing more than methodological 
or natural, and Stern rules out that transcendental necessity (or indispensability) can 
embody either of these. Yet if weaker kinds of necessity can do precisely the same 
work, why should we opt for a stronger notion of necessity, which Stern seems to think 
                                                
34  In his Introduction Stern asks that we leave the question of necessity open. Unfortunately, 
apart from stipulating the problems with the use of necessity in ambitious transcendental 
arguments, and his own gesturing at a notion of indispensability, nowhere does Stern give a 
detailed explanation of what we are to understand by modest necessity especially with 
regards to conventional distinctions (natural/causal, logical, metaphysical). 
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is central to any transcendental claim? Why can we not say that the necessity that Stern 
describes can be adequately accounted for by our practices of justification so that 
nothing absolute or universal is in play? Modifying the directedness of transcendental 
arguments from world to self, for these reasons, does not get rid of metaphysical 
problems inherent in the modality of the second premise of transcendental arguments.  
 
Conclusion 
Transcendental arguments depend on several elements for their success. They are 
metaphysically charged in that they appeal to universal and unchanging features either 
of the world or of the self. It is these crucial features that are brought in with the second 
modalized premise and which stand in need of a philosophical explanation. Without 
such an explanation, transcendental arguments merely have the guise of starting with an 
uncontroversial premise in order to deduce a necessary condition. As we will see in 
future chapters, among other things, transcendental claims are bound up with a certain 
model of understanding concepts (the simple model of conceptual unity; Kuusela 2008), 
underhandedly assuming that the skeptic should share this way of understanding 
concepts; transcendental claims have a commitment to apriority which may entail 
transcendental idealism; and transcendental claims are committed to a form of 
universality that stands in need of defense. All of these, including the metaphysical 
commitments we have seen both with respect to ambitious and modest transcendental 
arguments, are full-blown philosophical commitments in their own right and so the view 
that transcendental arguments stand on their own, with no presuppositions, should be 
rightly rejected.  
In this chapter, I have presented two varieties of transcendental arguments, 
modest and ambitious. I have argued that both accounts fail to pay adequate attention to 
what transcendental claims actually provide, namely, claims couched in necessity, a 
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priority, and universality. In this chapter, I have focused on necessity. Overall, necessity 
turned out to be a major stumbling block for both, ambitious and modest transcendental 
arguments. Modest transcendental arguments latently rely on the view that modal 
claims regarding facts about us should be more metaphysically parsimonious than 
modal claims regarding facts about reality. This latent reliance could be shown to be 
ungrounded, for modest transcendental arguments face the same problems with 
modality, moving from beliefs to unchanging, metaphysical structures of the self, that 
ambitious transcendental arguments face, moving from facts about us to facts about 
external reality. If, in both cases, however, transcendental arguments tacitly owe their 
modal strength to an underlying metaphysical realism that is indefensible, we have to 
find ways to dissociate necessity, apriority, and universality from underlying 
metaphysical commitments. These problems, however, should not spell the end of 
transcendental arguments or claims altogether, but open the route to new conceptions of 
the transcendental, which do not fall into the same traps. It seems inescapable that 
transcendental arguments are bound up with complex commitments and thereby need 
more comprehensive background explanations than those contained in the logical form 
of deductive argument. Once it is acknowledged that the thorny and obscure notion of 
transcendental claims cannot be conceived narrowly or selectively, but requires more 
discussion of the broader philosophical program in which they are couched, the 
discussion unavoidably moves beyond refutations of skepticism that stand-alone, 
“presuppositionless,” transcendental arguments claim to embody. 
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Chapter 2 
Transcendental Universality and Apriority 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that recent discussions have largely restricted the 
scope of transcendental arguments to anti-skepticism. Both ambitious and modest 
transcendental arguments comprise an inference between psychological facts about us 
and non-psychological facts about reality and mind respectively. Further, the modality 
governing these problematic inferences stands in need of justification. In order for a 
transcendental account to serve anti-skeptical purposes, it must appeal to a notion of 
necessity that is acceptable to the skeptic. Given the dialectic of the skeptic and her 
interlocutor, the skeptic is free to reject a picture of necessity that “forces” her to an 
anti-skeptical conclusion. Attempts, as we saw, to justify a particular conception of 
necessity require that we step outside the stand-alone transcendental argument in order 
to offer a broader explanation, one that attempts to negotiate the notion of necessity 
with the skeptic. If, however, the transcendental argument depends on the skeptic's 
agreement with respect to broader philosophical commitments, the danger that Stroud 
points out emerges again: transcendental arguments become superfluous. Further, any 
anti-skeptical argument that appeals to a fixed and non-contingent reality (whether of 
mind or of world) is ultimately wedded to metaphysical realism (Sacks 2000), which 
undermines the status of transcendental arguments as self-standing and independent 
from background philosophical commitments.    
 The current chapter will examine the challenges that confront the notion of 
universality (and to some degree apriority) of transcendental arguments. Examining 
universality and apriority is all the more relevant because the contemporary 
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epistemological discussion focuses nearly exclusively on issues around necessity and 
largely neglects the universality to which these arguments lay claim. I will argue that in 
order to rescue transcendental claims from objections against universality the anti-
skeptical focus of transcendental arguments must be abandoned. Freed from their anti-
skeptical focus, the philosophical significance and potential of transcendental claims 
can be fully examined as can their utility for philosophical enterprises beyond 
epistemology.  
 To understand the full force of challenges directed at the notion of universality 
requires that we understand the tight relation between apriority, necessity and 
universality as well as how they furnish conditions of possibility. Therefore, in the first 
part of this chapter, I will recount the original formulation of the transcendental in 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, where the relation between necessity, universality and 
apriority comes into view. In the second part of this chapter, I will examine the most 
influential recent objection to Kant's universality, an argument advanced by Stephan 
Körner (1967). Körner argues that it is impossible to establish the singularity or 
uniqueness of a conceptual scheme as universally supplying the conditions for the 
possibility of experience. According to Körner, Kantian transcendental claims rest on 
the assumption that there is a unique conceptual scheme for knowledge; and he shows 
that, in the final analysis, this assumption cannot be defended. It cannot, in Körner's 
view, be ruled out that other conceptual schemes might take radically different 
conditions to be transcendental for experience than those envisaged by Kant, so that 
Kant’s transcendental claims cannot maintain their aspirations to exceptionless validity. 
In the final section, and by way of introducing the second part of this thesis, I will argue 
that the notion of universality and apriority operative in transcendental claims can be 
modified in such a way that meets this objection once they lose their anti-skeptical and 
metaphysical focus. 
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1. Kant’s Conception of the Transcendental 
Kant takes the transcendental to refer to what enables or furnishes the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of, variously, “experience,” “possible experience,” 
“cognition,” “objects of experience,” and “appearances” (Gardner 1999, 45). A 
transcendental condition is first and foremost a priori. A judgment that is a priori 
“establish[es] something about objects before they are given us” (CPR Bxvi) and is 
opposed to the a posteriori, a judgment “merely borrowed from experience” (CPR A2). 
However, not just any a priori judgment can count as transcendental: 
 
 I call a cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much 
with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects 
insofar as this is to be possible a priori (CPR A11/B25). 
 
And here I make a remark the import of which extends to all of 
the following considerations, and that we must keep well in view, 
namely that not every a priori cognition must be called 
transcendental, but that by means of which we cognize that and 
how certain representations (intuitions and concepts) are applied 
entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition 
or its use a priori). Hence neither space nor any geometrical 
determination of it a priori is a transcendental representation, but 
only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical 
origin at all and the possibility that they can nevertheless be 
related a priori to objects of experience can be called 
transcendental (CPR A56/B80-81).  
 58 
 
In the above, Kant makes the claim that a transcendental condition neither involves a 
posteriori knowledge (of objects) nor merely a priori knowledge, but the manner in 
which a priori cognition relates to objects of experience. In other words, transcendental 
conditions do not comprise a mere enumeration of a priori claims in general, but only 
those that have a particular relation to objects of experience. In the longer quote, Kant 
disambiguates between notion of spatial representation as a priori, from the notion of 
spatial representation as a priori and transcendental. Spatial representations conceived 
as a priori are not transcendental; rather it is the non-empirical origin of such 
representations alongside their relation to objects of experience that grants them the 
status of transcendental. The foregoing gives us two defining features of a 
transcendental condition: 
 
1)  c is a transcendental condition if and only if c has a non-empirical (a 
priori) origin.  
2)  c is a transcendental condition if and only if c gives us the mode of our 
relation to objects of experience  
 
 Let us turn to 1), the non-empirical genesis of transcendental conditions. For 
Kant, a priori judgments that are transcendental are not merely those “that occur 
independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely 
independently of all experience” (CPR B2). This rules out not only any a posteriori 
judgment, but also judgments in which empirical experience in intermixed. 
Consequently, any consideration that we might carry out independently of experience, 
but which is nonetheless derived from empirical sources, does not count as pure a 
priori. For instance, the rule “bodies are heavy and hence fall if their support is taken 
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away” is derived from experiences by inductive generalization (CPR B2). A judgment 
involving the application of this rule will not count as a priori in the pure sense, due to 
its source in empirical experience. Therefore, since only the pure a priori can count as 
transcendental, any such generalization is ruled out from the domain of the 
transcendental. 
 The genesis of the a priori is crucial to Kant’s broader transcendental idealist 
project. Kant takes the a priori to comprise not only that which is independent of 
empirical experience, but also that which has its genesis “in us”. He treats the notion of 
the a priori as belonging wholly to our subjective constitution so that his position 
advocates a qualified kind of idealism (Strawson 1966). In the preceding paragraph we 
saw that Kant excludes the possibility of rule-like generalizations from the pure a priori. 
He thereby suggests that since experiential content cannot be allowed, even as a general 
rule, a priority must be furnished entirely by us. If we factor in the a priori as belonging 
to our own subjective constitution, transcendental claims are always in some sense 
committed to a qualified kind of idealism.  
Let us now turn to 2). Despite the genesis of apriority in us, Kant argues that the 
a priori is nonetheless related to objects of experience, that is, the a priori furnishes the 
mode of our relation to objects. This makes clear that the a priori, while independent in 
from experience in its origin, is nonetheless only given to us in experience. As Kant 
famously states, all cognition commences from experience, even though it does not 
originate, or have its source, in experience (CPR B1). For Kant, cognition is something 
composite, consisting of what we receive through impressions and what the 
understanding “provides out of itself,” i.e., concepts/unity of apperception (CPR B2). 
Since the a priori is free of any empirical content, it concerns only the form of our 
experience, that is, the a priori intuitions of space and time and the categories of the 
understanding. This formal relation of the transcendental a priori to objects of 
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experience is to be distinguished from a causal relation – often understood as natural or 
empirical – or a definitional relation. The a priori intuition of space, for instance, does 
not cause appearances to show themselves to us, but is the form in which appearances 
are given to us; it constitutes appearances. Further, space is not included in the 
definition of, say, a triangle, but is the form that allows us to construct a figure. The 
mode in which space relates to objects of experience is that it furnishes the condition for 
the possibility of objects of experience; it enables objects of experiences by furnishing 
their form.35 
 What allows us to differentiate pure a priori judgments, which count as 
transcendental, from the rule-like a priori generalizations described above or from 
empirical experience more generally? Kant points to at least two ways in which we can 
determine that a judgment counts as pure a priori. The first is a method of abstraction, 
which takes off from experience. In order to show that space is an a priori form of 
intuition, we must abstract anything that is given to us by empirical experience, i.e., 
sensations, as well as anything supplied by the understanding, i.e., the categories. 
Consequently, if we abstract everything that the understanding supplies – substance, 
force, divisibility – or what is given in sensation – color, hardness etc. – we are left with 
the form of sensibility, extension (or space), which cannot be abstracted from 
experience of objects (CPR A20-21/B35).  
 That an a priori condition is necessary can be shown by abstractions of the kind 
just seen. These abstractions reveal structures, which are indispensable to experience in 
a particular way, namely, insofar as they make experience possible. The second way of 
                                                
35   It is important to point out that Kant distinguishes transcendental logic from general logic; 
whereas the former considers specifically “how thought about objects is possible,” formal 
logic considers “only the relations of thoughts to one another” (CPR A55/B79, Gardner 
1999, 125). According to Kant “Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience 
(in accordance with intuition and concepts) is possible” – that is to say, conditions of 
possibility give us the range of what is possible.  
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determining whether a judgment counts as a priori is to assess whether it is necessary 
and universal, given that a priori judgments are not accidental or contingent and are 
valid without exception. Necessity and universality, then, are criteria any judgment 
must possess if it is to count as a priori (CPR B4, Allison 2004, 94).  
 
3)  c is a transcendental condition if and only if it is necessary that c 
4)  c is a transcendental condition if and only if it is universal that c 
 
Beginning with 3), Kant gives the following characterization of necessity:  
 
Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted 
thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. First, then, if a 
proposition is thought along with its necessity, it is an a priori 
judgment; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition 
except one that in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it 
is absolutely a priori (CPR B3-4). 
 
This passage is a useful starting point for an examination of necessity in a priori 
judgements and, ultimately, transcendental conditions. In the above, Kant makes the 
familiar claim that experience, at best, can give us an inductive generalization in the 
form of a rule as seen above, with respect to the example “bodies are heavy and hence 
fall if their support is taken away.” However, inductive generalizations are too weak to 
provide us with necessity, because necessity gives us what must be the case, that is, 
what “could not be otherwise.”36 Basing our claims on inductive generalizations, we 
                                                
36  As we will see in Chapter 3, there is a connection between actuality or, 
phenomenologically, facticity – what is the case – and transcendental necessity, which is 
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could still imagine cases where, for whatever contingent reasons, a body did not fall 
once its foundation was undermined. Take, by contrast, the following example from 
arithmetic: “5 + 7= 12.” That the sum should result in 12 is not explicable in terms of 
generality, i.e., that 5 + 7 is generally 12, though it is conceivable that it is another 
number at particular instances; in the decimal system, the sum of 5 + 7 must of 
necessity be 12. With regards to the necessity of transcendental claims, Kant makes a 
comparable move. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, he argues that space is not taken to 
be a condition of experience as a generalization of experiences we have had so far; 
rather, space as the necessary form of experience belongs to experience essentially 
(CPR B4). For this reason, Kant takes space as an absolute, that is to say pure, a priori 
condition, not originating in experience, but in the way subjects constitute experience. 
The assumption here is, of course, that experience can never give us the strictness or 
absoluteness that certain judgments possess. This, for Kant, gives us reason to uphold a 
distinction between pure a priori and empirical judgments.  
 Turning to 4), the universality criterion for transcendental conditions, Kant 
explains: 
 
Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only 
assumed and comparative universality (through induction), so 
properly it must be said: as far as we have yet perceived, there is 
no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in 
strict universality, i.e., in a way that no exception at all is allowed 
to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather 
valid absolutely a priori (CPR B4).  
                                                                                                                                          
seldom recognized. As Mohanty remarks “If transcendental necessity means being 
presupposed by our experience’s being what it is in its most general features, one then 
recognizes that the transcendental is grounded in what is the case” (Mohanty 1985, 210).  
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In the above, Kant argues that universality, as a criterion for apriority, is not relativized 
to a set of observed cases. As exceptionless, it applies to any act of human cognition. A 
generalization like “bodies are heavy and hence fall if their support is taken away” boils 
down to the inductive claim that, insofar as we have observed, bodies fall if their 
foundations are undermined. Once again, the status of such a generalization stands in 
stark contrast to the universality of the mathematical statement: 5 + 7 = 12. We do not 
say that generally the sum results in 12, but that in every case of addition 5 + 7 must 
result in 12. However, we cannot universalize the statement 5 + 7 = 12 if we consider 
only a posteriori experience, since, as Kant sees it, the latter could never guarantee that 
something must hold in every case. Kant, therefore, places the source of universal 
cognition in us, as pure a priori.  
 We can sum up the significant features of a transcendental condition once more:  
 
1)  c is a transcendental condition if and only if c has a non-empirical 
origin (pure a priori)  
2)  c is a transcendental condition if and only if c gives us the mode of 
our relation to objects of experience (condition of possibility) 
3)  c is a transcendental condition (a priori) if and only if c is necessary. 
4)  c is a transcendental condition (a priori) if and only if c is universal.  
 
These considerations allow us to conclude that, as Kant sees it, any claim is 
transcendental if it is an a priori, necessary, and universal condition of possibility. 
Because these features are interdependent, successful objections to any of these features 
will yield a failure of the transcendental claim as a whole. If it can be shown that 
transcendental conditions are not universal, for instance, then transcendental conditions 
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will not be able to make claims to necessity or apriority either. The most central claim 
here is that a transcendental condition is pure a priori; necessity and universality are 
markers of the fixedness of the a priori conditions of experience, a changelessness that 
is tied to their non-empirical origin. 
 In order to highlight the strength of Kant’s claim, let us examine some of his 
remarks: 
 
For no cognition can contradict it [the principles of the 
Transcendental Analytic] without at the same time losing all 
content, i.e., all relation to any object, hence all truth (CPR A62-
63/B87). 
 
The understanding gives a priori to experience in general only the 
rule, in accordance with the subjective and formal conditions of 
sensibility as well as of apperception, which alone make it 
possible. Even were they possible, we could still not conceive of 
and make comprehensible other forms of intuition (than space and 
time) or other forms of understanding (than the discursive form of 
thinking, or that of cognition through concepts); and even if we 
could, they would still not belong to experience, as the sole 
cognition in which objects are given to us (CPR B283). 
 
In both passages Kant contends that contradicting or introducing alternatives to the pure 
forms of intuition and the categories would render our experience unintelligible.  While 
intelligibility is central, Kant’s claim is not merely that we must understand experience 
in this way, rather, it is necessary and universal that experience, in fact, is governed by 
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space and time as well as the categories (for any being that is a discursive and not a 
divine intellect). This is to say that any claim about experience must appeal to these 
same conditions, because these conditions actually enable possible experience. Kant 
advances this claim from the perspective of transcendental idealism, according to which 
we furnish the conditions of experience such that “[t]he a priori conditions of a possible 
experience in general are at the same time conditions of possibility of the objects of 
experience” (CPR A111). This suggests that, for Kant, transcendental conditions are not 
just one way in which we can make experience intelligible to ourselves. Transcendental 
conditions, instead, exhibit the actual and the only way in which we experience the 
world.  
 At this point, we can draw out further consequences of this picture. From Kant’s 
point of view, all experiences are shaped by the same conditions, because these 
conditions are necessary and universal. Apriority grants them security from change. Yet 
a precondition of such a picture is that the conceptual scheme in question be established 
as unique – as specifying conditions, which cannot be dispensed with because they 
cannot allow for alternatives. Because, as Kant remarks in the above, these conditions 
alone make experience comprehensible, universality and necessity rule out that there are 
alternatives to the conceptual scheme in question. In what follows, I will critically 
explore the uniqueness claim to which transcendental arguments are tacitly committed.  
 
2. The Universality Condition 
Is it possible to show that a certain condition must hold universally in the Kantian sense, 
in other words, that a set of conditions exceptionlessly reflects the true structure of 
experience? It could be argued that we just cannot imagine experience that does not 
involve, for example, the categories. Yet inconceivability does not entitle us to the claim 
that a certain condition extends to any possible experience. In other words, 
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inconceivability may entitle us to the claim that a certain concept is necessary and 
universal given where we stand, that is locally, but it does not entitle us to extend what 
is inconceivable for us to any act of experience or cognition globally. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, inconceivability might tell us about the limits of our imagination, 
instead of giving us metaphysical constraints. Deeming inconceivability to give us 
constraints of this kind would count as an unwarranted inferential leap from facts about 
our imagination and its limits to metaphysical reality, i.e., how the mind actually 
constitutes experience. According to Kant, the conditions of experience are facets of our 
mind; that is, as a priori, they belong “to the subjective, transcendental, object-enabling 
constitution of our mind” (Gardner 1999, 93). The conceptual scheme Kant advances, 
then, is necessary as a feature of the kind of intellect we are – and any transcendental 
condition, qua a priori, must originate in our own cognition, as its essential feature, 
without having an empirical genesis. One conceptual scheme, that is to say, is taken to 
reflect the structures involved in any possible experience. I will henceforth refer to the 
claim that a single conceptual scheme reflects experience necessarily and universally as 
a “uniqueness claim.” 
 Stephan Körner (1967) raises objections to precisely this claim to the uniqueness 
of one conceptual scheme as consisting of concepts that are irreplaceable conditions of 
experience, or uniquely give the conditions of experience. As Körner explains, Kant's 
conception of our experience of the external world is based on the idea that we should 
be able to “constitute” and “individuate” (by means of the categories and the pure 
intuitions of space and time, respectively) what we classify as objects of our experience.  
From this fact, Kant attempts to show that any possible experience must use this 
scheme. In his Transcendental Deduction, Kant supplies a “demonstration of the reasons 
why a particular conceptual scheme is not only in fact, but also necessarily, employed in 
differentiating a region of experience” (i.e., cognition) (Körner 1967, 318-319). While 
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showing that we employ a particular scheme might be uncontroversial, provided we 
describe the scheme accurately, it is the stronger claim that the scheme we describe is 
the scheme for any possible experience that raises questions.  How can it be shown that 
a certain conceptual scheme uniquely identifies the structures of experience so that 
alternative schemes are ruled out? Three options are available: we can compare the 
scheme with raw experience, other schemes, and the principles the statements of the 
scheme embody (Körner 1967, 320-321).37 I will address each option in turn. 
 Let us begin with the first option. We could try to establish the uniqueness of our 
scheme by comparing undifferentiated experience to our conceptual scheme, 
demonstrating that our scheme captures the true constitutive and individuating 
principles operative in undifferentiated experience. However, the criteria we employ to 
determine whether our conceptual scheme is “correct” with regards to undifferentiated 
experience would already presuppose precisely those principles on which our 
conceptual scheme is based, rendering the attempt circular. More importantly, the very 
notion of experience that is undifferentiated, if by the latter we mean pure empirical 
content that is not contaminated by concepts, but to which our concepts can be 
compared, is incoherent. In fact, this is a message that more recent literature on 
conceptual and non-conceptual content takes from Kant, (e.g., McDowell 1994). At the 
very least, the possibility of comparing our scheme to undifferentiated experience 
would require that we mount an argument in favour of undifferentiated experience first. 
Direct comparisons between undifferentiated, unschematized, experience, whatever that 
might be, and our conceptual scheme turn out to be a dead end. 
 Second, we could try to establish the uniqueness of our scheme by demonstrating 
that a particular conceptual scheme is uniquely necessary and universal in relation to 
other conceptual schemes. According to Körner, however, this approach would be self-
                                                
37  I expand on the options Körner examines more briefly. 
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defeating, since we would already grant that our conceptual scheme is not in fact 
unique, affirming that there are competitors to which it can be compared. For Kant, any 
such comparison is ruled out, because competitors are unintelligible; what they attempt 
to describe is incomprehensible and fails to exhibit any feature of experience. To begin 
with, in order to carry out a neutral comparison, we would need criteria that would 
specify what any scheme must satisfy to be a genuine scheme (Malpas, 1990, 237). 
Such criteria, however, would rest on our conceptual scheme, thus rendering our effort 
question-begging (Malpas 1990, 237). If we take the criteria of another scheme, then we 
admit competitors and therefore lose our claim to uniqueness. Further, putting these 
objections aside, an argument that is not considered by the discussion is that even if we 
could compare our scheme to others and prove that they are not genuinely unique, we 
could not rule out the possibility of still other conceptual schemes. For example, I may 
compare my scheme A, to your scheme B, and establish the superiority of my scheme, 
proving yours to be defective or parasitic. But I cannot from this comparison rule out 
the existence of other schemes C, D, E..., upon which, it might turn out, my scheme A is 
parasitic, leading to an infinite regress. The possibility of our scheme turning out to be 
defective or parasitic when confronted with still other schemes cannot be a priori 
foreclosed.  
 Eva Schaper (1972) has argued that Körner is misguided in assuming that any 
comparison counts as an acceptance of competitors. According to Schaper, we could 
compare alternative schemes with ours, without ceding uniqueness, by arguing that 
other conceptual schemes masquerade as genuine alternatives when, in fact, they are 
defective or parasitic on our conceptual scheme. Now, Körner’s argument 
fundamentally depends on the very possibility of making the notion of alternative 
conceptual schemes intelligible. One can object to Körner that alternative schemes will 
not really be schemes at all if they fail to share what Schaper calls certain “general 
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principles of significance” – certain saliences or points of convergence – with our 
standard conceptual scheme (Schaper 1972, 109). Drawing on the notion of translation, 
Schaper argues against Körner that languages must share certain principles of 
significance in order to count as languages at all. Taking this analogy to conceptual 
schemes, if a conceptual scheme shares nothing in common with ours, it would not 
count as a conceptual scheme. We simply would not recognize it as one. Uniqueness as 
Schaper argues can be demonstrated if we keep this insight in mind, namely, that 
conceptual schemes, in order to count as conceptual schemes at all, must depend on 
certain principles of significance. It is these principles of significance that can bring 
conceptual schemes under a common framework from which comparisons can be 
carried out. Such comparisons can determine which concepts are unique and 
fundamental between schemes. Such a move would involve showing, for instance, that 
the concepts of one conceptual scheme are parasitic on more fundamental conceptual 
schemes. Schaper’s criticisms, however, are inconclusive, because her line of argument 
falls prey to the circularity problem we have encountered above, with respect to 
undifferentiated experience (Malpas 1990, 242). For what grants us the authority to 
determine the general principles of significance are? Certain conceptual schemes might 
seem fundamental and others parasitic, given certain general principles which act as a 
kind of criteria for establishing what a conceptual scheme is. What these general 
principles are, however, has to be settled from a neutral perspective, a perspective which 
is uncontaminated by our own scheme. How we are to settle this question of general 
principles of significance remains open to the same problems we have seen above. 
 Third, the remaining option Körner entertains that might allow us to justify 
uniqueness would be an assessment of the statements that belong to a conceptual 
scheme, in order to show that these statements are necessarily differentiated in the way 
suggested by our conceptual scheme. However, such a strategy would be circular as 
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well. We would not be demonstrating that our conceptual scheme is unique, only that it 
functions in particular ways or possesses certain features. These three reasons – we 
cannot establish that our scheme is unique by comparisons with respect to raw data, 
competing schemes, or our own concepts – prompt Körner to conclude that 
transcendental arguments, which attempt to guarantee the uniqueness of a conceptual 
scheme, are impossible.  
 Let me add some further comments on the issue of uniqueness and Körner’s 
treatment of it. It has been argued that Körner's challenge rests on the idea that we can 
make the notion of alternative conceptual schemes intelligible (Malpas 1990). 
According to Körner, there cannot be, as we saw in his second objection, independent 
criteria for determining the genuine uniqueness of a conceptual scheme; any criteria 
would be reflective, and therefore restricted to, our own scheme. If everything we might 
say about alternatives could turn out to be reflective of our own case, then it is not 
entirely clear how it is possible to establish that there are any schemes outside of ours at 
all. In other words, not only do we encounter problems with establishing that our 
scheme is unique; similar problems arise if we want to say that our scheme coexists 
with other schemes and for this reason is non-unique. When we attempt to demonstrate 
uniqueness or non-uniqueness, we are caught up with the question of whether we are 
projecting our own scheme on what we deem to be alternatives. We simply cannot give 
any sense to the notion of a conceptual scheme that is completely independent of ours 
(i.e., that shares nothing with ours), for how would we ever understand it as a scheme. 
On the other hand, to oscillate back to the attempt of proving uniqueness is also futile; 
there is no way of getting outside one's own conceptual scheme, to a transcendent 
perspective, from which one could demonstrate that our scheme is unique or, indeed, 
non-unique. That is to say, any attempt to demonstrate either the uniqueness or the non-
uniqueness of conceptual schemes faces insurmountable difficulties. Both attempts are 
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dilemmatic and circular as Malpas argues (1990, 243). Ultimately, Malpas follows 
Davidson’s contention that we cannot give any sense to the notion of conceptual 
schemes (ours or alternatives to ours), because the scheme/content distinction on which 
the notion of a conceptual scheme rests is indefensible (Davidson, 1973). Both Körner 
and Schaper implicitly adhere to the scheme/content distinction when they agree that 
comparing our conceptual scheme to undifferentiated experience is untenable, because 
we cannot attach any sense to the notion of undifferentiated experience, i.e., pure 
content. What both Körner and Schaper overlook is that precisely such a distinction 
must be upheld for us to speak of conceptual schemes intelligibly, since the notion of 
conceptual scheme rests on the scheme/content distinction. If we share Malpas’ 
Davidsonian reservations, there is, then, a deeper problematic: not only is it impossible 
to demonstrate the uniqueness or non-uniqueness of a conceptual scheme, it is also 
problematic to talk about the world in terms of conceptual schemes. These general 
concerns with conceptual schemes aside, Körner’s strategy to criticize universality 
claims through uniqueness needs further comment. 
 As we saw in the previous section, universality necessity and apriority, imply 
each other since for Kant transcendental necessity is co-extensive with a priority. 
Therefore, if we can show that universality fails, the others fail too. Further, since for 
Kant conditions of possibility supply pure apriority, once a demonstration of the 
universality of transcendental conditions is shown to be impossible, their role as 
enabling conditions also collapses. What is underlying Körner’s critique of Kantian 
universality is the notion that in addition to universality, necessity, and apriority, 
universality and uniqueness imply each other. This notion seems plausible, because if 
by uniqueness we mean that phenomena X can only be rendered intelligible by Y, this 
covers all possible instances of X, such that X is impossible without Y.  
 In the final analysis, Körner thinks that there is a solution to the uniqueness 
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problem that saves contextual schemes but denies a genuine role to transcendental 
deductions or transcendental arguments. Our claim to universality, according to Körner, 
can be contextualised. By so contextualizing transcendental conditions, we are able to 
allow, for instance, different ways in which external objects in the world are 
individuated (the Newtonian way and the Einsteinian way) (Körner 1967, 328). Körner 
contends that by arguing for non-unique a prioris, we do not illicitly universalize one 
way of rendering the world intelligible, against “the historical truth that the schemata of 
external and practical [referring to moral thought] can change and become obsolete” 
(Körner 1967, 328). In this way, he suggests that transcendental claims can be saved 
from making unbounded universal claims that rest on the uniqueness of one way of 
rendering phenomena intelligible. As we will see in the next section, however, 
epistemological transcendental arguments must remain committed to uniqueness in 
order to refute skepticism. In light of Körner’s critique, as uniqueness is indefensible, 
anti-skeptical transcendental arguments cannot maintain claims to universality and 
therefore also necessity and apriority. As we lose the transcendental altogether if we 
give up on the combination of universality, necessity, and apriority, the task for the next 
section is to find a way to maintain universality that does not involve uniqueness. 
 
3. Validation and Description 
Transcendental arguments are beset by persistent problems. We are repeatedly thrown 
back to the anti-skeptical orientation of these arguments. To make headway, we have to 
take into account that anti-skeptical transcendental arguments serve the distinct purpose 
of validating knowledge claims, to demonstrate that we do not merely as a matter of 
fact advance certain judgments, but that these judgments are justified (either by virtue 
of being ontologically true or by virtue of being necessary for our doxastic/cognitive 
structure, e.g., Kant’s immanent metaphysics) (Cassam 1999, 86). The validatory 
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arguments against the skeptic that we have encountered in the previous chapter rest on 
being able to prove the uniqueness of a conceptual scheme.  
Let us consider the case of modest transcendental arguments and look at an 
example from Kant. One of the central contenders Kant wishes to challenge in this 
manner is Hume who questions the legitimacy of our use of concepts -- most crucially 
the synthetic a priori proposition that every effect has a cause. Hume famously argues 
that our concept of a necessary causal connection is based on psychological principles 
of custom or habitual association. Therefore, causal necessity is merely a projection of 
regularity onto a reality that could depart from this regularity at any moment (e.g., 
Hume 1978, 88-9). Kant rejects the Humean picture, arguing that instead of 
psychological principles of custom or habit, certain concepts, including causal concepts, 
are necessary for the very possibility of experience (CPR B127, B233). In order to 
safeguard these central concepts from the threat of Humean scepticism, which renders 
our concepts unstable and arbitrary, Kant argues that our basic concepts are 
transcendental that is, a priori, necessary, and universal. Instead of originating from 
experience, concepts of the understanding like causality originate from human reason 
itself. This structural fact about these concepts has an important implication for the 
judgments we make on the basis of these concepts. They are synthetic, not because they 
originate in experience, but because they give us ampliative knowledge, i.e., they are 
informative, of our own a priori contribution to experience.  
 Let us now turn to the role that uniqueness considerations play for Kant’s 
response to Humean skepticism. If Kant had argued that transcendental conditions are 
necessary and universal, insofar as we organize experience in particular ways, such that 
alternative conceptual schemes, however inconceivable from where we stand, cannot be 
ruled out, his position would be proximate to Hume’s. He would be granting a necessity 
that, in his terminology, is merely an empirical and not a transcendental necessity, and 
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therefore a necessity that could not render certain concepts secure once and for all. 
Necessity, however, has to secure our categories once and for all given Kant’s 
systematic aim of furnishing the conditions for discursive intellects universally, without 
exception. For this reason, Kant could not resort to a notion of non-unique a priori 
either. Resorting to this notion would be analogous to a response to a Cartesian skeptic 
according to which external world objects exist only as far as this conceptual scheme is 
concerned, which is not a refutation at all. We would rather want to contend that what 
the skeptic doubts is true for any conceptual scheme, and in the case of ambitious 
transcendental arguments true because the concepts we employ correspond to a mind-
independent reality. In the same way, a response to Humean skepticism would hold that 
any experience necessarily relies on the concepts Hume’s skepticism targets; since 
Hume would grant we have experience, he must grant the validity of concepts such as 
causation, where validity of such concepts is understood as their necessary and 
universal application to the objects of experience.  
 In answering the skeptic, therefore, we must hold that the concepts we take to be 
necessary in our transcendental argument belong to a unique conceptual scheme. The 
anti-skeptical force of a transcendental argument rests on the claim that experience can 
only be rendered intelligible by what the skeptic doubts. If experience can be rendered 
intelligible with alternative concepts, we can no longer force the skeptic to our desired 
conclusion, because the skeptic can argue that our concept is non-unique. This makes 
anti-skeptical transcendental arguments difficult to defend. As we saw in Chapter 1, the 
necessity operative in transcendental arguments is problematic because it depends on 
covert metaphysical commitments. Similarly, the notion of apriority, and now, as we 
can see in the current chapter, the claim to universality ultimately run into difficulties. 
This should not come as a surprise. As we saw in the first section, since universality, 
necessity, and apriority are inextricably linked, a challenge against one notion 
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undermines the others. 
 This pessimistic conclusion about the anti-skeptical utility of transcendental 
arguments should not dissuade us from cognates of the transcendental. For this 
conclusion only affects a certain way of employing these considerations, the way I have 
described as validatory. Therefore, we have reasons to look at how transcendental 
claims operate in enterprises different from validation and whether these enterprises can 
interpret the subcomponent terms of transcendental claims – necessity, universality, and 
apriority – differently. An alternative to validatory uses of transcendental claims is their 
descriptive use (Taylor 1979). Such approaches do not claim to validate knowledge, but 
merely to describe transcendentally different facets of our experience. Descriptive 
approaches helpfully contrast with validatory ones insofar as they can index the 
subcomponent terms of transcendental claims in a way validatory accounts cannot. It is 
open for descriptive approaches to hold that there are non-unique a prioris as Körner 
suggests, because unlike a validatory program that might aim to refute skepticism, a 
descriptive account need not argue for the uniqueness of a proposed set of conditions. 
As we have seen, if we have in mind a skeptic about causation, a transcendental 
argument would hold that the skeptic must accept causation if she accepts the fact of 
experience, because the former is necessary for the latter. Now, if experience can be 
understood by alternative conditions that do not involve causation, the transcendental 
argument makes no progress. Descriptive approaches, on the contrary, do not contradict 
their ambitions by allowing that we can understand experience in multiple ways. For 
this reason, descriptive approaches, as I hope to show, may allow us to revise our 
conception of transcendental conditions. There are various reasons why descriptive 
approaches are more congenial to transformations of the transcendental than validatory, 
anti-skeptical, ones. I want to conclude this chapter by sketching some of these reasons. 
 It is important to point out that abandoning a validatory programme in favor of 
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description does not immediately entail that transcendental claims are immune from the 
problems we have seen so far; there are multiple ways in which descriptive approaches 
can be understood. Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, for instance, aims to present an 
account of the fundamental conceptual scheme that governs experience (1959). The 
contrast for Strawson, for example, is one between descriptive metaphysics, geared at 
describing “the actual structure of our thought about the world” and revisionary 
metaphysics which challenges our existing conceptual scheme in favour of new 
conceptual schemes that are putatively “better” than ours (1959, 9). In light of his 
remarks, Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is not partial or limited; it is supposed to 
give us the most general concepts operative in our experience about the world (1959, 9). 
At the same time, Strawson recognizes that concepts change. He acknowledges that 
metaphysics is “essentially an instrument of conceptual change, a means of furthering or 
registering new directions or styles of thought” (Strawson 1959, 10). However, he 
argues against what he characterises as historicism that it is a “great blunder” to think of 
metaphysics in terms of change exclusively (Strawson 1959, 10). “For” he continues 
“there is a massive core of human thinking which has no history – or none recorded in 
histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental 
character, change not at all” (Strawson 1959, 10). That is, some aspects of our 
conceptual scheme are, so to speak, eternal and unchanging. Even if his primary 
concerns are not validatory but descriptive, the success of Strawson's account will, 
ultimately, depend on the uniqueness of the scheme he describes, for if he does not 
supply the most general concepts that govern human experience universally as he claims 
to, he would fail by his own standards of description. This encapsulates a view, which 
will be committed to the “strong” notions of necessity, universality and a priority that 
we have seen so far. Therefore, a commitment to description by itself does not 
guarantee that our account does not fall under the criticisms we have seen in the 
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previous and current chapter. Whether description makes strong claims is connected to 
its relation with metaphysics; since metaphysical accounts claim to provide the general 
conditions for all thought and experience, they rest on strong notions of necessity and 
universality. What Strawson's account and validatory accounts share, one could say, is a 
commitment to the metaphysics, in the first case, of what exists and in the second case, 
of the unchanging nature of our conceptual scheme. 
 To get a truly alternative perspective on the transcendental, then, we have to 
envisage descriptive accounts without these metaphysical commitments. Disentangling 
the transcendental from metaphysical ideas about the structure of all thoughts or 
sempiternal conceptual frameworks will provide room for manoeuvre to look at 
necessity, universality, and apriority differently. In the next two chapters, I will interpret 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Wittgenstein's descriptive approaches as two paradigms for a 
transcendental that does not run into the difficulties we have seen so far. To put it 
boldly, Merleau-Ponty’s and Wittgenstein's commitment to description is more radical 
than any of their forerunners and contemporaries. Their respective take on description 
reflects, among other things, the attitude that how we live, speak and act should not be 
obscured by our philosophizing. Therefore, both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty do 
not just reject traditional revisionary metaphysics but also reject traditional 
transcendental accounts, which claim to give absolute, unsituated and decontextualised 
conditions for experience. What emerges from a transcendental reading of their 
descriptive accounts are novel applications for transcendental claims beyond the narrow 
and problem-ridden domain of epistemology. In Chapter 3, we will see that conditions 
for the possibility for experience, while universal and necessary, are, on Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenological account, based on a fundamental contingency. This 
contingency reflects the embodied and situated character of experience; due to this 
character, conditions of experience are open-ended. In Chapter 4, we will see that 
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Wittgenstein account of certainties, which he understands as indubitable statements that 
serve an enabling role for our epistemic practices, pushes for a context-sensitive 
understanding of necessity and universality. These, among other, multifarious ways of 
indexing and contextualising otherwise strong claims to necessity and universality have, 
in part, to do with the specific descriptive approach of these accounts.  
 What changes under the descriptive account of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein 
is, first, that there is no need for a stand-alone knockdown refutation of the skeptic from 
putatively thin or uncontroversial premises (e.g., the fact of perception or self-
consciousness). Rather, the descriptive approach turns to examples and gradually builds 
the case for a particular way of understanding phenomena and the relations between 
them. Second, validatory transcendental arguments ultimately need to provide an 
account of the modality that is at stake. They cannot just assume that the skeptic shares 
their views on modality. Necessity can be conventional, natural or metaphysical; and 
the skeptic is free to argue that necessity is merely conventional, for example, in order 
to undercut the modality of the transcendental argument, which is very likely to depend 
on a stronger conception of necessity than conventionalism accords. Descriptive 
transcendental claims do not need to provide an account of the ultimate nature of 
necessity and can, indeed, take it as a primitive. This gives them the space to explicate 
only the way our experiences fit together without having to worry about metaphysical 
depth structures. Third, and in relation to the first point, a claim to apriority cannot go 
undefended in the validatory setting; the skeptic is free to argue that apriority is a 
philosophical thesis that she rejects so that the claim that transcendental arguments 
proceed democratically with what the skeptic accepts is undercut. If the transcendental 
argument, furthermore, depends on a traditional account of apriority, i.e., makes 
independence from experience a criterion for apriority, it must be clarified whether or 
not it entails some form of idealism. As we saw in the last chapter, Stroud's famous 
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argument holds that a reliance on idealism makes transcendental arguments superfluous, 
since if the skeptic accepts our idealist position, we do not need to present a further 
argument to convince her to our “anti-skeptical” position (idealism, in any case, can be 
understood as a form of skepticism about the possibility of unmediated access to 
reality). Descriptive accounts can, by contrast, provide multifarious ways of 
understanding apriority. They can, as in Merleau-Ponty's case, present a prioris that are 
both necessary and contingent in different senses (necessary with respect to how things 
appear; contingent because how things appear is based on facticity). In Wittgenstein's 
and Merleau-Ponty's case, the non-empirical can be ambiguous, that is, can be difficult 
to dissociate from the empirical sometimes. Descriptive transcendental accounts do not 
superimpose clear distinctions on ambiguous phenomena, and therefore, do justice to 
how things appear. They are not, in other words, pigeonholed into making absolute 
distinctions on pains of being defeated by the skeptic. Finally, descriptive accounts do 
not make claims to uniqueness. Neither account claims to furnish the only way of 
understanding phenomena for multiple reasons having to do with their contextualisation 
of transcendental conditions. For Merleau-Ponty, the transcendence of the world as a 
transcendental condition suggests that we, as subjects, are not in exclusive ownership of 
the nature and boundaries of our experience, a view that undercuts transcendental 
idealism. The possibility that things might be different cannot be ruled out especially 
once the a priori does not just belong to the subject, in a secure and unchanging realm, 
but the world comes to have its own a priori status. This move evidently results in an 
account that does not guarantee uniqueness. The schema of one’s experiences, as it 
were, is also shaped by the way in which it is situated in the world, and there are 
multiple ways to be situated. Wittgenstein, similarly, does not take the non-empirical to 
describe a subjective or inner metaphysical structure, by taking his philosophical 
account to be a model or mode of representation, instead of taking it to be a 
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metaphysical account of reality. Neither holds transcendental conditions to be fixed and 
uniform. Ultimately, as I hope to show following Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, once 
freed from concerns with skepticism and validation, transcendental accounts are in 
reach that overcome some of the most persistent difficulties associated with 
transcendental claims. 
 
Conclusion  
In the foregoing, I have discussed universality issues with transcendental arguments. 
The discussion shows that uniqueness claims with respect to one’s conceptual scheme 
are untenable. Yet the canonical usage of transcendental arguments, their anti-skeptical 
usage, depends on a successful defense of uniqueness. To defend the transcendental 
approach against uniqueness-based objections, I have argued for a modification of the 
notions centrally involved in transcendental claims, that is, claims concerning necessary 
conditions for the possibility of experience or empirical knowledge. The modification 
envisaged only in outline in this chapter concerns the strong notions of apriority, 
universality, and necessity involved in validatory uses of transcendental arguments. I 
have suggested that we look to various contextualizations of these notions in descriptive 
accounts of the transcendental. We might have to give up those aspects of 
transcendental arguments that make them interesting for epistemology. But in this way 
we can gain an unencumbered perspective on the transcendental. As I will argue in 
Chapter 3 and 4 respectively, the transcendental aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the body-subject and a transcendental reading of Wittgenstein’s 
account of certainties can provide us with a framework of using transcendental claims 
that do not run into persistent difficulties. 
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Part II 
Transcendental Description 
 
Chapter 3 
Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental 
 
Introduction 
Let me begin with a few programmatic remarks about the descriptive approach to 
transcendental claims. The rest of this chapter will then examine how this program is 
instantiated in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Descriptive approaches, as I suggested 
in the previous chapter, can be more liberal with respect to how they interpret the 
subcomponent terms of transcendental claims. In Merleau-Ponty’s case, for instance, 
necessity and universality can be indexed to the embodied subject and the field in which 
it is situated. As we saw in the previous chapter, apriority is one of the crucial features 
of a transcendental claim and is inseparable from the kind of necessity and universality 
transcendental claims possess. Anti-skeptical transcendental claims aim to furnish 
unchanging conditions of possibility to refute skepticism; consequently, as they are 
committed to a unique conceptual scheme, their conception of apriority cannot be 
interpreted as contextualised and open-ended. By contrast, a descriptive account that is 
non-metaphysical insofar as it eschews the realism of background structures can provide 
us with a novel interpretation of apriority that is characteristic of transcendental claims. 
In this chapter, we will encounter Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori which can 
be considered transcendental although it is not grounded on the unchanging intellect but 
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on the facticity of the embodied subject and of the field in which it is situated. The term 
facticity captures the characteristic feature that Merleau-Ponty’s a priori is necessary, in 
the sense that it structures our intentional experience or provides conditions that allow 
phenomena to appear, but these a priori and necessary structures are indexed to actuality 
– actuality is how things are, and nothing can prevent how things are from changing, so 
our a priori and necessary structures are indexed to the (non-empirical) contingency of 
facticity. Another striking characteristic of his phenomenology is that the transcendental 
is not just a feature of subjects, but Merleau-Ponty holds the world, too, to be 
transcendental.  
 Because these notions depart radically from traditional transcendental accounts, 
questions have been raised about whether Merleau-Ponty's account is transcendental at 
all (e.g., Gallagher 2010; Inkpin 2017; Reynolds 2017). To bring out the difficulties 
with classifying Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental phenomenologist, I will discuss two 
opposed tendencies in the literature: the first tendency attempts to deflate or neutralize a 
priori aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (no a priori account), arguing that he 
rejects the distinction between a priori and a posteriori crucial to transcendental claims; 
and the second tendency inflates a priori aspects by taking the subject as unilaterally 
constituting the world  (subjective a priori account), i.e., apriority is strictly subjective. 
This interpretation results in the view that Merleau-Ponty offers a species of 
transcendental idealism, a Kantian doctrine according to which the conditions of 
experience and thought are strictly subjective (Zahavi 2008; Baldwin 2013; Gardner 
2015). I will reject both positions, because they fail to do justice to Merleau-Ponty's 
transcendentalism. Against the first position, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty endorses a 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, and indeed, many of Merleau-
Ponty's insights rely on this distinction.38 Against the second position, I will argue that 
                                                
38 According to Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal field, which is the object of his investigation, 
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Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori should not be conflated with the issue of 
subjective genesis, the Kantian view that the transcendental has its source in the 
cognitive structure of subject. What will emerge is a new conception of the 
transcendental, one that does not see the subject as unilaterally constituting the world, 
but sees the world as having a constituting role as well.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will critically explore Joel Smith’s (2005) no 
a priori account. In the second section and, based on my criticisms of Smith, I will then 
take a closer look at Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the a priori, which differs in 
important respects from the usual notion that we have discussed so far. I will defend his 
conception of apriority against recent objections by Andrew Inkpin (2017) who denies 
that Merleau-Ponty’s modifications to the a priori leave us with genuine apriority. In the 
third section, I will examine Sebastian Gardner’s (2015) subjective a priori account, 
which, I will argue, misses the relevance of co-constitution for Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of apriority. 
 
1. The No A Priori Account 
Although few single secondary texts deal exclusively with Merleau-Ponty’s conception 
of the transcendental in detail, one way of approaching his putative transcendentalism is 
by route of his views on the a priori (Landes 2013; Morris 2012; Priest 1998; Dillon 
1988). Given that one of the most crucial aspects of a transcendental claim is its 
apriority, Merleau-Ponty's transcendentalism, it would appear, stands or falls with his 
commitment to some distinction between a priori and a posteriori claims. Some believe 
Merleau-Ponty's account lacks any such distinction. According to Joel Smith, for 
example, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology cannot be considered aprioristic for the 
                                                                                                                                          
is a transcendental field; “a space,” as Carman puts it, “of abiding perceptual possibilities, 
impossibilities, and necessities” (2008, 105). 
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following reason: first, Merleau-Ponty neither sides with the Husserlian “eidetic” 
method, which is a priori, nor with the inductive method, which depends on a posteriori 
insight, but dissolves the distinction between the two. This line of thought makes sense 
in light of Merleau-Ponty's endorsement of “joining effort” between empirical domains, 
such as anthropology/psychology and phenomenology (Smith 2005, 567; PSM 91). This 
joining effort, according Smith, involves a blurring of the eidetic and inductive method, 
which ultimately results in a rejection of the a priori and a posteriori distinction (Smith 
2005, 568). Smith's contention is, ultimately, that Merleau-Ponty's methodology leaves 
no room for apriority. If this is right, Merleau-Ponty cannot be interpreted as a 
transcendental phenomenologist. 
 To prepare for the discussion of Smith's claim, let us briefly describe what is 
meant by the eidetic method. Husserl uses the term Wesensschau, “eidetic insight,” 
“essence viewing,” “eidetic seeing” to describe an insight that is founded on perception, 
but is geared at what is necessary, universal, and “apprehends the a priori essences of 
things” (Moran & Cohen 2013, 91; Drummond 2007, 64). According to Husserl, 
through the special method of eidetic variation, we can shift our attention from the 
empirical aspects of our experience to its essential structures, that is, to the structures 
that allow us to experience a given phenomenon exactly in the way we experience it 
(Husserl 1983, 156-160). These structures are not derived, like Kant's categories, but are 
seen or viewed in both real and imaginary cases. If, for example, I want to determine the 
essence of a melody, I will go through different variations of sound. If I vary the 
experience of a melody to a sound that is merely sustained or a sound that is merely 
repeated, for example, I will no longer be describing the experience of a melody. 
Through such variations, I come to see that what is essential to a melody is, among 
other things, that a melody unfolds as a unity in differing tones over a temporal 
duration. Through this imaginative method, I can intuit what properties are 
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indispensable for the integrity of the phenomenon in question qua the type of 
phenomenon that it is, and if varied, would destroy its identity (Romdenh-Romluc 2011,  
8). This method is circular, because it assumes that I have a prior sense of what destroys 
the identity of a given phenomenon; that is to say, eidetic variation presupposes 
assumed limits to varying an experience. Varying my melody-experience to a sustained 
tone or a repetition of a single tone can only destroy the identity of a melody qua 
melody if I already have some intuitions about what makes a melody a melody. This 
circularity, however, is not problematic. Eidetic variation is not intended to establish or 
generate the essence of a phenomenon, but to make explicit a priori characteristics of 
experience that are already latent in our experiences. This a priori aspect is perhaps the 
most significant feature of the eidetic method. 
 According to Smith, anything having to do with the eidetic or the essential just 
described is absent from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Before I detail Smith's view, 
I want to draw attention to a crucial remark Smith cites from Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, an early work where Merleau-Ponty discusses 
the relation between scientific and phenomenological methodology. In the following 
remark, Merleau-Ponty gives us an example of how physicists might arrive at inductive 
judgments: 
 
[T]he method actually used by physicists ... is rather a reading of 
the essence. Through certain impure and imperfect phenomena, 
such as the fall of a body on an inclined plane, I read off the free 
fall of the body, which is theoretically conceived, or forged, by 
the intellect. That which gives its probable value to the induction 
and which finally shows that it is truly founded on things is not 
the number of facts invoked to justify it. No! It is rather the 
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intrinsic clarity which these ideas shed on the phenomena we seek 
to understand (PSM 69, quoted in Smith 2005, 566). 
 
Merleau-Ponty holds that physicists rely on Wesensschau (“reading of the essence”) 
when they make inductive generalizations. Typically, we view induction as an empirical 
generalization that carries predictive force. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, holds that the 
inductive method gets its value not from “the number of facts invoked to justify it,” that 
is to say precisely not from empirical generalizations, but from the “intrinsic clarity” an 
idea has with respect to the phenomenon under investigation. The generalization is 
valuable, not because it is supported by repeated experiments or an overwhelming 
number of facts, but because it chimes with the phenomena under investigation. By 
contrast to what an empiricist or indeed Kant would say about inductive generalization, 
Merleau-Ponty makes a purely aprioristic case for what backs up inductive thinking – 
inductive generalizations strike us because they capture the essence of the phenomenon; 
their empirical aspects – frequency considerations or predictive inferences – become 
salient only due to this fundamental phenomenological property of inductive 
generalization. As Merleau-Ponty puts it elsewhere, induction is “not founded on the 
collection of a vast number of cases [but] rather, a process of intellectual analysis whose 
verification consists in the total, or at least sufficient, clarity which the group of 
concepts worked out in this way [inductively] to the given phenomenon” (PSM 78). 
Summarily, then, induction gets it force, not from empirical facts, but from whether the 
concepts we arrive at can a priori clarify the phenomena in question. 
Merleau-Ponty describes the relation between induction and the eidetic method 
more directly in the following paragraph, which is not quoted by Smith: 
 
If eidetic psychology is a reading of the invariable structure of our 
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experience based on examples, the empirical psychology which 
uses induction is also a reading of the essential structure of a 
multiplicity of cases. But the cases here are real and not 
imaginary. After closer examination, the only difference which 
we find between the inductive procedure – so far as it is 
justifiable and moves towards what is truly essential – and the 
procedure of eidetic psychology is that the later implies imaginary 
variation to its examples, while the former refers to effective 
variations in considering the different cases that are actually 
realized (PSM 70).  
 
In other words, while the eidetic method relies on variation in the imagination, the 
sciences deal with actual or real variations. What this reveals, however, is that Merleau-
Ponty's idiosyncratic conception of induction has something in common with eidetic 
variation, namely a commitment to the essential. Both eidetic method and inductive 
method aim to discover what makes a given phenomenon what it is. The target of 
Merleau-Ponty's critique does not seem to be the eidetic method, but an empiricist 
conception of induction which he finds ultimately misguided, because it does not 
recognize its indebtedness to non-empirical or a priori features of induction. As he puts 
it “any knowledge of fact always involves an a priori understanding of essence” (PSM 
72). His phenomenological criticism of traditional accounts of induction is even more 
transparent in remarks such as this: “The empiricist theory of induction is one of these 
points of view (in the pejorative sense of this phrase), a vague opinion without rigor, 
which prevents us from seeing ourselves when we practice the Wesensschau, especially 
in making inductions” (PSM 72).39 Given these remarks, it is safe to say that Merleau-
                                                
39 If the new, eidetic sense of the inductive is disregarded or left unqualified, Merleau-Ponty's 
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Ponty is contending that despite their claim to being completely empirical, some of the 
sciences latently rely on the a priori method of Wesensschau. 
 Smith takes the quote above from Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man 
(PSM 69) to suggest that Merleau-Ponty endorses a blurring of the eidetic and inductive 
method or the phenomenological and the psychological method (2005, 566). The 
general point is, indeed, correct. If the inductive method and the eidetic method both 
rely on an a priori understanding of essence, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, then both 
methods are brought closer together. In light of his remarks it seems, moreover, that the 
blurring of the distinction between the eidetic and the inductive amounts to treating the 
inductive method as a species of the eidetic method. In combination with Merleau-
Ponty's remarks above, the view that both inductive and eidetic method include, as 
Smith puts it, a grasping of the essence, suggests that Merleau-Ponty is critical of the 
lack of recognition of a priori and eidetic considerations that go into inductive science.  
 Smith's conclusions, however, are surprisingly different. Smith acknowledges 
that Merleau-Ponty's conception of induction is “idiosyncratic” and that both the eidetic 
method and the inductive method are linked since they consist of “a certain grasping of 
the essence of a type of phenomenon,” but he stops short of explicating just what this 
grasping of essence involves (2005, 566). Clarifying the latter, would have made clear 
that “grasping of essence” describes Wesensschau, an a priori method, and that 
Merleau-Ponty explicitly upholds the importance of apriority throughout the text. 
Smith, rather, concludes that by “blurring of the distinction” between the eidetic and 
inductive, Merleau-Ponty is rejecting the “traditional distinction” between the a priori 
                                                                                                                                          
calls to view induction and eidetic variation as similar is wrongly understood as Merleau-
Ponty's attempt at championing of the sciences. In a recent paper, Reynolds disregards 
Merleau-Ponty's commitment to Wesensschau, which results in the view that Merleau-
Ponty takes the notion of induction given by the sciences without qualification and appends 
it to the eidetic method (Reynolds 2017, 89). 
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and the a posteriori as well as the distinction between necessity and contingency (2005, 
568). Smith's conclusion can only follow if Merleau-Ponty takes an a posteriori or 
empirical view of induction in which case Merleau-Ponty’s blurring of the inductive 
and eidetic method would, indeed, result in a rejection of the distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori. Since Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, takes the inductive 
method to be a priori in the sense that it rests on eidetic variation or a reading of 
essences from actual experiments, he resolves the relation between induction and 
phenomenological method in the opposite direction to the one suggested by Smith: 
Merleau-Ponty infuses induction with the a priori and in this way makes a case for the 
importance of the a priori in distinction to the a posteriori, instead of diluting it with the 
a posteriori.40 Despite stating that Merleau-Ponty discards “sharp” distinctions, 
suggesting that there is still some distinction in place, Smith largely underplays the role 
of the a priori and transcendental methodology at the heart of Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology. 
 In order to see how, let us turn to Smith's claim that Merleau-Ponty calls for a 
union of empirical fields such as anthropology and psychology with phenomenology 
(PSM 91) which should, again, point to the fact that he is blurring the empirical – 
psychology – with the a priori – phenomenology. Here again, it is evident that Smith 
underplays the role of the a priori. Smith holds that Merleau-Ponty’s employment of 
psychological or empirical studies in describing the structures of experience is evidence 
for his departure from a priori pursuits and encouragement for a naturalistic 
interpretation of his phenomenology. This interpretation makes Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology compatible with the a posteriori methodology of the empirical sciences 
                                                
40  As Wittgenstein remarks in On Certainty, that distinctions are blurred does not entail the 
absence or the rejection of distinctions (OC 97). 
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and undercuts any prospects for a transcendental understanding of his phenomenology.41 
According to Smith, the surface of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology invites the 
contention that he is critical with respect to the sciences. Smith characterizes Merleau-
Ponty’s critique as “an attempt to undermine widely held objectivist, empiricist, and 
intellectualist42 dogmas concerning perception” (Smith 2005, 566). In Smith’s view, 
however, not all of the psychological studies Merleau-Ponty employs are subject to 
criticism. Smith cites Merleau-Ponty’s example of color acquisition, which is taken 
directly from psychological studies: infants first globally distinguish between colored 
and colorless and then between warm and cold shades, and finally they are able to 
distinguish between the shades of the whole color spectrum (PP 34). In Smith's view, 
Merleau-Ponty is employing “empirical psychology to help found general truths about 
the nature of perception,” and therefore, his relation to the empirical methods is not 
critical or negative (2005, 567). If, indeed, Merleau-Ponty is not critical of this 
psychological study and believes that its empirical methods result in the correct 
conclusions, then Smith’s interpretation that Merleau-Ponty blends the 
phenomenological with the empirical method and consequently rejects a distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori would find some support.  
  However, the passage Smith cites in support of the claim that Merleau-Ponty is 
                                                
41  A rejection of the a priori is a common to various kinds of naturalism e.g., Quine 1951, 
1960, 1969; Fodor & Lepore 1992.  
42  Empiricism, to put it roughly, consists of views typical  (but not limited to) the sciences 
according to which world and entities within it (including the subject) are understood along 
mechanistic and causal lines. On this view, the world and entities within it is governed by 
objective laws and external relations (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 49). Intellectualism, on the 
other hand, holds that while the world and entities within stand in external causal relations, 
it does not hold that consciousness stands in the same causal relation to objects. Rather, 
consciousness is spontaneous and not causally determined (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 54). 
Merleau-Ponty places Descartes, Kant, and at times, Husserl under the intellectualist 
rubric.  
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congenial to empirical methods demonstrates, in fact, Merleau-Ponty’s critical attitude 
towards psychology:  
 
But psychologists assumed that what prevents the child from 
distinguishing colors is merely an ignorance of or a confusion 
over color names. Where there is green, the child must surely 
have seen green; he just failed to pay attention to it and to 
apprehend his own phenomena. On the contrary, psychologists 
themselves were simply not yet able to imagine a world in which 
colors are indeterminate, or a color that is not a precise quality. 
The critique of these prejudices, however, allows us to perceive 
the world of colors as a second-order formation, established upon 
a series of “physiognomic” distinctions, such as between “warm” 
shades and “cool” shades, or between the “colored” and the “non-
colored.” We cannot compare these phenomena occupying the 
place of color for the child to any determinate quality […] 
Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these 
originary acts, since a second-order attention that limited itself to 
recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to 
the acquisition itself. To pay attention is not merely to further 
clarify some preexisting givens (PP 32). 
 
Merleau-Ponty contends in the above that the psychologists failed to give an accurate 
account, which he says is due to certain “prejudices”. Psychologists, he argues, believe 
that the child is receiving the same sense data as an adult, but is incapable of naming the 
color. Merleau-Ponty is arguing that the psychologists’ implicit empiricist and 
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objectivist prejudices give them the view that the color green is, so to speak, “there” in 
the child's reality, but the child fails to attend to it. The world is not considered from the 
point of view of the child, “a world in which colors are indeterminate, or [do not have] a 
precise quality.” What the child experiences, Merleau-Ponty holds, cannot be treated as 
an impoverished version of what the adult experiences. The psychologists do not see 
color acquisition as “an originary act” – because they look at it from a retrospective 
point of view, reading what the adult sees back into what the child sees, and therefore 
leave untouched the question of how the child acquired a new dimension of experience 
(“refer us back to the acquisition itself”). Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty adds, “To pay 
attention is not merely to further clarify some preexisting givens.” The psychologists he 
criticizes start from an empiricist picture according to which all perceivers are given 
determinate sense data, but in some cases simply lapse in their attention to them. Instead 
of appreciating infant perception as a mode of perception to which indeterminacy is 
essential, the psychological picture presents its indeterminacy as a defect. It should be 
clear from the passage above that Merleau-Ponty rejects this psychological picture.43   
 If Merleau-Ponty departs from the findings of the psychological account, what 
are his own conclusions? Merleau-Ponty provides the following alternative: “The first 
perception of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of 
consciousness, the institution of a new dimension of experience, and the deployment of 
an a priori” (PP 34). In other words, when we acquire the ability to perceive colors – 
the full range of the spectrum – it is not that we now finally attend to the colors that 
were always there, but we merely failed to “see.” Rather, the ability to see colors is “a 
                                                
43  It can be argued that Merleau-Ponty’s reliance on empirical studies, as a starting point is 
itself a suggestive of an endorsement of empirical methods. Merleau-Ponty, in the example 
above, does not endorse the case study and the psychologists’ position in his own voice. 
Especially with The Phenomenology of Perception’s dialectical structure -- which does not 
aim to give full-blown refutations, but to point out to shortcomings -- mere reliance does 
not constitute unqualified acceptance. 
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change in the structure of consciousness,” such that, once this change occurs, our 
consciousness develops a new a priori, i.e., the ability to see colors becomes a priori and 
structural. Despite Merleau-Ponty’s explicit use of the term “a priori,” which Smith 
cites without explanation, Smith refers to Merleau-Ponty's conclusion as 
“generalizations about perception” that are founded on psychological studies (2005, 
567). This view clashes directly and explicitly with Merleau-Ponty's commitment to the 
a priori in the same example, for a generalization is typically empirical; Smith, at least, 
does not give any further qualification. It could be that Smith is referring to the new 
phenomenological sense of the inductive, which takes generalizations to be tied to 
apriority, but Smith never makes that suggestion and, indeed, simply drops the a priori 
aspect. 
 At the same time it would be a mistake to think that Merleau-Ponty wishes to 
merely reiterate the Husserlian conception of the eidetic. To understand this last point, 
we can return to Merleau-Ponty’s joining effort between empirical science (including 
psychology and anthropology). For Merleau-Ponty, anthropology gives us a “mere 
inventory of actual facts” and traditional phenomenology amounts to nothing more than 
“a mere thinking of possibilities” (PSM 91). What he wants is that “abstract 
phenomenology should come into contact with facts” by “animating” and “organizing” 
these facts (PSM 91). This emphasis on fact, as we will see, is tied to the interrelated 
notions of facticity, world, and actuality. Ultimately, the transcendental that Merleau-
Ponty advocates is one that distances itself from talk of the sheer possibility of a 
phenomenon, and focuses on how we actually experience the world. In other words, any 
investigation into “essential structures […] must begin by understanding lived 
experience” (PSM 92). Possibility comes to be grounded, in this way, on actuality 
(more on this in the next section). None of this, however, is apt to suggest a non-
aprioristic approach in phenomenology. 
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 In summary, Smith holds that Merleau-Ponty rejects a priori/a posteriori 
distinctions because, first, he blurs the eidetic and inductive method, and second, he is 
not always critical of psychological studies. In the first case, we have seen that Merleau-
Ponty incorporates induction into his a priori methodology by changing the meaning of 
induction from its empiricist original to a phenomenological concept that serves as a 
technique of clarifying essential features of experience. In the second case, we have 
seen that Merleau-Ponty starts off from psychological studies; however, he is critical of 
the studies he examines, and his own position, as is obvious in the case above, involves 
a claim about apriority. While we have seen that the view that Merleau-Ponty discards 
the a priori is questionable, what remains to be seen is the kind of apriority his account 
recommends. In what follows, I will examine some key features of the a priori (and, to 
some degree, necessity and universality) in Merleau-Ponty’s account, before turning to 
further crucial objections that will allow us to bring Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the 
(transcendental) a priori into sharp relief. 
 
2. Merleau-Ponty’s Transformation of the Transcendental  
The question we turn to now is whether Merleau-Ponty's revision of the a priori and 
associated notions of necessity and contingency can be considered transcendental. 
Merleau-Ponty, throughout the Phenomenology of Perception, endorses apriority when 
speaking in his own voice. In fact, he distinguishes various kinds of a priori according 
to different domains or modalities of experience: the a priori of the species (PP 80), the 
a priori of color perception (PP 32), which we encountered above, and the a priori of 
history (PP 90). Let me begin with perhaps the least explored of the examples, the 
historical a priori, in order to clarify just what the a priori and its contingency, which we 
touched upon above, might mean.  
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[W]ithin the cultural world, the historical a priori is only 
consistent for a given phase and provided that the equilibrium of 
forces allows the same forms to remain. History, then, is neither a 
perpetual novelty nor a perpetual repetition, but rather the unique 
movement that both creates stable forms and shatters them. 
(PP 90) 
 
According to this passage, the historical a priori or the structure of a historical phase, 
can be subject to change. So long as certain forces remain in play, certain forms are 
retained; if these forces lapse, the a priori structures change. The a priori, in this sense, 
is indexed. It is not necessary as such, but necessary given the existence of certain 
historical forces (“the equilibrium of forces”). That is, the a priori is necessary but also 
contingent in a special sense: it is necessary in the context of existing circumstances; if 
these circumstances change, the a priori loses its structural force. This, however, does 
not mean that the a priori is tantamount to the a posteriori. Rather, it means that the a 
priori is indexed to whatever exists around it. This kind of indexing is present in Kant, 
too, who argues that the necessity of transcendental condition is indexed to discursive 
intellects. Beings of a different kind (i.e., a divine intellect) would have a different 
“experience” (CPR B135, B138-139). While Kant indexes apriority to a fixed model of 
discursive cognition, however, which enshrines faculty subdivisions of the mind in 
terms of sensibility, imagination, and understanding, Merleau-Ponty indexes apriority to 
facticity, that is “[o]ur concrete and embodied experience as being-in-the-world” 
(Landes 2013, 80).  
 Merleau-Ponty clearly indicates to what extent his understanding of the a priori 
is indebted to Kant, and to what extent it diverges from Kantian apriority. He states: 
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Kant already showed that the a priori is not knowable prior to 
experience, that is, outside of our horizon of facticity, and that it 
cannot be a matter of distinguishing two real elements of 
knowledge, one of which would  be a priori and the other a 
posteriori. If the a priori maintains its character in Kant’s 
philosophy of that which ought to be the case, in opposition to 
what  exists in fact and as an anthropological determination, this is 
merely  to the extent that he has not followed his own program to 
its logical conclusion, for he set out to define our powers of 
knowledge through  our factual condition and that should have 
obliged him to place every conceivable being against the 
background of this factual world (PP 229). 
 
Merleau-Ponty explains that Kant recognized that all knowledge begins with 
experience, or, in other words, is situated in a world of experience, which Merleau-
Ponty calls our horizon of facticity; but despite having started with facticity, Kant did 
not follow through the ramifications of his starting point. In order to understand this 
latter point, let us first examine the notion of facticity. To start on a cautionary remark, 
fact and facticity should not be understood as empirical terms, because in the 
phenomenological context, facticity has to do with more than what is observable. 
Heidegger, for whom the notion of facticity plays a significant role, took the latter to be 
a priori and transcendental, standing for the irreducible situatedness of human beings 
(BT 174). In turning to experience, we do not find ourselves confronted “by our own 
existence in some detached or abstracted form” nor do we find “a field of sensory 
‘evidence,’” (Malpas 2006, 52). We find, rather, that we are always already “enmeshed 
in a world” in such a way that does not allow us to distinguish strictly the subject and 
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the world (Malpas 2006, 52). It is this facet of our experience that, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, Kant does not adequately appreciate, because he takes the subject alone 
to furnish the conditions for the possibility of the world, discarding the facticity of the 
subject, that is, the subject as always already embedded in the world. Our facticity is, to 
conclude, not a particular fact about us, but our whole situation and this situation is not 
completely explicit, that is, not entirely reflectively tractable (Crowell 2003). 
 To return to the passage above, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, Kant is wrong to speak 
of “what ought to be the case [qui doit être]” in abstraction from our factual situation. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that instead of keeping our factual situation in view, Kant 
attempted to construct what should be the case given, for instance, certain ideas of 
knowledge.44 This reading can be substantiated by reference to Merleau-Ponty’s critical 
remarks about classical transcendental philosophy: “They are satisfied with the 
necessity of this possibility, and they thereby judge what is by what ought to be [qui 
doit être], or by what the idea of knowledge requires” (PP 62). To apply this remark to 
the current example, Kant fails to recognize the inherence of the subject in facticity, and 
turns, instead, to what must be the case, “given what the idea of knowledge requires;” 
that is, Kant discards facticity in favor of conceptual systems and the moves they 
prescribe. The translation of “doit” as “ought” comes to signify the prescriptive element: 
Kant ends up with his picture of cognition as the cooperation of sense data and a priori 
concepts because he starts from the recognition that the philosophical systems of 
empiricism and of rationalism fail to provide satisfactory accounts of knowledge. 
Therefore, combining and recombining elements of empiricism (sense data) with 
elements of rationalism (a priori concepts) provides us with a solution to these 
                                                
44  Merleau-Ponty's complaint with respect to Kant is that he fails to consider the facticity, 
our concrete being in the world, at each step and as Husserl puts in the Crisis, retreats into 
“mythical construction” (Husserl 1970, 114-116). This critique, as we saw in Chapter 1, is 
one that Strawson shares with the phenomenologists.   
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problems. So the source of his account of knowledge is purely theoretical. What is 
completely overlooked is the lived character of experience. Consequently, the a priori 
will turn out to be what ought to be the case given a particular conception or 
(theoretical) idea of knowledge. This is incompatible with Merleau-Ponty's descriptive 
commitments, according to which we cannot lose sight of facticity, our concrete being 
in the world. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty's eidetic method, his pursuit of essences, 
anchors the transcendental a priori in the factual and does not base it on purely 
systematic considerations. As he puts it in the passage above, if we want to do justice to 
facticity, we are “obliged to place every conceivable being against the background of 
this factual world.” 
 What are the consequences of this notion of facticity on the distinction between 
a priori and a posteriori? Merleau-Ponty says in the passage above that the a priori in its 
new sense tells us what must be, given what is – the “horizon of facticity,” or 
“background of this factual world”. Bearing this in mind, let us now return to Merleau-
Ponty’s text. He continues the passage above:  
 
From the moment in which experience – that is, the opening onto 
our factual world – is recognized as the beginning of knowledge, 
there is no longer any means of distinguishing a level of a priori 
truths and a level of factual ones, or between what the world 
ought to be and what the world actually is. The unity of the 
senses, which was taken as an a priori truth, is no longer anything 
but the formal expression of a fundamental contingency: the fact 
that we are in the world. The diversity of the senses, which was 
taken as an a posteriori given, including the concrete form that it 
takes in the human subject, appears as necessary to that world, 
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that is, to the only world that we could think of with any 
importance; the diversity of the senses thus becomes an a priori 
truth (PP 229). 
 
While Merleau-Ponty states that “there is no longer any means to distinguish a level of a 
priori truths and a level of factual ones,” this should not be confused with the claim that 
there is no distinction between apriority and the a posteriori. Rather, they cannot be 
distinguished as existing on different levels, a priority in the immanent domain of the 
transcendental ego and the a posteriori in the empirical domain. Once again it is 
facticity, our concrete being in the world, which is the level at which both a priori and a 
posteriori truths can be postulated. Apriority, then is not “in the final analysis” as we 
saw above, immutable. It is based on a fundamental contingency, namely the fact that 
we are in the world. But within the world we inhabit there are certain necessities. As 
Merleau-Ponty explains above, Kant held that “the unity of the senses” was a priori (the 
a priori forms of time and space) and viewed the diversity of the senses (touching, 
hearing, etc.) as contingent. From the perspective of facticity, from the point of view, 
that is, “of the concrete form the human subject takes,” we can see, however, that Kant's 
a priori is contingent. It is contingent in the sense that it rests on the contingent fact that 
“we are in the world”, which is bound up inseparably with concrete modalities of 
experience or concrete ways of inhabiting the world. What Kant took to be a posteriori 
and contingent, in abstraction from facticity, becomes a priori and necessary in light of 
facticity: given the kind of beings that we are, the diversity of our senses is necessary 
and a priori in that it makes our experiencing the world possible. When Merleau-Ponty 
introduces the passages above, he says that he aims to furnish “a new definition of the a 
priori” (PP 229). This new definition keeps facticity in view. 
 To summarize this section, Merleau-Ponty's position, as expressed in the above 
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passage, complicates the traditional distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. 
First, it places both at the level of facticity, our being in the world, rejecting the 
traditional notion that a priori truths belong to the inner domain of consciousness and a 
posteriori truths to the outer domain of sensible experience. Second, Merleau-Ponty 
holds that the a priori is necessary and contingent in different senses, as we saw in the 
case of the historical a priori with which I began. Since the a priori is not grounded in an 
inner realm but in facticity, it is not cut-off from contingency. This displacement of the 
a priori from the inner realm of subjectivity to the world is one of Merleau-Ponty’s 
major transformations of the Kantian and the Husserlian program (Dillon 1987). 
 
3. Objections to the Transcendental Interpretation  
 From an exegetical point of view, it is evident that Merleau-Ponty does not dispense 
with apriority and necessity. Systematic problems, however, remain. It has been argued 
that Merleau-Ponty's revised conceptions of apriority and necessity, when scrutinized, 
are largely unintelligible and ultimately collapse into the empirical (Inkpin 2017, 
Reynolds 2017). This collapse, so the contention goes, proceeds from the contingency 
of facticity on which apriority and necessity are grounded. According to this view, 
because necessity is indexed to facticity, which is contingent, and contingency is 
empirical, Merleau-Ponty's philosophical account is ultimately empirical. Further, it is 
argued that Merleau-Ponty gives up on the question of possibility that is essential to the 
modality of transcendental claims. That is, while transcendental claims purport to 
supply “conditions of possibility,” given that he bases apriority and necessity on 
facticity (our actual embodied being in the world), Merleau-Ponty replaces the latter 
with “conditions of actuality,” thereby rejecting one crucial feature of transcendental 
claims. In the final analysis, Merleau-Ponty's revision of ideas that seem vital to 
transcendental accounts renders his account non-transcendental. If this critique is 
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accurate, it has wide-ranging implications. Not only is Merleau-Ponty's transcendental 
approach undermined, but so is, at least in part, the future of transcendental thought, 
given that Merleau-Ponty's modification of apriority and his appeal to contingency in 
this context can be interpreted as attempts to revise the problematic aspects of 
traditional transcendental accounts we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2.  
  Let us begin with the first criticism. Andrew Inkpin argues that Merleau-Ponty 
fails to meet the “transcendentalist challenge” because he ultimately fails to supply an 
intelligible account of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori (2017, 41-
45).  To this end, Inkpin cites Merleau-Ponty's following remark: “The a priori is the 
fact as understood, made explicit, and followed through into all of the consequences of 
its tacit logic; the a posteriori is the isolated and implicit fact” (PP 230). According to 
Inkpin, Merleau-Ponty's explanation is not sufficiently clear and even if liberally 
interpreted still fails to supply an adequate distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori. First, it is hard to make sense of “an isolated fact,” especially in the context 
of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. As Inkpin puts it, “any fact we are 
aware of presupposes either the use of concepts that inferentially/rationally integrate it 
into our understanding of the world or—perhaps more immediately for Merleau-
Ponty—a holistic background of practical engagement with the world” (2017, 42).  
Inkpin suggests that isolated facts are always integrated in a wider rational/practical 
context. But here, inadvertently, Inkpin presents us precisely with the distinction on 
which Merleau-Ponty's account turns. Transcendental thought precisely brings into 
view, that is, makes explicit the background of what might appear to us as isolated facts. 
In this sense, the a posteriori is the presentation of an isolated fact and the a priori is 
what the fact “presupposes,” namely an “understanding of the world […] a holistic 
background of practical engagement with the world,” that is a structure in which 
subjects are always already practically engaged with the world. The a priori as Merleau-
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Ponty formulates it, puts us in a position to comprehend the fact and allows us to trace 
out “the consequences of its tacit logic” – how the fact connects up with others in the 
structured horizon of facticity. The a priori, in other words, takes the relation between 
facts into account and the a posteriori considers isolated facts.  
 In the same passage that Inkpin cites, Merleau-Ponty explains that considered 
from the a priori perspective,  “sensation, such as it is presented to us by experience, is 
no longer an indifferent matter and an abstract moment, but rather one of our surfaces of 
contact with being, or a structure of consciousness” (PP 230). In other words, a 
posteriori, sensation is an empirical abstraction from lived experience, but, a priori, it is 
a structure of embodied consciousness, or a structural component of our being in the 
world. Inkpin disregards the larger context of the passage, which clarifies Merleau-
Ponty’s ideas about the relation between apriority and facticity. It is for this reason that 
Inkpin concludes that the distinction Merleau-Ponty presents is empirical throughout 
and therefore has little to do with the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori. It is clear, however, that the function of the a priori in Merleau-Ponty’s 
account is to present structural relations between facts, namely, necessary connections 
that are not furnished by a consideration of individual cases. 
 Second, according to Inkpin, Merleau-Ponty's view that embodied subjectivity 
and the phenomenal field “are conditioned or determined by contingent facts” suggests  
“Merleau-Ponty has effectively given up the idea of necessity” (2016, 42). If this is true, 
a great deal of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, which rests on, for instance, the 
necessity of bodily orientation in space and time, the figure/ground distinction for 
perception (PP 4), the body schema (PP 102), and the intentional arc (PP 137), which 
Merleau-Ponty holds to be necessary features of being in the world are rendered 
unintelligible. Thankfully, however, this fatal consequence for Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology can be averted. Inkpin contends that contingency contradicts necessity, 
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because he assumes they are operative at the same level. However, he is misguided in 
his contention. For Merleau-Ponty all necessity is grounded on facticity; this does not 
mean that necessity is tantamount to contingency; rather, necessity is indexed to the 
world, which we inhabit as embodied subjects. Given that we are in the world, in the 
way that we are (qua embodied subjectivities) certain necessities emerge. The 
contingent fact is that the world and our embodiment could be otherwise. Why this 
counts as giving up on necessity altogether, as Inkpin alleges, is not entirely clear. The 
Kantian account, for instance, treats cognition as indexed to discursive intellects; if 
these intellects did not exist, there would be no cognition so that in this sense, cognition 
is based on the contingent fact that there are discursive intellects. The distinction 
between this Kantian account and Merleau-Ponty's account is that while the latter works 
with a fixed conception of the discursive intellect, Merleau-Ponty takes facticity, our 
embodied being in the world, as an open horizon that cannot be made static. Therefore, 
any account of necessity is provisional, open to what shows itself. This openness to 
change and revision does not remove necessity from the picture altogether. Given the 
world we are situated in contingently as embodied subjects, various structures have to 
be in place for it to be possible for us to perceive, act, or have knowledge. Inkpin 
attempts to trace Merleau-Ponty's transformation of the transcendental, but perhaps 
because he takes traditional transcendental accounts as a litmus test for any 
transcendental account, he fails to see how necessity and contingency can, in two 
different senses, apply to a given condition. He fails to see that necessity and 
contingency can relate in two ways to each other – first, that contingent experiences 
presuppose necessary structures, and second that these necessary conditions are 
grounded in contingency, in our facticity, or our lived situation.  
 Third, Inkpin holds that Merleau-Ponty's  “wants to make constitutive claims—
say about the constitution of intentional structures—these must be understood as 
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descriptive statements of (empirically) conditioned facts” (2017, 42).45 It is not clear 
why Inkpin thinks that because constitutive features are in some sense contingent (they 
are tied to facticity), they are conditioned by something empirical. It appears that he 
takes contingency always to belong to the empirical. As should be obvious by now, 
contingency and the empirical are two separate moments; and a proper understanding of 
Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about facticity depends on keeping them separate, so that we 
do not conflate facticity with the empirical. The example of the historical a priori we 
have encountered above can be helpful at this juncture. As we have seen above, 
Merleau-Ponty says that so long as the “equilibrium of forces,” or the dynamic of the 
status quo, remains intact, certain a prioris will be operative (PP 90). If this dynamic 
changes, the a priori changes, too. Now, this shows that a priori and necessity are 
contingent, insofar as they are grounded on facticity. But it would be a mistake to hold 
that the a priori is conditioned by empirical facts. First, the status quo, if understood as a 
dimension of facticity, surpasses the empirical; it is a context of meaning and 
intelligibility that cannot be reduced to a set of discrete empirical facts. That is, the 
“equilibrium of forces” does not consist of punctual, atomistic facts, but amounts to a 
comprehensive situation. So, it remains unclear why Inkpin holds that the only way we 
can understand the conditioning of the a priori by facticity and the resulting contingency 
                                                
45  Inkpin takes Merleau-Ponty's views on conditions to be the same as Rorty's conception of 
naturalism: “anything might have been otherwise, that there can be no conditionless 
conditions [...] and that there is no such thing as a noncausal condition of possibility” 
(Inkpin 2017, 42; Rorty 1991, 55). But this proposal is rather difficult to understand. 
Merleau-Ponty nowhere supports causal conditions of possibility and indeed much of the 
Phenomenology of Perception is dedicated to criticizing mechanistic and causal 
explanations in science (e.g., PP 75-91). Inkpin would have to show that Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of constitutive features such as the body-schema and the intentional arc are 
causal conditions of possibility. The view that anything can be otherwise, too, does not 
describe Merleau-Ponty's position, especially, as we will in the next section where 
Merleau-Ponty describes the body's permanent perspective as metaphysically necessary. 
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of the a priori, is to treat the a priori as empirically governed by facts. Even if one were 
to hold that Merleau-Ponty's conception of the a priori is in some sense empirically 
governed, there would be no reason to discount it as a priori, given the role it plays 
within his account, unless one takes Kant's pure a priori which had its genesis in the 
subject or the intellect to be exhaustive of apriority. But even Kant permits that there 
can be an impure a priori, which is based on experience (the a priori involved in 
inductive generalizations; see Chapter 2).  
 Finally, Inkpin argues that while transcendental conditions supply conditions of 
possibility, Merleau-Ponty aims to supply conditions of actuality (2017, 42-43). In 
Inkpin's view, transcendental conditions aim not for actuality, how things are, but 
conditions of possibility concern how things must be if they are to be possible at all; i.e., 
the possibility of knowledge, the possibility of perception etc. Inkpin believes that there 
is no room for conditions of possibility in Merleau-Ponty's account, given especially 
that Merleau-Ponty attempts to describe, rather than explain phenomena. First, let us 
address the contention that Merleau-Ponty dispenses with conditions of possibility 
altogether. It is true that Merleau-Ponty repeatedly criticizes traditional transcendental 
thought for its emphasis on conditions of possibility, because, in his view, conditions of 
possibility do not take into account how the world actually is (PP 464, 468, lxxiii). A 
rational reconstruction of experience, which gives us conditions for the possibility of 
various concepts, neglects the actual situations where these concepts have their life. 
Given his descriptive intentions, Merleau-Ponty is not concerned with “what the idea of 
knowledge requires,” (PP 62, emphasis mine) as we saw above, but what knowledge as 
it is actually lived requires. It is clear, however, that despite his criticism of the 
conditions of possibility advanced by traditional transcendental accounts, Merleau-
Ponty does employ the notion. Here is an example: “Our body, insofar as it moves 
itself, that is, insofar as it is inseparable from a perspective and is this very perspective 
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brought into existence, is the condition of possibility not merely of the geometrical 
synthesis, but also of all of the expressive operations and all of the acquisitions that 
constitute the cultural world” (PP 412). For Merleau-Ponty any condition of possibility 
should be based on actuality – our embodiment and our inherence in the world. But this 
by no means indicates that Merleau-Ponty rejects the conception of a condition of 
possibility as such. He merely insists against the prevalent understanding of 
transcendental conditions as the last ground that the modality of possibility is grounded 
on actuality just in the way in which necessity is based on facticity. Inkpin opposes the 
transcendental interpretation of Merleau-Ponty because he fails to recognize the modal 
structure Merleau-Ponty has in mind – a structure where actuality grounds and qualifies 
possibility rather than replacing it. 
 Let me expand on this interpretation. According to M. C. Dillon, Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy is not just “another version of post-Kantian transcendental 
philosophy,” but it “still aims at preserving the truths of transcendental thought” (1997, 
174). Merleau-Ponty disagrees with post-Kantian philosophy for its naive forgetfulness 
of lived experience, which becomes tangible wherever the subjective is taken “as 
founding, when it is founded in actuality” (Dillon 1997, 175), wherever, that is, 
subjective conditions of possibility are taken to enable actuality. As Dillon puts it, 
“transcendental thought […] takes its departure from the phenomenal world of 
perceptual faith, and it also takes its measure from that world; that is to the extent that 
transcendental philosophy succeeds in revealing the structure of meaning constitutive of 
the phenomenal world, that success is measured against the standard of actual 
experience” (1997, 174-175.) Dillon's remark is an echo of Merleau-Ponty's outline of 
phenomenology in the Preface of the Phenomenology of Perception where he says that 
phenomenology is a transcendental philosophy, but for phenomenology “the world is 
always ‘already there’ there prior to reflection – like an inalienable presence” (PP lxx). 
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Therefore, it is fair to say that Merleau-Ponty's problem with subjective conditions of 
possibility is that they are taken as foundational, thereby failing to recognize that our 
being in the world is more primary than reflection, such that transcendental philosophy 
itself depends on our being in the world. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, 
Inkpin makes a similar mistake. He fails to recognize that, in arguing that conditions of 
possibility are problematic, Merleau-Ponty's positive proposal is to ground possibility 
on actuality, or facticity, and not to reject conditions of possibility altogether. This is 
textually evident in various remarks: “human existence will lead us to revise our usual 
notion of necessity and contingency” (PP 174); “the only way to understand man and 
the world is by beginning from their 'facticity'” (PP lxx); “the eidetic method […] 
ground[s] the possible upon the real”  (PP lxxxi). The overarching point Merleau-Ponty 
is making in these remarks is that philosophy should keep in view what is actual and 
should not, one can add, escape into possibility that takes leave of facticity, our situation 
in the world. Conditions of possibility have to be grounded on actuality so that they do 
not destroy the primacy of the world for embodied experience (more of this in the next 
section). One of Merleau-Ponty's central criticisms against Kant is concerned with what 
he calls the naivety of taking consciousness to be foundational without asking what 
makes consciousness possible. For Merleau-Ponty, the possibility of consciousness 
itself rests on the world. As he puts it, the world is not the result of syntheses generated 
by the intellect, but rather, “the world is there prior to every analysis I could give of it” 
(PP lxxiii).  
 Crucial to understanding Merleau-Ponty's proposal is the idea that the world 
(alongside other embodied subjects) is also a transcendental condition. Numerous 
authors have referred to this as “co-constitution” or “complicity” (e.g., Zahavi 2001; 
Behnke 2002) The latter notion, in particular, is developed in Merleau-Ponty's later 
work, where he suggests that “perception,” is not just structured by the subject, but rests 
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on “an active attunement to the directives of things” (emphasis mine, Wheeler 2008, 
60). Because, further, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is what perceives, not an atemporal 
and amorphous mind, the inner domain of traditional transcendental philosophy is 
cracked open. Merleau-Ponty transports the discussion of the transcendental from a 
transcendental idealist perspective, which endorses the unilateral constitution of 
experience by the subject, to the complicity and co-constitution of subject and world. As 
the significance of this shift is rarely taken seriously, the impression could take hold in 
the literature that Merleau-Ponty rejects transcendental thought altogether. With this 
disregard, perhaps one of the most fundamental and fruitful developments in 
transcendental philosophy goes neglected. It cannot be stressed enough that the 
distinction between embodied subjectivity and facticity or world should not be read 
along classical lines, as a distinction between the a priori and the empirical, so that, as in 
the previous cases, Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the world, facticity or actuality is 
taken as his championing the empirical against the a priori or a blurring of the two such 
that they become identical.  
 
4. The Subjective A Priori Account 
As we have seen, one tendency in the literature is to reject that apriority has a place in 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. From both an exegetical and a systematic point of 
view, such readings have serious shortcomings. The opposite tendency, which I have 
introduced briefly at the beginning of this chapter, is to take Merleau-Ponty to be 
furnishing a wholesale endorsement of the traditional Kantian conception of apriority, 
which ultimately leads to the view that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental idealist. One 
example of an interpretation that portrays Merleau-Ponty as a Kantian transcendental 
philosopher is Sebastian Gardner's (2015) account, which in my view fails to dissociate 
the transcendental aspects of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology from the doctrine of 
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transcendental idealism (Gardner 2015).  
Before I proceed to the critical assessment, I want to acknowledge my 
agreements with Gardner's reading of Merleau-Ponty. For example, he rejects the no a 
priori position that the interpretations discussed above endorse. He contends that any 
such position would “plainly make nonsense of much else that he [Merleau-Ponty] 
says” (Gardner 2015, 319). As I have also argued above, Gardner contends that 
Merleau-Ponty wished to “free the transcendental a priori from its Intellectualist 
misconception” (2015, 319). However, as we will see, Gardner does not adequately free 
Merleau-Ponty from one of the central intellectualist misconceptions attributed to him, 
namely transcendental idealism (e.g., Baldwin 2013). Gardner overstates Merleau-
Ponty’s commitment to Kantian apriority, especially to the thesis of subjective genesis, 
instead of staking out the far-reaching consequences of Merleau-Ponty's transformed 
conception of the transcendental, which we will come to recognize is incompatible with 
transcendental idealism 
The main move of Gardner’s transcendental idealist interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology is to establish a connection between Merleau-Ponty’s views on 
the necessity of embodiment and Kant’s Copernican turn. He states: 
 
Kant’s Copernican form of explanation is affirmed in the 
argument that Merleau-Ponty gives for this thesis, which 
corresponds closely to Kant’s argument regarding space and time 
in the metaphysical expositions of the Transcendental Aesthetic: 
the body’s permanence cannot be a ‘necessity of fact, since such 
necessity presupposes’ it, and ‘factual situations can only impact 
upon me if my nature is already such that there are factual 
situations for me’ (PP 91). Merleau-Ponty affirms, therefore, the 
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distinction of the transcendental from empirical necessity, and 
that the subject’s mode of cognition has Kantian explanatory 
priority over the objects of cognition (Gardner 2015, 301). 
 
Gardner argues, in the above, that Kant’s Copernican strategy is upheld by Merleau-
Ponty, because Merleau-Ponty takes the “metaphysical” necessity of the fixed nature of 
the body’s perspective on the world as a condition for the possibility of factual 
situations in which we encounter objects. Gardner holds that there is an analogy 
between Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic and Merleau-Ponty’s account. According to 
Gardner's contention, this analogy between Kant and Merleau-Ponty ultimately shows 
us that “the subject’s mode of cognition” is prior to the objects of cognition; it is their 
transcendental condition. Kant’s Copernican Revolution intended to show that the 
subject’s a priori modes of cognition have priority over, and in this sense shape, objects 
of cognition. The subject’s modes of cognition, sensibility and understanding, consist of 
those transcendental, a priori conditions, space and time and the categories, that make 
experience possible. The subject, thanks to these a priori structures, unilaterally 
constitutes the world. The world is, in other words, passive; the subject is spontaneous 
and active.  
 First let us turn to the detail of the analogy Gardner draws between Kant and 
Merleau-Ponty. While Kant offers several arguments for the transcendental ideality of 
space, I will consider the most relevant one for the current discussion. Kant holds that 
space is a necessary condition for the experience of external objects, because I can 
conceive of a space without objects (an empty space), but I cannot conceive of objects 
without space (CPR A24/B38-39). In Kant’s words: “One can never represent that there 
is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered 
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in it” (CPR A24/B38). Space is thus an a priori form of intuition.46 Henry Allison 
presents Kant's argument structure in the following way: if X can be (represented) 
without A, B, C and their mutual relations, but A, B, C cannot be (represented) without 
X, then X is a necessary condition for the possibility of A, B, C (paraphrased from 
Allison 2004, 104). Once again, if I can represent space without objects and their 
relations, but I cannot represent objects without space, then space is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of objects. For Kant, then, there is an asymmetry between 
the objects of my experience and space; “the thought experiment indicates, although the 
latter remains when one abstracts from the former, the converse does not hold” (Allison 
2004, 107). They are, as Allison puts it, not “equal partners,” because space is 
“epistemically prior in the sense that it is the a priori condition of the representation of” 
objects of experience (2004, 107). I will call this the thesis of unilateral subjective 
constitution. It is unilateral because the a priori subjective form of intuition constitutes 
objects, but not the other way around (CPR A28/B44). It constitutes objects in space 
unilaterally, because there are no other transcendental conditions outside the subject that 
enable space. This is essentially Kant’s transcendental argument for the ideality of 
space. 
 Before I offer an appraisal of Gardner's position, namely, that Merleau-Ponty is 
committed to something along the lines of a thesis of unilateral constitution and for this 
reason to transcendental idealism, I will offer a few broad remarks on the place of 
embodiment in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
                                                
46 A similar argument for the ideality of space is the following: In order to argue for the 
apriority (subjective genesis) of space, Kant states that space is not “an empirical concept 
drawn from outer experiences,” because in order to have outer experiences, that is 
experiences of non-identical objects in different places, space must already be presupposed 
(CPR B38) I could not, according to Kant, get my idea of space from my perception of 
objects, because my very perception of objects presupposes space (CPR B38). This, 
according to Kant, establishes the apriority of space. 
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embodiment is our way of being in the world: “One’s own body is in the world just as 
the heart is in the organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible spectacle, 
animates it and nourishes it from within, and forms a system with it” (PP 209). The 
body, here, is presented by Merleau-Ponty as “one’s own,” suggesting that embodiment 
is not experienced as an object among other objects but ineluctably as part of my own 
subjectivity. It is not something I possess, but something I am. My own body plays “a 
constitutive role in experience precisely by grounding, making possible […]” (Carman 
1999, 208). Unlike classical transcendental views, which would take the body to be “an 
object of judgment, inference, or even conscious awareness,” Merleau-Ponty does not 
take the body to be an “I think,” but an “I can” anchored in our precognitive 
engagement with the world (Carman 1999, 218).47  
To return to Gardner's subjective a priori account, in the passage cited above he 
points to certain features of embodiment which he takes to play a role in Merleau-Ponty 
that is analogous to the Kantian view that the subjective features of cognition have 
explanatory priority over objects. That is to say, we can understand or explain objective 
cognition only through the subjective framework of cognition. According to Gardner, 
then, Merleau-Ponty shows along similar lines that the necessity of embodied 
perception is transcendentally prior to the objects of perception; the objects of 
perception are merely empirically necessary, but the embodiment of the subject is 
transcendentally necessary. Perceivable objects could not exist without the body-
subject.  
The two necessary features of embodiment, which motivate Gardner's view are, 
as we saw above, the “permanence” and the “fixed perspective of the body” (2015, 
301). Let us therefore examine Merleau-Ponty's position on the necessary permanence 
                                                
47 Carman’s reading, however, suggests foundationalism with respect to Merleau-Ponty if we 
understand the body subject’s grounding of experience unilaterally.  
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of embodiment. Merleau-Ponty holds that psychology characterizes the permanence of 
the body in a partially correct, but ultimately misguided manner: according to 
psychology, unlike other objects, my body is “constantly perceived” (PP 92). In other 
words, unlike the objects laid out before me – the lamp, the cup of coffee, the 
windowsill, and the view of the church – which can vanish from my visual field if, say, 
I turn around or leave the room, my body is always present, always “with me” (PP 92). 
The objects before me can be “moved away” and “ultimately disappear,” but my body 
cannot be taken away from me.48 However, the psychologists fail to characterize this 
permanence accurately: “The permanence of my body,” as Merleau-Ponty says, “is of 
an entirely different type [than the permanence of objects]” (PP 93). That is to say, the 
psychologists are correct in understanding the body as a constant, but incorrect in 
conflating it with something perceived on par with other objects. The permanence of the 
body is an empirical fact for the psychologists, just a perception among others, while it 
is transcendental for Merleau-Ponty, that is to say, it is necessary and constitutive. This 
necessary and constitutive feature of embodiment becomes clear when we consider the 
fact that the permanence of one’s own body is characterized by a fixed perspective: “my 
own body always appears to me from the same angle” and, therefore, “defies 
exploration” (PP 93). The objects I perceive do not defy exploration; I can turn this 
book around, I can view it sides and back, that is, I can take several perspectives on it. 
Now, one’s own body is, like objects, perspectival; but unlike physical objects which, as 
they appear in perspective, can be seen or touched from various angles, one’s own 
body’s perspective is fixed. In this sense, one is, to use Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor, 
“imprisoned” in one’s perspective on one’s own body, in an entirely different way than 
if one were actually imprisoned and could only see the steeple of a church from the 
                                                
48 This is not to imply that I am always explicitly aware of my body. For instance, being a bad 
dancer, an awkward presenter, or being in pain can make my body explicit to me in 
various. Ordinarily, however, one is not explicitly aware of one’s body.  
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window of one’s cell (PP 93). In the latter case, I would know that in principle I can see 
the church from various perspectives. By contrast, I, as a living embodied subject, 
cannot see my own body from various perspectives. I can see my back in the mirror, but 
I cannot change the “original structure of my own body”; for instance, I cannot see my 
body directly from the back of my head (PP 93). I know, as in the case of the church, 
that others can see my body from various angles; but I cannot alter my original 
perspective on my body.  
Now the necessity of permanence and fixed perspective is stronger than the 
merely factual necessity that Merleau-Ponty has ascribed to physical objects. It is true 
that physical objects cannot be seen from all sides at once; but why is it true? It is true, 
because my own body imposes a fixed perspective on the world. The contrast between 
physical objects and one’s own body is that the former involves factual necessities, 
while the latter is metaphysically necessary (PP 93). Particular factual necessities – that 
from my window I can only see particular perspectives, say, the façade of the church 
before me – presuppose a metaphysical necessity: that my body, given what it is, 
imposes on me a perspective on the world. For the window to constrain my view – I can 
only see part of the façade, not the entrance, from this window – my body must first 
impose on me a perspective on the world. This imposition is not of the same order as 
the window framing my view. The metaphysical necessity Merleau-Ponty takes the 
body to exhibit can be clarified with reference to the following remark: “Factual 
situations can only affect me if I am first of such a nature that there can be factual 
situation for me [my emphasis]” (PP 93). In other words, our nature, the kind of beings 
that we are is of such a type – necessarily embodied – that we are open to factual 
situations and the specific necessities they impose on us in turn. The window in front of 
me can frame the façade of the church only because I am first and foremost embodied. 
“Metaphysical” here means nothing more than that, given the kind of beings we are, 
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embodiment is a constraint on our experience of the world. Of course, I can picture 
myself as a soul flying above Amsterdam but, even if I do, I cannot but think of 
perceiving as I do while I am embodied. I cannot, for instance, conceive of perceiving 
every nook and cranny of Amsterdam – the interiors, exteriors – at once. My original 
embodied perspective on the world is necessary in a strong sense, because I am unable 
to conceive of disembodied perception or experience.49 
We are now in the position to examine the analogy Gardner draws between Kant 
and Merleau-Ponty. Let us recall the structure of the argument from the Transcendental 
Aesthetic: X can be (represented) without A, B, C and their mutual relations, but A, B, 
C cannot be (represented) without X. On this model, Merleau-Ponty would be saying: 
embodiment and its features of permanence and fixed perspective can be (represented) 
without factual situations and their mutual relations, but factual situations and their 
mutual relations cannot be (represented) without embodiment and its features. However, 
does Merleau-Ponty effectively put forward claims of this sort? We have seen that 
crucial for Merleau-Ponty’s own argument are two claims: factual necessity (objects 
appear from a particular angle) presupposes the necessity of the body (the body appears 
in a permanent and fixed perspective) and, relatedly, for there to be factual necessities 
for me, I must be “of such a nature that there can be factual situations for me.” The 
body has primacy over factual situations, because factual situations presuppose the 
body. However, does Merleau-Ponty claim, as Gardner’s analogy requires, that we can 
conceive of the body without factual situations? There is no textual evidence for that. 
Nowhere in the passage above and the other relevant passages of Phenomenology of 
Perception does Merleau-Ponty make the Kantian claim that we can envision 
                                                
49  A similar point can be found in Strawson’s Individuals. He argues that whatever 
consciousness we ascribe to souls is derivative of embodied consciousness. As he puts it 
“in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as 
disembodied, as a former person” (1959, 116) 
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embodiment without factual situations. Beyond textual evidence, there are systematic 
reasons for which Merleau-Ponty keeps his distance from this Kantian claim. The 
reason Merleau-Ponty does not make the claim that the body can be conceived without 
factual situations is, as we will see, that he rejects subjective unilateral constitution. 
This is why Gardner’s analogy falls apart.   
Gardner’s own conclusion, in the spirit of the analogy with Kant, is that 
Merleau-Ponty executes a Copernican Revolution and is, therefore, committed to a form 
of transcendental idealism: the subjective structure of embodiment makes the 
experience of objects in the world possible; we cannot have experiences of the world 
without being embodied. It is, of course, true that remarks such as “my body is that by 
which there are objects” (PP 94) suggest the primacy of embodiment in Merleau-
Ponty’s account of constitution. But this suggestion is misleading because it relies on 
the tacit assumption that the relation of constitution is unilateral and subjective. In order 
for the Copernican thesis to go through, the body would have to be a priori and 
constitutive, as a sole generator and guarantor of the world and its factual situations. In 
order to establish whether or not this is the case for Merleau-Ponty, we have to return to 
the question of the a priori: is Merleau-Ponty’s a priori subjective and unilateral? 
 Even a cursory overview of Phenomenology of Perception reveals that Merleau-
Ponty, far from establishing the subject’s body and its structure as unilaterally a priori, 
repeatedly holds the subject and the world to be in “complicity” with each other so that 
perception can be seen as the yield of what is best described as co-constitution. 
Consider, in this light, the following passage: 
 
 […] I understand the world because I am situated in the world and 
because the world understands me. We are not saying that the 
notion of the world is inseparable from the notion of the subject, 
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nor that the subject thinks himself to be inseparable from the idea 
of the body and the idea of the world, for if it were merely a 
relation in thought, this very fact would preserve the absolute 
independence of a subject as a thinker and the subject would not be 
situated. If the subject is in a situation, or even if the subject is 
nothing other than a possibility of situations, this is because he 
only achieves his ipseity by actually being a body and by entering 
into the world through this body (PP 431, my emphasis). 
 
In the above, Merleau-Ponty expresses a different understanding of the relation 
between the body and situations, one that contrasts with Gardner’s reading and allows 
us to make sense of Merleau-Ponty's remark concerning the putative priority of the 
body. We saw that Gardner held the body to be primary in the same way that Kant 
could be said to hold space to be primary. Here, Merleau-Ponty presents the 
situatedness of the subject in a way that suggests the subject is not the fundamental 
ground (as for Cartesian foundationalism and its offshoots). Merleau-Ponty holds that 
the body is situated, owing to its inherence in the world, and therefore is open to factual 
situations. Contrary to Gardner’s view, the subject as a condition for the possibility of 
factual situations is itself enabled, in its role as a condition for the possibility of 
experience, by its situatedness in the world. In other words, the Copernican claim “X 
(space) without A, B, C (objects), but no A, B, C without X” does not hold for the body-
subject. It is true that the world would not appear without the subject, yet the subject 
cannot be embodied and situated without the world. So, with respect to the world, the 
body-subject does not satisfy the “X without A, B, C” branch of the Copernican claim.  
It might be argued in response that as Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body-
subject does not comply with the Copernican picture, we cannot legitimately talk of 
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constitution in this context any longer. However, what is crucial for Merleau-Ponty’s 
move to a co-constitutive picture is that he does not place the inseparability of the 
subject from the world at the level of thought or reflection. As Elizabeth Behnke points 
out, it is crucial for Merleau-Ponty that the thinking subject is replaced with a living 
subject and that perception should not be replaced with “intellection […] movement 
with the thought of movement” and so on (2002, 38). If, by contrast, the subject's 
relation with the world were “merely a relation in thought” the subject would not be 
situated in the world at all. So the level of inseparability between subject and world is 
not at the level of “notions,” but at an existential level – in the subject’s lived 
engagements with the world. The subject, Merleau-Ponty holds, is only a body-subject 
because of its inherence in the world. This already shows us that the subject does not 
generate the world through the synthetic activity of consciousness as the Kantian view 
would prescribe. According to this Kantian view, the “constituted [exists] only for the 
constituting agent […] and the constituted consciousness is […] 'co-extensive' with 
being” so that ultimately, all of empirical reality is absorbed by the knowing subject 
without remainder (Behnke 2002, 39). For Merleau-Ponty, the subject's essence 
(“ipseity”) as embodied rests on “actually,” and not notionally, being embodied. 
As we can see, Merleau-Ponty takes the world to make an indispensable 
contribution to embodied subjectivity. The body-subject “achieves his ipseity,” or her 
essence, from her inherence in the world. The world, the subject, and the body are 
“identical,” insofar as the embodied subject is embedded in the world. Merleau-Ponty 
remarks that the “the world is inseparable from the subject” and “the subject is nothing 
but a project of the world” (PP 454). At the same time, “the subject is [also] inseparable 
from the world […] from a world that it itself projects” (PP 454). In other words, 
neither world nor subject can be understood without the other. Their inseparability 
presents a serious challenge for Gardner’s view that the subject has ultimate explanatory 
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priority. 
To deepen the challenge, it is worth noting that Merleau-Ponty clarifies that the 
world is not constituted by subjects. He writes: “The world is not an object whose law 
of constitution I have in my possession; it is the natural milieu and the field of all my 
thoughts and of all my explicit perceptions” (PP lxxiv). Finally, when talking about the 
uninterrupted structure of our sensory modalities, the view that our modes of experience 
are on a synesthetic continuum, that is without strict separation between them, Merleau-
Ponty makes abundantly clear that the world is inseparable from the subject in the 
specific sense that the world is a transcendental condition for the subject: “Our 
possession of the world is of the same genre, except that one can conceive of a subject 
without an auditory field, but not of a subject without a world” (PP 343). This is an 
almost direct inversion of the Kantian thesis of the ideality of space that Gardner cites. 
Here, rather than demonstrating the absolute priority of the subject, as Merleau-Ponty 
must if he is to be considered a transcendental idealist, Merleau-Ponty seems to hold 
that the world is prior to the subject. This tells us that, as a transcendental 
phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty is not committed to transcendental idealism. But this 
is not Merleau-Ponty’s final word on constitution. For Merleau-Ponty does not view the 
world as belonging to the bottom of a constitutive chain, where constitutive relations are 
unilateral so that the world would be the enabling condition of subjects and situations, 
mirroring the role of the Kantian subject. From Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, the 
subject, the world, and the other are inextricably linked: “We are mixed up with the 
world and with others in an inextricable confusion” (PP 481). This statement 
compounds what has been adumbrated before, in Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about the 
“complicity” between subject and world: the world does not just have a transcendental 
role in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, but fulfills this role jointly with the subject. 
This suggests a conception of transcendental constitution that differs from the Kantian 
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unilateral conception underlying Gardner’s interpretation. 
To understand this different conception, it is important first of all to note that 
“world” is a phenomenological concept so that “world” is not tantamount to the totality 
of discrete objects. As Stephen Priest comments: “It [the world] is not, so to speak, one 
thing amongst others” (Priest 2003, 32). Instead it is “a context, or the context, for all 
the thoughts and actions of the subject” (Priest 2003, 32). This sense of the world, 
which is not an explicit or determinate totality of facts, but the setting or milieu of the 
subject, is furthermore not only chronologically before the subject, but “prior…in the 
transcendental sense [such that] the existence of the world is a necessary condition for 
knowledge of it” (Priest 2003, 33). Merleau-Ponty takes his notion of world from 
Heidegger when he remarks: “This facticity [that there is the world] of the world is what 
establishes the Weltlichkeit der Welt [worldliness of the world], which makes it such 
that the world is a world […]”  (e.g., PP lxxxi). For Heidegger, world possess several 
designations, including ontic or existentiell ones, that is, it addresses particular facts 
about our situation (e.g., our domestic environment) (BT 93). But the concept of world 
also possesses an ontological or existential designation. It gives us the necessary 
preconditions for the possibility of the ontic world. The notion of world, understood in 
its ontological sense, is referred to by Heidegger as worldhood, which gives us the “a 
priori character” of the world in general (BT 93). Merleau-Ponty connects facticity with 
the notion of the world along similar Heideggerian lines by suggesting that facticity 
makes it possible that there is a world for us.  
If the world is a transcendental condition, it actively structures our relation to 
experience and perception and carries its own a priori. The complicity or co-constitution 
of subject and world gives us a subject that is polarized “by its tasks,” because the 
subject “exists toward them” – this allows that certain things shine with significance 
like “privileged figures against indifferent backgrounds” (PP 103). This privileging or 
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polarizing is not just the result of the subject gearing itself toward the world, but the 
subject responding to the solicitations of the world. Two transcendental features that 
bring this complicity or co-constitution into sharper relief are the body schema and the 
intentional arc. The body schema consists of the subject's “non-thetic” bodily awareness 
and orientation. The intentional arc “projects around us our past, our future, our human 
milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or 
rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships” (PP 137). 
Neither the body schema nor the intentional arc are immanent features that create or 
construct reality unilaterally. They are already tied to the world, which as a recent 
commentary puts it, “'proposes' things to my body as things to be touched, taken up, 
traversed” (Behnke 2002, 43), that is, which gives us situations such that the body 
schema and intentional arc can be directed and polarized. The subject's relation with 
respect to the world is neither one of unilateral constitution nor creation. Rather, the 
world “[constitutes] itself […] and solicits from me the bodily attitude in which it will 
come into focus” (Behnke 2002, 43). The intentional bond of the subject with the world 
requires the world so that the subject can take its place in a situation; in turn, situations 
only arise for subjects and thus depend on the constitutive powers of subjects. For this 
reason, the relation between the world and the subject is “strictly bilateral,” a thesis a 
transcendental idealist, committed to the view that the conditions of experience are 
strictly subjective, would have to reject (PP lxxi, Morris 2012, 15). 
 Idealist readings of Merleau-Ponty, such as Gardner's, overlook co-constitution 
or complicity and therefore ultimately fail to recognize the transcendental status with 
which Merleau-Ponty invests the world. In investing both world and subject with a 
transcendental status, Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental phenomenology cuts across the 
traditional distinction between realism and idealism. As we saw in Section 1, 
interpretations that deny that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental thinker fail to recognize 
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this shift adequately, because like the transcendental idealist reading, they take notions 
such as world and facticity to be tantamount to the empirical, thereby empiricising what 
is genuinely transcendental for Merleau-Ponty. The no a priori account holds that 
Merleau-Ponty's insistence on the influence of facticity, which is contingent, on the 
level at which a priori claims can be made is tantamount to basing the a priori on the 
empirical; but in holding this view, the no a priori account neglects the transcendental 
status of facticity. The subjective a priori account takes Merleau-Ponty's remarks with 
respect to subjective constitution as suggesting that Merleau-Ponty is committed to the 
view that the world or facticity is nothing more than empirical reality constituted by the 
transcendental ego. Once facticity and world are understood as transcendental 
conditions, however, the transcendental is no longer part of an unchanging inner 
domain, but includes a dimension which, while complicit with the subject, also outruns 
her, thus cancelling any idealist tendencies so often found in transcendental thought. 
Perhaps more than any transcendental thinker before him, Merleau-Ponty 
insisted that the conditions for various phenomena cannot be fixed and guaranteed. Part 
of the reason Merleau-Ponty held this view is due to his notion of the phenomenal field, 
or the field of lived experience, which, as Landes remarks, is neither “the 'objective' 
world discussed by empiricism nor the 'transcendental' field of intellectualism” (PP 62, 
Landes 2013, 147); if one were to stop here, at this negative statement, it would seem as 
if Merleau-Ponty rejects anything transcendental. But as Landes continues, “the field 
itself […] must be seen also as a 'transcendental field', not in the sense of the place of a 
universal knowledge, but in the sense that the field structures our experience as a field 
of possibilities according to contingent a prioris” (Landes 2013, 147). It should be 
stressed at this point that the a priori is both contingent and necessary; the latter because 
it necessarily structures phenomena, and the former because its necessity can never be 
guaranteed given that the phenomenal field is not a static unchanging metaphysical 
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construct. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that partly because we do not constitute or create 
reality, and partly due to the ineluctability of our embodied situation, the field of lived 
experience can never be made fully explicit. The word “field,” Merleau-Ponty argues, 
“signifies that reflection never has the entire world and the plurality of monads spread 
out and objectified before its gaze, that it only ever has a partial view and a limited 
power” (PP 62). This is reflected by Merleau-Ponty’s appeals to facticity and his 
dynamic conception of apriority. The philosopher, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, is 
ultimately subject to her situation; she cannot surpass it by metaphysical constructions 
including those of transcendental idealism (PP 63). As Dillon puts it, “Merleau-Ponty's 
a priori is not timeless and oblivious to the transcendence of our situation; its necessity 
is provisional, its pro-vision [anticipation] is open to modification in the light of what 
shows itself” (Dillon 1991, xvi). The constellation of investing the world and facticity 
with a transcendental status, taking the subject to be a part of the world qua embodied, 
emphasizing the situatedness of philosophy, and the notion of the phenomenal field as 
never entirely explicit, but always unfolding, gives us a transcendental that does not 
make the unwarranted ambitious claims of previous transcendental philosophies. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued for a transcendental reading of Merleau-Ponty based on 
his treatment of apriority. Whereas for Kant, transcendental conditions were purely 
subjective and the world or facticity was a correlate of subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty 
invests the world with a transcendental status. This results in what might be called a 
liberation of apriority from its static position in transcendental thought. In Kant’s 
metaphysics of the mind, apriority is the characteristic property of changeless, strictly 
necessary, conditions for the possibility of experience. These conditions are sempiternal 
principles of cognition which is true at all times and for all places; crucially, they owe 
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their sempiternal status to the structural fact that every a priori claim is true at all times 
and for all places; or, in brief, apriority itself is sempiternal on the Kantian picture. 
Merleau-Ponty’s a priori, by contrast, is inextricably tied to our concrete situation and 
its facticity. Because of their link with facticity, Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental claims 
or considerations, the transcendental conditions that enable particular embodied 
experiences, may be said to have an open-ended character. Their necessity and 
universality is indexed to the world in which we, as subjects, are embodied. If this 
world changes, our embodied subjectivity changes, and with it what is necessary and 
universal with respect to the resulting, different, embodied experience. This link with 
facticity means at the same time that the a priori, the non-empirical structure of our 
embodied experience, ceases to signify truth at all times and for all places. Effectively, 
Merleau-Ponty liberates apriority from its traditional sempiternal status. This is, 
ultimately, the upshot of the phenomenological transformation of the transcendental. As 
I have tried to show in this chapter, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodied 
experience can be interpreted as a descriptive philosophy, which articulates basic 
structures of embodied experience without traditional metaphysical aspirations. That is 
to say, if phenomena are genuinely taken as our guide, and if facticity, our concrete 
being in the world, is taken seriously, the transcendental can be liberated from the 
strictures of realist and idealist commitments that are ultimately responsible for the 
difficulties with anti-skeptical transcendental arguments. Since the a priori is no longer 
grounded in Kantian metaphysics of the mind, which entails changeless and strictly 
necessary conditions, but is inextricably tied to our concrete situation, the necessity and 
universality operative in transcendental claims are open-ended. This is, ultimately, the 
upshot of the phenomenological transformation of the transcendental. If the 
phenomenon is genuinely taken as a guide and if facticity, our concrete being in the 
world, is taken seriously, the transcendental becomes a route to understanding how 
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various phenomena are structured, without any commitment to metaphysical positions 
such as idealism and realism. This is a significant step forward, because metaphysical 
commitments to realism or idealism leave the transcendental stranded with the 
unachievable tasks of proving its uniqueness and sempiternal validity. If the 
transcendental is reconfigured to incorporate facticity, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, 
necessity, universality, and apriority are also reconfigured so that uniqueness and 
sempiternality cease to be stumbling blocks. As Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
embodied experience teaches us, we can both, take facticity into account and still retain 
a meaningful notion that certain structural features of our experience are necessary, 
universal, and a priori. 
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Chapter 4 
Wittgenstein and the Transcendental: On Certainty 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I argued that liberating transcendental claims from their original 
metaphysical commitments involves modifying the notions of apriority, necessity, and 
universality operative in transcendental claims. In the current chapter, I aim to bring 
together insights from Wittgenstein’s later work in order to provide another radically 
different reading of the transcendental. Focusing on his work On Certainty, I will argue 
that Wittgenstein’s notion of certainties, namely, states of affairs expressed by 
statements that are exempt from doubt (or justification) and which enable (epistemic) 
practices, are amenable to a transcendental reading. These states of affairs may include 
that there is an external world, that the table in front of me will not disappear once I turn 
my back on it, or that I have two hands. Since Wittgenstein is interested in a conceptual 
investigation of certainties, he focuses on the linguistic expression of these certainties. 
As we will see logical role of these statements brings to view or clarifies the 
significance of certainties (e.g. that the world has existed for a long time, which is not 
just a proposition, but is expressed in one) for our epistemic practices. My discussion of 
certainties should be understood accordingly.   
  The aim of this chapter is to establish that statements expressing certainties, due 
to the special logical role that Wittgenstein assigns to them, have the features 
characteristic of a transcendental claim, namely, necessity, universality and a non-
empirical status. Unlike ordinary transcendental accounts, however, Wittgenstein’s 
methodology offers us a unique way of understanding transcendental considerations in a 
non-metaphysical fashion. Taking onboard Oskari Kuusela’s (2008) reading of 
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Wittgenstein’s method, I will argue that instead of advancing (metaphysical) theses, 
Wittgenstein’s account is directed at providing different ways of seeing or presenting 
the object of inquiry in order to clarify philosophical problems. In the case of On 
Certainty, one of the central problems Wittgenstein addresses is the dispute between the 
skeptic and her interlocutor. Wittgenstein neither offers a refutation of skepticism nor an 
endorsement, but supplies a particular way of conceiving matters, which relieves us 
from both skepticism and the desire to refute it. Ultimately, as I hope to show, this 
methodological insight gives us a truly non-metaphysical and non-dogmatic way of 
understanding the transcendental. 
 In the first section, I will present an overview of On Certainty, in particular, its 
reception of G. E. Moore’s common sense realism. Wittgenstein holds that Moore’s 
treatment of statements that are exempt from doubt and justification (Moorean 
propositions) as knowledge claims renders these statements nonsensical. As I will 
contend, however, Wittgenstein’s position entails more than a charge of nonsense. We 
will see in the second section that Wittgenstein’s methodological commitments ask us 
to differentiate between the mode of representation, namely, Wittgenstein’s conception 
of certainties, and the object of investigation, namely, epistemic practices and what they 
involve. These considerations will be central to what, I will argue, a reading of 
Wittgenstein along transcendental lines can achieve. In the third section, we will see 
that according to Wittgenstein, Moore fails to recognize the enabling role of statements 
expressing certainties, conceived as a mode of representation; rather than being 
epistemic themselves, as we will see, these statements enable empirical judgments, i.e., 
knowledge claims (and epistemic practices, more broadly). Statements expressing 
certainties, as Wittgenstein conceives of them, provide us with a model for looking at 
epistemic practices and what they involve in a specific light, a model that is directed at 
clarifying a philosophical problem. Section 4 and 5 will turn to how an application of 
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this reading can be fruitfully applied to other features of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, 
namely, the necessity, universality and the non-empirical characterization of these kinds 
of statements. As I hope to show, understanding statements expressing certainties as 
transcendental modes of representation can give us a new account of the transcendental 
that manages to circumvent metaphysics and dogmatism.  
 
1. On Certainty: An Overview 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, edited by Elizabeth Anscombe and published 
posthumously nearly two decades after his death in 1969, consists, among numerous 
other topics, of remarks about epistemological skepticism and attempts to refute it. 
More specifically, it deals, in part, with the impasse that arises in epistemology between 
idealism and realism. While idealist arguments give rise to skepticism with respect to 
the existence of a mind-independent external world, realist arguments aim to counteract 
this skepticism by proving the existence of just such a world. Aspects of On Certainty 
respond to G. E. Moore's common sense realism espoused in Moore's rejoinder to 
idealism and skepticism in the papers “Defense of Common Sense” (1993) and “Proof 
of an External World” (1993). In “Defense of Common Sense,” Moore argues that 
certain common sense propositions pertaining to myself, others, and the world around 
me are unassailable. These include propositions such as “There exists at present a living 
human body, which is my body,” “The earth existed for a long time before my birth” 
and so on (Moore 1993, 107). Moore contends that these truisms have three properties: 
they are (1) knowledge claims, (2) maximally certain, and (3) true. At the same time, 
Moore holds that unlike ordinary epistemic propositions, conceived traditionally as 
justified true belief, these truisms cannot be justified. According to Moore, we cannot 
point to particular evidence that would justify truisms of this kind, that is, we lack 
evidential grounds for common sense propositions. Moore demurs that a linguistic 
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analysis of these truisms that attempts, for instance, to break truisms down to their 
elemental parts, is parasitic on our common sense understanding where such truisms 
first acquire their intelligibility (1993, 111).50 
 While in “Defense of Common Sense” Moore champions common sense realism 
and rejects the desire to justify common sense truisms, in “Proof of External World” 
(1993). Moore tries to prove one of the truisms he had held was beyond the compass of 
justification, the existence of the external world. Moore dismisses Kant's attempt in the 
Refutation of Idealism to prove that external objects exist independent of my awareness 
of them as a failed attempt at disarming skepticism about the existence of physical 
objects (1993, 148; CPR B74). In its place, and after considerable stage setting, Moore 
offers his own famous proof against external world skepticism. His proof consists of the 
following premises: here is a hand, here is another; therefore, at present, there exist two 
hands. From this Moore concludes that physical objects and, ultimately, an external 
world, exist. Moore's view that the ostensive presentation of hands gives us 
demonstrative warrant that there are external objects is tied to the common sense 
realism endorsed in his previous paper. The philosophical understanding of the word 
“hand,” which may define it as a mental representation, departs from the common sense 
meaning of the term, according to which a hand is a physical object.51  If the vantage 
                                                
50 I have presented Moore's argument with a slant, allowing it to speak more clearly to 
Wittgenstein's concerns. Moore's whole position is complex and involves the claim that 
physical facts are not logically or causally dependent on mental facts, such that truisms 
comprising facts about the external world can be conceived as independent of mental 
representations. 
51 I follow Norman Malcolm's reading, which understands Moore's truisms as having 
semantic implications. According to Malcolm, Moore is opposing the view held, for 
instance, by idealists that the external world reduces to mental representations (Malcolm 
1992). Against this view, Moore holds that the utterance “I see my cat” is not tantamount to 
“I see a part of my mind,” i.e., “I am having a mental representation of a cat.” The 
utterance does not refer to mental representations, but something mind-independent.     
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point of common sense realism is recognized, proving the existence of hands is 
tantamount to proving the existence of physical objects.52   
 Wittgenstein, though he sees much that is commendable in Moore's approach, 
offers a different perspective. He agrees that the truisms Moore lists cannot be justified, 
especially since they are non-evidential; but in contrast to Moore, Wittgenstein takes 
their groundlessness, that they cannot be justified, to entail that they are non-epistemic, 
that is, that they are not knowledge claims at all. Wittgenstein presents the following 
reasons for assigning a non-epistemic status to Moorean propositions or statements of 
certainties: first, a hallmark of knowledge claims is that they can be doubted and 
justified while certainties, by contrast, are open neither to doubt nor justification (OC 4, 
10, 56, 88, 94, 359, 166); second, while knowledge claims are propositions that can be 
true or false, Wittgenstein points out that Moorean truisms are non-propositional and 
                                                
52   Moore's approach has faced serious criticisms. Barry Stroud, for instance, holds that 
Moore's response is ultimately trivial and fails to take seriously the force of the skeptical 
worry. According to Stroud, Moore's insistence that he knows the existence of external 
things sidesteps the problem of skepticism. Arguing that one knows that one possesses 
hands “in one's own case” is a position from “one's own current knowledge” (Stroud 1984, 
117). The skeptic's concern is not internal to one's knowledge, whether one believes in a 
propositions “in one's own case,” but rather an external one, bringing into question the 
entirety of objective knowledge of the world, “requiring a certain withdrawal or 
detachment from the whole body of our knowledge of the world” (Stroud 1984, 26). 
Stroud, in a sense, repeats his objection to transcendental arguments that we saw in Chapter 
1. That we believe X is the case does not warrant that X is, indeed, the case. Wittgenstein 
expresses a similar criticism when he draws a distinction between psychological and 
objective certainty: “Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is 
analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise', 'doubt', 'be convinced' in that the statement "I 
know..." can't be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an 
utterance to the truth of an assertion. And here the form "I thought I knew" is being 
overlooked. - But if this latter is inadmissible, then a mistake in the assertion must be 
logically impossible too. And anyone who is acquainted with the language-game must 
realize this - an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything” 
(OC 21, my emphasis). 
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thus cannot be true or false (OC 137, 404);53 third, while knowledge claims are 
empirical, Moorean propositions are non-empirical (OC 308). 
 According to Wittgenstein, Moorean truisms are problematic on two principal 
counts: to begin with, they neglect the context-dependency of utterances and, relatedly, 
they confuse empirical propositions with what Wittgenstein calls grammatical 
statements (e.g., Coliva 2010, Stroll 1994, Moyal-Sharrock 2004). In what follows, I 
will turn to this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, in order to argue that 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moore goes beyond a charge of nonsensicality and, 
relatedly, a failure to adequately contextualize utterances expressing certainty. In the 
next sections, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty is offered as part 
of a model, which aims to clarify philosophical confusions that give rise to skepticism 
and attempts to refute it. Wittgenstein’s certainties, as I will argue further on, can be 
conceived as transcendental, because they play the characteristically non-empirical role 
with respect to epistemic practices of enabling these practices.  
 Wittgenstein criticizes Moore for his attempt to enumerate certainties, “straight 
off” without paying heed to the context in which advancing these assertions would 
make sense (OC 348, 353, 468, 558). In Wittgenstein’s view, Moorean propositions, 
stated without context as empirical propositions, are nonsensical in the last instance, 
that is, we cannot attach any meaning to these propositions if they are stated out of 
context. If the assertions “I am conscious,” “I know that I am sitting in a chair,” or “X is 
a physical object” are abstracted from their appropriate contexts they are rendered 
unintelligible. One can imagine that someone might wish to give me tragic news on the 
phone and insist on confirming whether I am sitting in a chair. I might reply impatiently 
                                                
53  That Wittgenstein considers Moorean truisms, or statements expressing certainties, to be 
non-propositional may sound confusing in light of Wittgenstein’s own terminology for 
them and their cognates: “hinge propositions” or “grammatical propositions”.  See footnote 
56.  
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that I know I am sitting in a chair. If I happen to have an accident in the street, a 
passerby might ask me if I can hear her, and I might respond by stating that I am 
conscious. However, in the absence of any context, these pronouncements cease to 
make sense, i.e., if I were to utter “I am conscious” or “I know I am sitting in a chair” in 
the middle of an ordinary conversation. To look at the third example, “X is a physical 
object” might be stated in order to instruct someone who might not understand what 
“X” or “physical objects” signifies (OC 46). “Physical object” is, in this light, a 
grammatical concept like color or quantity, that is, it constitutes the framework of 
meaningful language. The unqualified, context-free, statement “there are physical 
objects” treats grammatical propositions as if they are empirical.54 The confusion 
becomes obvious if we look at the use of the indexical term “there” in connection with 
the grammatical concept “physical object;” this concept does not state something 
located within the empirical world, as is implied by the use of the indexical “there.” 
Stating that “there are physical objects” out of context confuses a grammatical statement 
with an empirical proposition which this grammatical statement frames; e.g., “there is a 
chair next door” is framed by how we talk intelligibly about physical objects (Williams 
2005, 86). Proving that there are physical objects is nonsensical, because the procedures 
of proving or disproving do not extend to what can be conceived as framing our 
language. Any attempt to prove what frames language, would be parasitic on the 
framework itself and therefore question-begging. The nonsensicality of Moorean 
                                                
54 Wittgenstein's position with respect to meaning reappears here: “for a large set of cases, -- 
though not for all [...] the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (PI 43). 
Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of words is embedded in our practical dealings, such 
that abstractions that excise words from their use lack meaning (Rudd 2005, 32). This view 
brings Wittgenstein close to Moore's position in “Defense of Common Sense” to the effect 
that a logical analysis of language would be parasitic on the common sense/everyday use of 
words. Moore, however, succumbs to his own objection when he enumerates truisms 
without further determination, i.e., in the absence of a context.  
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propositions, results from a lack of determination, that is, it is not clear what the context 
of the proposition is supposed to be and in what sense we should understand them 
(Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 94). Grammatical propositions like “X is a physical object,” 
“two is a number,” or “I am conscious” are intelligible only when they figure in a 
certain context.  
 Wittgenstein holds that the philosopher, too, cannot forfeit conditions that apply 
for meaningful use of language in everyday contexts.55 The Moorean proposition “Here 
is a hand” is freestanding, unqualified and is supposed to serve as a premise in a 
philosophical proof. However, excising propositions such as “here is a hand” from the 
context in which they might be uttered in a meaningful way strips them of intelligibility 
and thus makes them useless for philosophical usage. Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
So if I say to someone "I know that that's a tree", it is also as if I 
told him "that is a tree; you can absolutely rely on it; there is no 
doubt about it". And a philosopher could only use the statement to 
show that this form of speech is actually used. But if his use of it 
is not to be merely an observation about English grammar, he 
must give the circumstances in which this expression functions 
(OC 433). 
 
Wittgenstein contends that unless the philosopher is describing the norms of English 
grammar, she must provide a context for the utterance “I know that that's a tree.”  It can 
                                                
55  “When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", 
"name"—and try to grasp the essence  of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the 
word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—  
What we  do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” (PI 
116).  
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be argued, however, that there may be no reason to view philosophical usages as 
extraneous to ordinary contexts so that the charge of insufficient determination does not 
apply. A philosophical proof may come with a philosophical context in which it might 
make sense to assert that there is an external world; and internal to the philosophical 
discussion, say, between idealism and realism, a defense or an objection to this assertion 
may not infringe on the bounds of meaningful language. Wittgenstein, indeed, considers 
precisely this objection: 
 
But is it adequate to answer to the scepticism of the idealist, or the 
assurances of the realist, to say that "There are physical objects" 
is nonsense? For them after all it is not nonsense. It would, 
however, be an answer to say: this assertion, or its opposite is a 
misfiring attempt to express what can't be expressed like that. 
And that it does misfire can be shown; but that isn't the end of the 
matter. We need to realize that what presents itself to us as the 
first expression of a difficulty, or of its solution, may as yet not be 
correctly expressed at all. Just as one who has a just censure of a 
picture to make will often at first offer the censure where it does 
not belong, and an investigation is needed in order to find the 
right point of attack for the critic (OC 37). 
 
Wittgenstein acknowledges in this passage that a charge of nonsensicality is not the end 
of addressing a skeptical problem, but a first attempt at tackling it. Just as one who is 
tasked with appraising a picture might, as a starting point, offers a first evaluation and 
only after further investigation discovers the right leverage point for her critique. This 
qualification suggests that the charge of nonsensicality is not exhaustive of 
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Wittgenstein's account (“but that isn't the end of the matter”). Wittgenstein seems to 
suggest that while stating truisms in the form of knowledge claims might be 
nonsensical, this does not mean that these statements cannot be made at all. In the 
passage above he says “what can't be expressed like that” (my emphasis) and not “what 
can't be expressed at all”. Given this remark, we can at least countenance the possibility 
that the philosophical understanding of Moorean truisms (from now on statements 
expressing certainties) is not nonsense as such. 
 We have thus far seen that on Wittgenstein’s analysis, statements expressing 
certainties lack crucial properties that knowledge claims possess. They are beyond 
justification or doubt, non-evidential, and non-propositional.56 Additionally, when 
uttered as knowledge claims, they infringe on the bounds of sense. Various 
commentators have remarked on these features of Wittgenstein's position (e.g., Moyal-
Sharrock 2004, Coliva 2010, Stroll 1994). For example, I can’t give reasons why “two 
is a number” – it simply is a number and not an insect or a subatomic particle; there is 
no evidence for “two is a number;” “two is a number” cannot be true or false thus 
lacking one defining feature of a genuine proposition. I would fail to understand both 
“two” and “number” if I were to entertain the idea that I could adduce evidence for their 
relation, could doubt it, or could falsify it. In what follows, I will argue that 
Wittgenstein's deeper attitude with respect to statements expressing certainties turns on 
what, I hope to show, is their transcendental role. Before I substantiate this reading, it is 
crucial to understand Wittgenstein’s methodological commitments, which give us the 
nucleus of a genuinely non-metaphysical account of certainties, and, as I will show, 
                                                
56 Wittgenstein refers to certainties as propositions throughout the text, but there is 
disagreement concerning whether certainties count as propositional (being either true or 
false) or non-propositional (neither true nor false; e.g., a feeling, an act). According to 
Moyal-Sharrock, for example, certainties are a kind of know-how or non-propositional 
belief that is expressed in the way we live or in how we act (Moyal-Sharrock 2004). Others 
contend that certainties are in some sense propositional (e.g., Hacker 1986).  
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their transcendental characterization.    
 
2. Wittgenstein’s Method  
Philosophers typically aim to give us an account of aspects of reality, such as language, 
experience, knowledge, etc. Some interpretations of Wittgenstein see his work as 
putting forth theses about such aspects of reality. For instance, it has been argued that 
Wittgenstein holds the philosophical view that meaning is use and that grammar serves 
as the scaffolding of language (Hacker 2013). On this view, On Certainty would give us 
a definite answer about how knowledge and certainties are essentially related in our 
experience. What interpretations like this neglect, however, is the crucial 
methodological step Wittgenstein makes, that is, how he understands philosophical 
accounts and their objectives. In what follows, I will describe a methodological 
approach that is crucial to my non-dogmatic account of statements that express 
certainties as transcendental. As we will see, if this methodological perspective is 
neglected, a transcendental reading of these statements cannot adequately maintain 
metaphysical parsimony, because it would relapse into the suggestion that there are 
metaphysical necessities underlying empirical statements and epistemic practices.  
The first step to take in understanding Wittgenstein’s methodology is what he 
believes philosophers are up to when they give us various accounts. While philosophical 
theories by their own self-understanding make claims about how reality necessarily 
must be, on Wittgenstein’s view, these philosophical accounts are, in fact, different 
models or modes of representation, that is, ways of seeing or understanding reality. Let 
us take an example to clarify this point, the Augustinian picture of language, which 
advances the view that the meaning of a word is its correspondence to an object, e.g. the 
word “chair” owes its meaning to its correspondence with the object chair. While a 
standard philosophical account might hold that this account describes the essence of 
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meaning (PI 1), for Wittgenstein, the Augustinian picture is one way among others in 
which we can represent meaning, but it does not capture all instances of meaning (PI 3). 
Conceived as a mode of representation, the Augustinian picture is one way of looking at 
language that can be fruitful given certain philosophical purposes. What distinguishes a 
mode of representation or model from a conventional philosophical account is that a 
mode of representation or model does not project the view that meaning is 
correspondence of word to object onto reality as a metaphysical account of meaning and 
its relation to reality but indexes the view to particular philosophical problems.  
Projecting in this case could be compared to conflating the sketch of a landscape with 
the landscape itself.   
To make this point clearer, we have to differentiate between modes of 
representation and objects of investigation, what I have called aspects of reality above, 
i.e., language, cognition, etc. Standard philosophical accounts, according to 
Wittgenstein, conflate modes of representation with the object they are investigating. 
Wittgenstein remarks in the Investigations: “We predicate of the thing what lies in the 
method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are 
perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality” (PI 104). In other words, we take 
aspects that belong to a mode of representation (meaning must be correspondence 
between word and object) to be a feature of meaning and language as such. We might, 
for example, be struck by a similarity between the mode of representing (meaning is 
correspondence of word and object) and the object of investigation, meaning and 
language. Yet, the unwarranted step is to take this similarity or point of convergence to 
make the claim that meaning really is correspondence of word and object. This tendency 
expresses itself when we take features such as generality or exceptionless necessity, 
which belong to our mode of representation and project it onto our object of 
investigation, taking language itself to carry these features of generality and 
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exceptionless necessity.57 As Wittgenstein explains, the Augustinian picture of language 
is not incorrect or false unless we collapse the distinction between mode of 
representation and the object of representing, taking correspondence to give us what is 
generally true for every instance of meaning. Understood as a mode of representation, 
what the Augustinian picture advocates “is appropriate, but only for this narrowly 
circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe" (PI 3). 
That is, it can insightfully be compared to some cases (the meaning of chair is the object 
that it stands for), but others cases do not fit it (“here,” “that,” “and” do not stand for 
any object); it cannot tell us what language generally turns on. Conceived in this way, 
philosophical accounts are models, various approaches to how certain facts (about 
language, cognition etc.) can be configured in a useful way.  
We have seen that Wittgenstein holds that philosophical accounts are modes of 
representation. I now turn to the purpose that a mode of representation serves in 
Wittgenstein’s own philosophy. For Wittgenstein, modes of representation can be used 
as objects of comparison.  To this extent, he remarks: 
  
The object of comparison [model], the object from which a way 
of conceiving things is derived, should be announced so that the 
examination does not become unjust. For now everything which 
holds of the model will be asserted of the object of examination; 
& asserted: it must always be…This is the origin of a kind of 
dogmatism. One forgets the role of the prototype in the 
examination; it is as it were the unit of measurement with which 
                                                
57  “(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how 
things are."——That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. 
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one 
is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.” (PI 114). 
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we measure the object of examination. Dogmatism, however, 
claims that every measured object must be a whole number of the 
units of measurement. (MS 115, 56-57; cf. PI 130-131). 
 
According to Wittgenstein, when we fail to make the distinction, fail to 
announce, that our philosophical account is offering an object of comparison rather than  
claims about necessities that actually govern reality we become dogmatic and unjust. 
Our dogmatism expresses itself in statements such as, “meaning must be reference,” and 
“knowledge must be justified true belief,” as articulating necessities that exist in reality; 
that is, we project the necessity of these statements onto reality. These instances, 
according to Wittgenstein are objects of comparison (e.g., the view that meaning must 
be reference, knowledge must be justified true belief) or  “prototypes,” that is, they are 
models with which our object of investigation (meaning, knowledge) can be compared. 
For instance, it might be useful to see meaning as correspondence of word and object. If 
we look at meaning this way, we might be able to clarify a certain set of cases. But what 
is problematic, according to Wittgenstein, is a conflation of the necessity expressed by 
our model with necessities located in the nature of language itself. For Wittgenstein, by 
contrast, “instead of asserting anything about an alleged necessity in actual language 
use,” an object of comparison “invites us to look at and examine language in the light of 
the necessity which the statement [e.g., meaning is correspondence of word and object] 
expresses” (Kuusela 2017, 341). Therefore, Wittgenstein allows us to propound the 
view that meaning is correspondence between word and object, conceived as an object 
of comparison with which language can be juxtaposed,, but cautions against the 
(palpably metaphysical) view that meaning must be correspondence tout court. This 
object of comparison specifically, and the mode of representation it involves broadly, is 
indexed to the philosophical context, to historically situated questions. In different 
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considerations about meaning, it might be completely unnecessary, non-salient or 
confusing to see correspondence as having a role.  
Let us get clearer about the role of objects of comparison and their purpose for 
Wittgenstein. To this end, let us turn to some remarks in the Philosophical 
Investigations: 
 
Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies 
for a future regularization of language—as it were first 
approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The 
language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison  which 
are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not 
only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. 
 
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by 
presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison— 
as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to 
which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we 
fall so easily in doing philosophy.) 
 
We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of 
language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many 
possible orders; not the order… (PI 130-132). 
 
In the remarks above, Wittgenstein says that his notion of “language-games”58 (and one 
                                                
58  Giving a definition of language-games is rather difficult and outside the spirit of 
Wittgenstein work, but one can say that language-games are examples that Wittgenstein 
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could add grammatical statements) should not be understood as a step towards a theory 
of language that would give us an account of what governs language. Rather, his 
examples of language-games are objects of comparison, which allow us to reveal 
similarities and differences between our actual language use and a given language-
game, which is useful for certain circumscribed purposes. If we hold, by contrast, the 
idea that language “must” fit X, we end up, as we saw in the paragraph above, being 
dogmatic. As the remark above and the remark cited prior to that suggests, dogmatism 
for Wittgenstein consists of an insistence on a “preconceived idea to which reality must 
correspond” (PI 131). We could say that what emerges from conflating the object of 
comparison (meaning is reference; meaning is use; knowledge is justified true belief) 
with necessary truths about reality itself is an attempt at giving one absolute and 
totalizing picture of reality and rejecting the possibility of alternatives (similar to the 
uniqueness problem discussed in Chapter 2). Wittgenstein’s problem is not that 
necessity is given a role in philosophical accounts; rather, what he finds problematic is 
that the projection of necessity, which belongs to a particular way of seeing things, onto 
reality as a whole. In doing so, we begin to hold whatever feature we believe is 
necessary to give us the genuine order of reality itself, i.e., reality itself is ordered by 
certain necessary features. As Wittgenstein says in the last of the above remarks, we 
want to make language and how it operates intelligible, that is, to give it some order; 
however, Wittgenstein’s intention is not to give us the order (PI 132), as philosophers 
commonly aim to, but one order, among others, that is useful given the purposes at 
hand.  
To bring these various themes together, Wittgenstein sees philosophical 
                                                                                                                                          
introduces as “resembling language.” He refers to language-games as “the practice of the 
use of language,”  “the process of naming stones and of repeating words after someone,” 
among other things (PI 7).  These language-games are introduced as objects of comparison 
that can shed light on some features of the phenomenon of language.  
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accounts as modes of representing reality. A mode of representing, or way of seeing is 
used as an  object of comparison with which objects of investigation (whatever we are 
investigating about reality) is juxtaposed keeping in view both similarities and 
differences between the object of comparison and what it seeks to investigate. 
Philosophers do not recognize that their accounts are models among other models, and 
claim to supply metaphysical truths about what is necessary and universal, without 
further qualification, for language, cognition, belief etc. while the necessity and 
universality operative in their account belongs only to their model. In this way, the 
distinction between object of comparison and object of investigation falls out of view; 
and dogmatism that claims to give us necessary and absolute truths about reality ensues. 
What, however, is Wittgenstein’s purpose of looking at philosophy in this way? 
I will now turn to what Wittgenstein means when he says that objects of 
comparison are advanced with a “particular end in view.” Basically, for Wittgenstein, 
objects of comparison serve a clarificatory role in conceptual investigations. To begin 
with conceptual investigations, philosophical accounts traditionally aim to give us 
answers to questions such as “What is language?” and then attempt to supply “an 
answer to these questions once and for all; and independently of any future experience” 
(PI 92). This is done, as we saw, by seeking the essence of our object of investigation, 
e.g., the essence of language. For Wittgenstein, by contrast, a conceptual investigation 
aims to give us a reconfiguration, rearrangement, or different ordering of facts about 
objects of investigation through different modes of representing it (RPP I 950). In 
reordering or rearranging it in a new way, and at times, in introducing new concepts that 
can help us think of the facts differently, we can make salient, for example, what other 
modes of representation were eclipsing in their way of seeing the object of 
investigation. In doing so, conceptual investigation aims to give us different ways of 
looking at our object of investigation that “may have advantages and consequences of 
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various kinds”  (RPP I 950). Wittgenstein’s aim is not to give us a metaphysical account 
of the essence of language etc., but clarifications by highlighting problems that arise 
under one mode of representation by introducing other, contrasting, modes of 
representation for which such problems do not arise. At the heart of this way of 
understanding the task of philosophy is Wittgenstein’s view that philosophical problems 
can be dissolved by looking at the object of investigation in a new way, that is, by 
reordering or reconfiguring certain facts about our object of investigation in such a way 
that we are released from what was philosophically perplexing.  
Describing this task of clarification, Wittgenstein says: 
 
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. 
But this simply means that the philosophical problems should 
completely disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes 
me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The 
one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented 
by questions which bring itself in question.—Instead, we now 
demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples 
can be broken off.— (PI 133). 
 
Complete clarity, according to Wittgenstein, is not to find an answer as philosophers 
traditional aimed to, but to find peace and relief from what we find perplexing. In other 
words, the task of philosophy, as Wittgenstein sees it, is the dissolution of problems 
through, connecting this remark to my discussion above, rearranging or reordering facts, 
introducing new ways of looking at things, which allows the problem to vanish. As 
Wittgenstein says, the way this is accomplished is through various examples that, one 
could add, invite us to look at what was perplexing in such a way that the perplexity 
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disappears.  
We are now in a position to bring these methodological considerations to bear 
on the topics of On Certainty. Let us recall some key aspects of Moore’s account and 
Wittgenstein’s take on it. The traditional epistemological views treat statements such as  
“there is an external world” as requiring justification. As epistemologists see it, and as 
we saw in Chapter 1,59 these statements are knowledge claims that can be doubted and 
justified. In order to justify these statements, as we saw in the previous section, Moore 
attempts to give a proof of the external world by casting truisms including “there is an 
external world” alongside others as knowledge claims that enjoy maximal certainty. 
These attempts, however, run into difficulties as we saw in the previous section, 
because Moore’s epistemic interpretation of these truisms misrepresents their role with 
respect to ordinary empirical knowledge claims. This conclusion does not lead 
Wittgenstein to take the position of the skeptic, arguing, for instance, that since these 
propositions cannot be defended, doubting them is justified; rather, as Wittgenstein sees 
it, both doubt and justification are illicit with respect to these propositions. Since 
Wittgenstein seeks to release us from the perplexities that result from Moore arguing 
that there is an external world and the skeptic insisting that such a statement cannot be 
adequately justified, Wittgenstein gives us a new way of looking at things, introducing 
the notion that we express certainties in statements which are not knowledge claims, 
and thus, beyond justification and doubt. Wittgenstein account of certainties as 
expressed by statements that are beyond doubt is an object of comparison with which 
the objects of our investigation, in this case, epistemic practices, Moorean propositions 
and so on, can be compared. Certainties in this non-epistemic perspective are part of 
                                                
59 Skeptical worries and attempts to refute them both consist of a dialectic that does not result 
in any solutions; the skeptic argues that there is always room for doubt and her counterpart 
insists that these claims are justified in one way or another. This leads to a dialectical 
gridlock of the kind that we saw in Chapter 1 
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Wittgenstein’s conceptual investigation and his clarificatory task: to rid us of the 
problem that perplexes us by providing a rearrangement of the facts, different analogies 
and comparisons, that allows us to be relieved from the specter of skepticism and the 
desire to refute it.  
We should be careful, however, not to sublimate the notion of certainties as a 
metaphysical account projected onto the object of investigation. Statements expressing 
certainties, as we will see, are necessary, universal, and non-empirical, but these are 
facets of our object of comparison, not a philosophical thesis to rival Moore’s, that 
share similarities (and differences) with what we are investigating. The success of this 
model, for Wittgenstein, does not depend on whether it can be established that the 
relation between certainty and knowledge claims that he proposes is metaphysically true 
(i.e., certainties are transcendental conditions for knowledge in precisely the same sense 
in which a priori forms of intuition and categories are transcendental conditions for 
cognition). Rather, the success of his model depends on whether we are released from 
the philosophical problem we began with through this way of looking at things. It 
should be added, that Wittgenstein does not claim that there is no correspondence or a 
perfect correspondence between the mode of comparison and what we are investigating. 
As Kuusela puts it, the object of comparison “is used to draw attention to certain 
characteristics of the objects of investigation, but to what extent the latter actually 
correspond to the former is left open” (Kuusela 2008, 125). 
This methodological insight will be crucial throughout what follows and, as we 
will see, allows us to understand the transcendental not as wedded to a metaphysical 
account of epistemic practices as such, but as an account that is indexed to a particular 
way of representing the object of investigation and is geared at relieving us of a 
philosophical perplexity. Keeping this in mind will be crucial for a non-dogmatic 
Wittgensteinian transcendental enterprise that is genuinely non-metaphysical. 
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3. The Enabling Role of Certainties 
Let us take up where we left in Section 1, where I indicated that Wittgenstein’s 
departure from Moore's account does not only include considerations about sense and 
nonsense, but goes further than that. In order to establish that statements that express 
certainties can be conceived as transcendental, we need to show that they play a 
necessary, universal, non-empirical and enabling role with respect to our epistemic 
judgments and practices. At the same time, we need to remain mindful of Wittgenstein’s 
methodological position in order to avoid conflating what he offers as an object of 
comparison with the object of investigation at hand. I will begin with the last feature of 
transcendental certainty statements, namely, the enabling role. To this extent 
Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
'Knowledge' and 'certainty' belong to different categories. They 
are not two 'mental states' like, say 'surmising' and 'being sure' [...] 
What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, 
we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical 
propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be 
possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not 
everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one 
(OC 308).  
 
In the above, Wittgenstein points to a categorial difference between knowledge claims 
and statements expressing certainties, which he develops in the rest of the remark. He 
begins by pointing out that certainty and knowledge are not “mental states,” an 
observation that becomes clearer in reference to various other passages in the text where 
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he asserts that he is not concerned with psychological or subjective certainty but with 
objective certainty. He remarks, for instance, that while subjective certainty consists of 
“a total absence of doubt,” embodied in one's comprehensive personal conviction about 
what one believes, objective certainty, by contrast, does not refer to this personal state 
of total conviction, but to the logical exclusion of doubt (OC 194).60 The logical 
exclusion of doubt can be expressed in the following way: if C is a certainty, then by 
virtue of this property, doubting C is impossible. The logical role of statements 
expressing certainties can be gleaned from the remark above as well: these statements 
must be held beyond doubt if “making judgments is to be possible at all,” that is to say, 
they are the condition for the possibility of making judgments. Their logical role is 
complemented by Wittgenstein’s suggestion that their status is non-empirical, evident in 
his hint that statements expressing certainties are not empirical propositions, even 
though they possess the form of empirical propositions. While Wittgenstein does not 
explicitly state what the categorial distinction between certainty and knowledge 
amounts to, the following can be gathered from the remark above: if knowledge claims 
are empirical and therefore dubitable, unlike knowledge claims, statements expressing 
                                                
60  Moyal-Sharrock presents a taxonomy of various kind of certainties, including subjective 
and objective certainty, but also linguistic hinges, or grammatical rules (“A is a physical 
object”); personal hinges (“My name is Wittgenstein”); local hinges, rules for a community 
in light of its background, say, scientific commitments (“Lunar travel is impossible”); and 
universal hinges, which Moyal-Sharrock holds are held by all human beings (“there is an 
external world”) (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 72). It is, of course, not clear how the distinction 
between these hinges can be maintained, since a linguistic hinge, for instance, can also 
serve as a personal or universal hinge. In any case, while Wittgenstein might be open to the 
view that certainty can be personal, in the passage I have cited, Wittgenstein wishes to 
clarify the logical role of certainty which a psychological reading would obscure. Therefo-
re, he explicitly states: “The physical game is just as certain as the arithmetical. But this 
can be misunderstood. My remark is a logical and not a psychological one” (OC 447). 
Understood psychological, we would conceive of the remark as a personal introspective 
feeling. Wittgenstein, by contrast, wants to point out the logical role of certainty.  
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certainties are non-empirical and indubitable. Wittgenstein, however, goes further. He 
observes that statements expressing certainties are distinct from knowledge claims 
because certainties possess an enabling role with respect to knowledge claims. Moore’s 
way of representing statements expressing certainties does not bring out these important 
features. In treating these statements as distinguished from knowledge claims and as 
serving a logical role, Wittgenstein offers a new way of conceiving of these statements, 
which allows us to see features of these statements that were previously obscured.  
According to Wittgenstein, Moore conflates statements expressing certainties 
with empirical knowledge claims, merely adding the proviso that the former statements 
are knowledge claims that enjoy a supreme degree of certainty. For Wittgenstein, as I 
have suggested above, Moore's error does not stop at a confusion of the grammatical 
and the factual (empirical), but goes further. Moore fails to recognize the role that 
statements expressing certainties have with respect to knowledge claims as evidenced in 
the following remarks: 
 
When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really 
enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm 
without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a 
peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions. 
  
Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows 
things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does 
know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore's 
assurance that he knows […] does not interest us. The 
propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such 
known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows 
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their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a 
similar role in the system of our empirical judgments (OC 136-
137) 
 
For Moore, statements expressing certainties are “empirical propositions which we 
affirm without special testing,” but on Wittgenstein's model, they serve “a peculiar 
logical role [that these propositions have] in the system of our empirical propositions” 
(OC 136). That is, their logical properties do not simply set them apart from empirical 
propositions; these properties also put them in a special relation with empirical 
propositions. In the second remark, Wittgenstein therefore points out that Moore's 
common sense psychological assurances are not ultimately interesting. What makes 
statements expressing certainties exceptional is that “they all have a similar role in the 
system of our empirical judgments” (OC 137). Whatever a particular certainty states, it 
is related to a set of empirical propositions in a way that is characteristic for all 
statements expressing certainties. As these statements are not knowledge claims 
themselves, they cannot give an epistemic foundation to empirical propositions. Their 
peculiar properties (they are indubitable and unjustifiable) suggests that statements 
expressing certainties frame empirical propositions and thus make them possible. 
Evidently, then, for Wittgenstein, one fundamental area of contrast between his mode of 
representation and Moore's is that the latter neglects the peculiar role of certainties with 
respect to empirical propositions.  
 It is important to point out, however, that this enabling role has to be 
characterized not as giving us the presuppositions for knowledge without qualification; 
rather, this enabling role serves as an object of comparison, as pointed out above, which 
is juxtaposed with statements that Moore treats as knowledge claims. Unlike the 
Kantian account, for instance, which gives us conditions for the possibility of cognition, 
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Wittgenstein is not offering a similar account of the nature of epistemic practices and 
what enables them. The enabling feature of statements expressing certainties should not 
be projected onto epistemic practices and what they involve; rather, this is an invitation 
to look at similarities between the object of comparison and the object of investigation 
(epistemic practices and what they involve). Wittgenstein is attempting to remove 
obscurities that result from Moore’s epistemic account of statements expressing 
certainties, by presenting these statements as non-epistemic and enabling. That 
Wittgenstein  pursues this strategy can be substantiated if we consider the following 
remark: “When one hears Moore say "I know that that's a tree", one suddenly 
understands those who think that that has by no means been settled. The matter strikes 
one all at once as being unclear and blurred. It is as if Moore had put it in the wrong 
light” (OC 481).  
So far, we have seen adumbrations of a transcendental reading according to 
which statements expressing certainties are seen as serving an enabling role.  
Wittgenstein points out the logical role of these statements with respect to knowledge 
claims and subsequently develops their transcendental dimension as conditions for the 
possibility of empirical claims and practices. But Wittgenstein’s conception of 
certainties is a new way of representing matters that can clarify “the unclear and 
blurred” way in which Moore understands them. Although this interpretation needs 
further textual corroboration, it is fair to say that apart from the considerations 
concerning sense and nonsense that we have seen above, Wittgenstein finds Moore's 
account problematic because it disregards the peculiar role certainties have with respect 
to empirical judgments. On Wittgenstein’s model, this role is one of enabling 
judgments, or, to use Wittgenstein's metaphor, providing hinges on which our epistemic 
practices turn (OC 341). In what follows I will substantiate the transcendental reading 
by examining the role necessity, universality and apriority play for certainties. To 
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further substantiate this reading we have to ask in what way statements expressing 
certainties make knowledge claims possible. 
 
4. Necessity and Universality 
If we keep in mind that the enabling role accorded to statements that are an expression 
of certainties belongs to them understood as an object of comparison and in order to 
shed light on certain features of our practices, we do stop short of the metaphysical 
perspective that our practices must be arranged in this and only this way. When I turn to 
necessity and universality next, this insight will be all the more important. Wittgenstein 
does not take the necessity and universality of certainties to be a self-standing thesis 
about what we must hold as beyond doubt and justification for knowledge to be possible 
as such. The necessity and universality in question belong to Wittgenstein’s object of 
comparison with which the object of our investigation (which as we see consists of a 
constellation of concepts such as knowledge, propositions that are unassailable, doubt 
etc.) can be compared. 
First, in order to justify my discussion of the topic of necessity and universality, 
let me substantiate Wittgenstein’s conception of certainties as possessing these features. 
Wittgenstein often suggests that a relation of presupposition exists between certainties 
and what they enable as expressed clearly in the following remarks: “The game of 
doubting presupposes certainty” OC 115; “isn't this 'certainty' (already) presupposed in 
the language-game?” OC 446). This relation shows up especially in light of the hinge 
metaphor: “If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put” (OC 343),  "Dispute 
about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn" (OC 
655), and “the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn” (OC 
341). If epistemic procedures such as doubt, enquiry, justification and so on cannot take 
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off without presupposing certainty, it is safe to assume certainty is in some sense 
necessary for these particular practices. This view is supported further by how 
Wittgenstein spells out the relation between certainties and the empirical judgments 
they make possible (OC 21). Wittgenstein suggests that certain propositions must be 
treated as unassailable, “fixed,” “removed from the traffic” and “shunted to an unused 
siding” for epistemic practices of various kinds to be possible. He offers various reasons 
for this. We have already seen that one reason is that doubting or justifying certainties is 
nonsensical. A further reason is that epistemic language-games simply would not be 
possible if propositions were subject to boundless doubt (OC 337, OC 519). Certainties 
are expressed by statements at which doubts have to stop. In turn, abandoning certainty 
statements at which doubts have to stop would result in the dissolution of intelligibility 
for empirical statements. This furthermore applies to certainties, not as a personal or 
subjective matter, but universally (OC 440). These remarks make clear that certainties 
are necessary; epistemic practices simply would not get off the ground if we directed 
boundless doubt to every proposition. I will now turn to the kind of necessity and 
universality that certainties embody by looking at a few contrasting positions, first 
Strawson’s metaphysical account in Individuals and then Moyal-Sharrock’s reading of 
certainties as universal hinges. 
 
4.1 The Emergence of Certainties 
According to Wittgenstein’s model, we can conceive of certainties as particular 
propositions that emerge as necessary over time through a sedimentation of empirical 
statements, rather than as static and unchanging features of an inner domain as Kant's 
transcendental idealism or neo-Kantian approaches such as Strawson's conceptual 
scheme suggest. Strawson’s is an interesting case because he rejects Kant’s 
transcendental idealism yet maintains that there is a dimension of human thinking which 
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is immutable in its “fundamental character;” this dimension is the subject matter of what 
he calls “descriptive metaphysics” and remains changeless despite differences in the 
idiom in which – for various contingent reasons – we express it (Strawson 1959, 10-11). 
Though Wittgenstein and Strawson can be said to share a concern with description, their 
goals are entirely different. These different intentions have implications for the 
necessity operative in their accounts. For example, Wittgenstein does not take himself 
to be describing the conceptual scheme that is underneath differences in idiom. The 
idiom cannot be separated from what it represents insofar as the idiom and what it 
represents are equally open to view. Further, in contrast to Strawson’s position, the 
necessity of statements expressing certainties is, according to Wittgenstein’s model, not 
a fixed feature of the human conceptual scheme, but emerges as part of a dynamic and 
shifting process. Strawson's presentation of what one could call a static account of the 
basic concepts that govern human thinking rules out the possibility that these basic 
concepts might be established just like other concepts and, therefore, might also change. 
Wittgenstein's contrast to a static account is clearly exemplified by the riverbed 
analogy: 
 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels 
for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; 
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions 
hardened, and hard ones became fluid (OC 96). 
 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed 
of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of 
the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though 
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there is not a sharp division of the one from the other (OC 97). 
 
But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" 
he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may 
get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at 
another as a rule of testing (OC 98). 
 
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to 
no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, 
which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or 
deposited (OC 99). 
  
While Wittgenstein names logic specifically in these remarks, their larger context 
addresses certainties (where Wittgenstein speaks of “Moore’s propositions” as a world-
picture or a mythology). In the remark above, it is evident that unlike the concepts of 
Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, propositions that express certainties can sediment 
over the course of time, but they can also crumble away, becoming empirical 
propositions again. Thus, they are not insulated from change. It could be that the 
certainty that the earth has existed for thousands of years is one of those certainties 
which “changes not at all” but only imperceptibly, but as we will see in what follows, 
there is no clear or principled way in which we can distinguish between certainties that 
are more fixed than others. The riverbed analogy suggests that there is no sharp or 
absolute distinction between certainty statements (the riverbed) and empirical 
propositions (the movement of the waters), but this does not rule out that I can 
differentiate between the two. In other words, in some cases the distinction between 
certainty and empirical propositions may be clear; and in other cases it may be 
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ambiguous. Again in the imagery of Wittgenstein’s analogy, some certainties are like 
hard rock, that is, they do not change or change merely imperceptibly, while other 
certainties are like sand, that is, they fluctuate and shift more readily.  
 Given that certainties can change, we might be led to the view that what 
Wittgenstein is describing are empirical propositions that have a special status, and thus, 
propositions that have the status of certainties belong to the empirical domain and 
embody something analogous to an anthropological or historical account of the 
statements people take for granted. When Wittgenstein points out in the above that the 
relation between certainties and empirical propositions “altered with time” and that 
propositions that have the status of certainties can become empirical propositions and 
vice versa, it might appear that Wittgenstein is providing just such an empirical account. 
However, at the same time, we saw in the preceding sections that Wittgenstein’s 
account of certainties is logical and not empirical. How are we to understand these 
contrasting features -- first the view that statements expressing certainties are non-
empirical and logical, which suggests that they do not change, and second the view that 
propositions that have the status of certainties can change, once again becoming 
empirical propositions as we saw in the riverbed analogy? 
 If the empirical perspective and a more robust metaphysical interpretation of 
certainties are the only two interpretive options available to us, we face an unwelcome 
oscillation. On the one hand, if statements expressing certainties are conceived as 
empirical, remarks elsewhere that suggest they are logical and non-empirical become 
impossible to explain. On the other hand, in rejecting this empirical reading and holding 
that statements expressing certainties are in some sense metaphysical, emphasizing the 
certainties that “change not at all or only imperceptibly,” we cannot explain how 
propositions that have the status of certainty statements can also come to lose this status 
and become empirical propositions. As we will see, the way out of this dilemma is to 
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recognize that statements expressing certainties are objects of comparison, that is, a 
mode of representation. Under this methodological framework, issues surrounding the 
changeable character of certainties can be resolved without oscillation.  
We can see the clearly how this oscillation arises by taking a look at Danielle 
Moyal-Sharrock’s (2004) account. While her account avoids empiricising certainties 
straight away, it has serious shortcomings. According to Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein 
incorporates change into his account of certainties by distinguishing between “local 
hinges” and “universal hinges” (Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 147). The latter, she argues, 
refers to a “universal grammar” that fixes the bounds for the human form of life; and the 
former refers to “culture variant” certainties true for a certain number of people at a 
given time and place. Moyal-Sharrock explains the universality of propositions 
expressing certainties by presenting an anthropological example of a tribe where some 
women are thought to be able to fly, but crucially, it is believed that the women exit 
their bodies before they take off or possess doubles in the form of fireflies (Moyal-
Sharrock 2004, 176). According to Moyal-Sharrock, this suggests that the universal 
hinge “human beings cannot fly unaided” is not transgressed, but accommodated. She 
thinks that if these women were to try to jump off a cliff in a bid to fly, their attempt 
could be characterized as pathological. On this view, universal hinges are analogous to 
Strawson’s conceptual scheme: they give us the fundamental certainties held by all 
members of the human form of life.  
Moyal-Sharrock’s account, however, faces serious problems. First, it is not clear 
on which grounds we could judge individuals who flew off a cliff to be pathological, 
since it could be part of the spiritual narrative that the soul splits from the body during 
the attempt. After all, it is a common religious idea that the soul and the body are 
equally real components of a person, except the soul is not bound by physical laws and 
for this reason does not need an airplane or a parachute but can, indeed, fly unaided. It 
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seems Moyal-Sharrock’s view that the tribe must accommodate universal hinges only 
works if we presuppose that language games based on “our science and education” are 
ultimately operative everywhere (OC 298). After all, it can be imagined that what we 
take to be universal, for instance, “human beings cannot fly unaided,” might turn out to 
be merely local. For terms like “universal” employed here can actually turn out to be 
local to us. It is our way of life that tells us that human beings, understood as a material 
category, cannot fly unaided. It is an unwarranted assumption to hold that this world-
view is the truly universal one to which everyone else must accommodate theirs.  
Secondly, Moyal-Sharrock does not explain how a principled distinction 
between a local and a universal certainty can be established. It is not clear how we can 
arrive at a principled way of distinguishing certainties that are “subject to no alteration” 
from certainties that are open to modification, because we would need a view from 
nowhere, an unchanging and non-situated perspective, to indicate how the two differ 
(OC 99). Moyal-Sharrock’s account of the universality of certainties relies on the 
unwarranted view that what might be universal for us is ultimately operative 
everywhere and that the distinction between local and universal hinges can be 
established in a principled fashion. It is difficult, however, to attribute this view to 
Wittgenstein who given his remarks on method, cautions against the dogmatism of 
views on which one way of representing an object of investigation must apply to all 
instances of the object of investigation. Indeed, if we take Wittgenstein’s conception of 
certainties as a mode of representation, we are not entitled to abstract them from their 
task of clarification and take them as self-standing universal hinges that tell us what is 
certain for the human life form as a whole, everywhere and at all times (OC 92, OC 
132). Wittgenstein, as we saw, is opposed to totalization, that is, the denial or 
effacement of difference that such a metaphysically charged account endorses. For if we 
were to assume truly universal hinges, we would need to assume a common unchanging 
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reality that unifies diverse communities and practices, for instance, the unvarying 
“essence” of the human form of life in which universal hinges would be grounded.61 
This account would take the necessity and universality of statements expressing 
certainties, which, according to the methodological considerations we have seen above, 
are features of certainties understood as an object of comparison, and project it onto our 
object of investigation, our epistemic practices and what they involve. This projection 
deprives us of the possibility of taking the necessity and universality of statements 
expressing certainties as one way of seeing matters that is profitable for the purposes of 
clarifying a philosophical problem. Moyal-Sharrock’s reading might place Wittgenstein 
closer to metaphysical transcendental perspectives like Strawson’s, which attempt to 
give us the universal scheme or conditions of human practice and belief, but it does not 
get us closer to the kind of non-dogmatic transcendental account that, on my reading, 
can be plausibly gleaned from On Certainty. 
 
4.2 Non-Temporality  
Let us now return to our dilemma. If certainties are not interpreted in the robust sense 
advocated by Moyal-Sharrock, we may risk interpreting them as empirical; as I pointed 
out, this stands in tension with Wittgenstein’s remarks that statements expressing 
certainties are at the same time logical and non-empirical. This tension arises once we 
attempt to give a place to the logical (and non-empirical) status of these statements and 
their temporal features (propositions can lose their status as expressing a certainty and 
become empirical) without keeping in view the methodological view that Wittgenstein’s 
account of statements expressing certainties are objects of comparison. The key to this 
                                                
61 We can relate the difficulty of arguing for universal hinges to the problem associated with 
the “uniqueness condition,” the view that one concept or conceptual scheme uniquely or 
without alternatives enables a phenomenon, such as cognition or perception discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
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puzzle, as I hope to show, is drawing out consequences of statements expressing 
certainties conceived as an object of comparison, which presents us with a third option 
between a metaphysically charged understanding on the one hand, and an empirical 
understanding of certainties on the other.  
 For Wittgenstein, a mode of representation is non-temporal.62 When a mode of 
representation is used as an object of comparison it is brought into contact with an 
actual practice or philosophical problem. Objects of comparison are used in certain 
historical circumstances, with a view to historically situated philosophical problems. 
However, statements expressing certainties, even though they are from this broad 
perspective historically situated, are treated as non-temporal objects of comparison. 
Wittgenstein comments on this non-temporal character of statements used as objects of 
comparison when he discusses grammatical rules: 
 
What I call a ‘rule’ is not meant to entail anything about any 
determinate (or also indeterminate) time or place of use, and not 
to refer to any determinate (or indeterminate) persons; but to be 
merely an instrument of representation. (MS 113, 29v). 
 
Statements expressing grammatical rules, such as “meaning is use” or “meaning is 
correspondence of word and object”, conceived as an object of comparison, are 
“instruments of representation.” These statements are to be compared with actual cases, 
namely, our objects of investigation. But they are not themselves empirical or 
sempiternal; their non-temporality is an inbuilt qualification. To understand this point 
more clearly, we can turn to Wittgenstein’s analogy between grammatical rules and the 
                                                
62  For Wittgenstein, all philosophical accounts are modes of representation. Metaphysical 
accounts take what are actually non-temporal features of their model to constitute a 
sempiternal account of their object of inquiry.  
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non-temporal statements of mathematics. Take the following statement: “'The 100 
apples in this box consist of 50 and 50 – here the non-temporal character of 'consist' is 
important. For it does not mean that now, or just for a time, they consist of 50 and 50” 
(RFM 101). On the one hand, this statement concerns the fact that this box contains 
hundred apples at this time, which is obviously a temporal fact about a box and what it 
contains. But if we look at the mathematical relation between 100 and 50 + 50, the 
statement is non-temporal. It is not just that for this box, 100 consists of 50 and 50. The 
latter mathematical relation does not stand or fall with any particular states of affairs; as 
Kuusela puts it, conceived as a mathematical relation, this statement “does not concern 
any particular occasion or occasions but is employed to make a statement about the 
concept of a hundred [that holds] universally for all cases in which we talk about a 
hundred in the relevant meaning, independently, as it were, of any contingent facts of 
the world” (Kuusela 2008, 196).63 At the same time, these mathematical statements do 
not describe essences of numbers that are immutable and that cannot change, as a 
metaphysical account would hold. Such an account would be forced to posit numbers as 
mysterious superfactual entities, when they are relations between concepts (Kuusela 
2008, 197). To explain this point further, Wittgenstein conceives of such statements as 
grammatical rules that do not tell us about the metaphysical essence of, for example, 
“numbers,” “colors,” etc., but are “nontemporal statement[s] that describe…conceptual 
                                                
63  Elsewhere Wittgenstein remarks “'White is lighter than black.' This expression too is non-
temporal and it too expresses the existence of an internal relation” (RFM 104). White and 
black, just as light and dark, are embedded respectively in conceptual “paradigms,” such 
that black and dark belong together under one paradigm and white and light belong to 
another. “The proposition” white is lighter than black, according to Wittgenstein, “is non-
temporal because it only expresses the connection of the words 'white,' 'black' and 'lighter' 
with a paradigm” (RFM 75-76). The internal relations of these terms do not stand and fall 
with their contingent, external, occurrence but are precisely necessary connections between 
paradigms. At the same time, as with the example of mathematical statements, this internal 
relation is not an immutable essence, but a non-temporal relation. 
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relation[s]” between, in our example above, 100 = 50 + 50. Keep in mind, however, that 
Wittgenstein is not advancing, say, a linguistic account or theory that presents the nature 
of numbers as grammatical, contrary to, for example, Platonic theories. Grammar is not 
the metaphysical essence of language, but, once again, an object of comparison, a way 
of representing certain statements, for the purpose of clarifying philosophical 
perplexities, e.g., it tries to clarify how we should understand the necessity of 
mathematical relations -- as metaphysical entities or as empirical etc. 
If we understand statements expressing certainties as similarly non-temporal 
objects of comparison, Wittgenstein’s riverbed analogy cannot be said to be describing 
an empirical process of change according to which propositions that have the status of 
certainties lose this status, and instead of necessary and universal for empirical 
propositions, become empirical propositions themselves.  If we do not keep in mind that 
statements expressing certainties are non-temporal, some examples from On Certainty 
strike us as confusing. Take his example of the certainty “no one has ever been to the 
moon” (OC 108). It would seem that one way to understand Wittgenstein’s view of the 
statement “no one has ever been to the moon” is to consider it to be empirical; it once 
had the status of a certainty, but now it is an empirical proposition and this shows us 
that certainties are ultimately empirical – for us this proposition does not express a 
certainty, but has become an empirical proposition; for our ancestors it has been 
indubitable, but now due to certain historical facts, it is an empirical proposition we can 
show to be false by reference to evidence of the moon landing. It would sound, then, 
that Wittgenstein’s remarks were intended anthropologically, as diachronic statements 
about a particular community or set of epistemic practices. If we take Moyal-Sharrock’s 
perspective, the statement “no one has ever been to the moon” was a local hinge, open 
to variation, less robust than universal hinges that are fixed and beyond change. We 
have seen, however, that both of these options run into difficulties; on the one hand, 
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Wittgenstein is not offering an anthropological or historical account; on the other hand, 
the distinction between local and universal hinges cannot be maintained. If we bring the 
view that statements expressing certainties are objects of comparison – like the 
grammatical rule 50 + 50 = 100 – to bear on this example, we can say that, conceived as 
an object of comparison, the statement “no one has ever been to the moon” is non-
temporal. This, of course, does not mean that the proposition “no one has ever been to 
the moon” is non-temporal. Wittgenstein did not intend for it to be a statement that is 
true for all times and all places or as embodying an anthropological fact, but as a way of 
representing the logical relation between some propositions that are unassailable and 
empirical propositions or practices. Wittgenstein claims that statements expressing 
certainties as an object of comparison are being used non-temporally, because they are a 
model, a prototype, or a way of seeing things. The non-temporal statement is used as an 
object of comparison with respect to something temporal, i.e., our practices that the 
philosopher wants to make intelligible in a certain historical setting. In this sense, the 
comparison is temporal, as it is directed at clarifying an actual practice in a historical 
setting. To use the example of mathematics from above, that 50 + 50 = 100 is a 
nontemporal statement; but when I count 50 apples in one box and 50 in another and 
have 100 apples, I am making a temporal use of the non-temporal rule 50 + 50 = 100. 
Wittgenstein’s conception of certainties shares this feature with mathematical 
statements. As a mode of representation or more specifically, an object of comparison, 
they can brought into contact with an actual or temporal practice; the mode itself, 
however, is not temporal. 
 Another example might be instructive. Traditional philosophical accounts give 
us perspectives on change and transformation that are non-empirical in the sense that 
these perspectives are sempiternal, always true for all transformations everywhere. For 
instance, according to Marxism all of human history is teleological, that is, societies go 
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through transformations and revolutions to arrive at a classless society. For 
Wittgenstein, that statements, which are certain can lose their status is not a sempiternal 
truth about how all human practices evolve. It is a model, which can shed light on a 
historically indexed set of philosophical problems and not a metaphysical account of 
transformation and change. At the same time, as we saw above, to take this model to be 
an empirical account misses the crucial third route: an understanding of statements 
expressing certainties as non-temporal objects of comparison with which we can 
compare objects of investigation, once again, (epistemic) practices, statements which 
are unassailable, doubt, justification etc., in order to bring out the logical relation we 
have explored in the previous section. The aim of bringing out this relation is to clarify 
the philosophical problems that arise, for example, from Moore’s way of conceiving 
these statements expressing certainties. We will return to this point below. 
 If we consider the three perspectives on certainties we have examined so far, 
empirical, metaphysical, and as an object of comparison (like grammatical rules), 
different conclusions emerge with respect to the necessity and universality of 
certainties. In the empirical or anthropological case, the necessity and universality of 
statements expressing certainties is merely conventional and in force for a certain time 
and place. Conventionalism would ground necessity and universality in tacit stipulations 
that human communities are agreed on (Dummett 1993, 447). However, in this context, 
Wittgenstein cannot be construed as a conventionalist. The view that the necessity and 
universality of statements expressing certainties is grounded in convention is in tension 
with Wittgenstein’s remarks that certainties are groundless (OC 66). If we look at 
certainties from a metaphysical perspective, on the other hand, the necessity and 
universality of certainties is a sempiternal truth about all human life forms. In this case, 
we take Wittgenstein to be advancing a metaphysical thesis about the grounds of human 
practices. We have seen that Wittgenstein cautions against the view that we can give the 
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essence or the order (PI 132) of what we are investigating. The last option is to take 
necessity and universality to be features of an object of comparison. Statements 
expressing certainties, conceived as a mode of representation, like grammatical rules, 
possess necessity and universality. When they are used as objects of comparison, they 
do not postulate or project what is necessary and universal onto the object of 
investigation. The extent to which the object of comparison and the object of 
investigation correspond remains an open question from Wittgenstein’s methodological 
perspective. If this methodological perspective is not recognized, we are quickly led to 
the view that certainties are either conventions or sempiternal truths, which means that 
we have to establish conclusions about the nature of necessity or universality involved. 
As we have seen in Part I of this thesis, fixed modal intuitions throw the transcendental 
into disarray. Wittgenstein’s methodological perspective does not have this 
consequence; hence its potential for a reformulated transcendental.    
 To give further credence to this reading, I would like to turn to the 
Wittgenstein’s peculiar literary style that is not just characteristic of On Certainty, but 
of his work more broadly. It is virtually impossible to ignore the recurrence of modal 
qualifiers throughout the text  (“it could be,” “one could say,” “it is as if,” “we can also 
imagine,” “one might grant,” “But in that case isn't it like this”) alongside the question 
marks with which many remarks containing substantive “theses” conclude. To disregard 
these considerations as trivial is to ignore the fact that Wittgenstein is not asserting, in 
the style of ordinary philosophical accounts, theses about his object of investigation that 
proceed unscrupulously and with only a few examples to supply overarching 
conclusions. As Katherine Morris points out, Wittgenstein's use of modal qualifiers 
should not be disregarded as merely stylistic or, when convenient, exploited to meet 
certain exegetical aims (Morris 1994). Attention to these qualifiers can bring to light 
that his interest, far from offering an empirical or metaphysical account of the object of 
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inquiry, is to bring to light diverse ways of seeing things, offering alternatives to the 
pictures that lead to philosophical quandaries and elicits the need for positive 
philosophical solutions. These modal qualifiers and, what at times seem like hesitations 
and questions, suggest, as has been argued above, that Wittgenstein is attempting to see 
the matter at hand in different ways, or to use the technical terminology, he is 
addressing the situation through a different mode of representing the place of Moorean 
truisms in our (epistemic) practices that would dissipate the philosophical perplexity 
that arises from, for instance, failing to see the enabling role of the former with respect 
to the latter. 
If we bring this to bear on the necessity and universality of statements 
expressing certainties, we can see a truly non-dogmatic way of understanding the 
transcendental. Statements expressing certainties, understood as an object of 
comparison, articulate enabling conditions that bring to light relevant features of the 
object of investigation by telling us how these features are possible. But these features 
may also be brought to light by other statements of certainties or in another way, not by 
asking how these features are possible but, for example, by looking at their definition, 
and so forth. So Wittgenstein’s statements expressing certainties do not settle once and 
for all what makes our practices possible, but they also do not leave the terrain to mere 
convention.  
We have so far considered the features of certainties as enabling, necessary, and 
universal and their role as objects of comparison with respect to a constellation of 
topics. But our picture of Wittgenstein’s contribution to a new understanding of the 
transcendental is not complete without taking into account what he has to say about the 
a priori. Transcendental claims characteristically involve a commitment to apriority. 
Therefore, I will turn to a Wittgensteinian construal of the non-empirical status of 
certainties in the next section. Before I do so, I will examine a standard transcendental 
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way of reading Wittgenstein, which construes him as advancing a form of 
transcendental idealism. My contrast with this position will bring into sharp relief how 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the non-empirical should be understood. 
 
5. Apriority 
Wittgenstein distinguishes knowledge and certainty on the basis of the empirical nature 
of the former and the non-empirical nature of the latter (OC 308). This places 
statements expressing certainties on the non-empirical side. It is important to point out, 
however, that a statement like “I have a hand” can be used empirically if the context is 
appropriate, that is, if it makes sense, for example, to adduce evidence for the fact that I 
have a hand; but when used as an object of comparison, a statement like “I have a hand” 
plays a logical role and expresses something non-empirical. Unlike empirical 
propositions, statements expressing certainties are not open to falsification or 
confirmation, they cannot be doubted or justified, and they are not “true” but are 
conditions for the possibility of distinguishing between true and false (OC 94). Then, 
while empirical propositions, such as knowledge claims, have evidential grounds, 
statements expressing certainties have no grounds whether evidential or rational 
(Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 12). Further, the formation of certainties is often incremental 
and non-reflective (OC 457): it is not because of an explicit process, such as an 
experiment, that we believe that the earth has existed for thousands of years. It is the 
sum total, the background, or, as Wittgenstein sometimes says, the mythology that 
guides us, so that we cannot allocate specific reasons in favor of a given statement 
expressing certainties (OC 95, OC 97, OC 162, 167). These remarks collectively 
support the view that statements expressing certainties are non-empirical. 
The move here, it can be argued, is Kantian in some respects. The scaffolding of 
experience, for Kant, does not belong to reality itself, but to our (a priori) way of 
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representing it; dogmatic metaphysics goes wrong, in Kant’s view, when it predicates 
what belongs to the scaffolding of experience to reality itself (as Kant explains in the 
Transcendental Dialectic). Kant, however, aims to furnish an immutable and universal 
framework of experience or empirical knowledge – that is, a metaphysical scaffolding 
of experience. In this sense, Kant replaces realist metaphysics with immanent or idealist 
metaphysics, centered on his notion that the genesis of the conditions of experience is a 
priori, i.e., has its source in the cognitive structure of the subject and for that reason is 
non-empirical. It has been asserted that Wittgenstein pursues a comparable course of 
argument; on this interpretation, grammar or, in our present case, certainties would 
serve as the scaffolding of knowledge or empirical judgments, which owes its a priori 
status to its subjective source.64 In what follows, I will argue that such a transcendental 
idealist reading of Wittgenstein conflates his account of the non-empirical with the 
Kantian a priori. To bring this problem into sharp relief, I will focus on relevant aspects 
of Bernard Williams’ (1981) interpretation of Wittgenstein according to which he 
advances a form of transcendental idealism. 
 
                                                
64 Such a conclusion seems difficult to avoid, if we consider readings such as the following: “in 
Wittgenstein’s view, what appear to be necessities of nature, and what Kant argued to be a 
priori principles that the understanding imposes on intuitions to constitute nature, are no 
more than shadows cast upon nature by the grammar of our language” (Hacker 2013, 36). 
To avoid this conclusion, it can be argued that grammar has its source both in us and in 
reality. Baker and Hacker, for instance, hold that mathematical concepts though they are 
not answerable to reality (because they do not correspond to facts) are nonetheless 
constrained by “our nature and the nature and stability of the world we inhabit” (Baker and 
Hacker 2009, 216). We have seen in the previous chapter that Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
complicity and co-constitution of subject and world can be said to offer a similar resolution 
to an oscillation between realism and idealism. As I will argue, in what follows, however, 
such a conclusion is difficult to defend with respect to Wittgenstein due to his methodology 
and his agnosticism with respect to the question of sources. 
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5.1 The Non-Empirical and Transcendental Idealism  
As opposed to transcendental realism, transcendental idealism emphasizes the 
subjective or inner genesis of the conditions of experience, and therefore draws a 
distinction between how things are for us (dependent on subjective constraints on our 
representations) and how things are in themselves (independent of these constraints). 
Lear (1984) and Williams (1981), famously argue for, and affirm, a transcendental 
idealist interpretation of Wittgenstein.  
An indication of putatively transcendental idealist views can be gleaned from On 
Certainty: “'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain 
of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and 
education” (OC 298).  It might be argued that by appealing to our communal practices 
(science, education, and so on), this remark places the source of statements expressing 
certainties on the subjective side. If we consider, further, that these statements are non-
empirical and serve an enabling role with respect to our epistemic practices, 
Wittgenstein can be viewed as advancing a form of idealism. Just as Kant held that the 
categories together with the a priori forms of intuition (the cognitive apparatus of the 
subject) make cognition possible, Wittgenstein can be seen as asserting that the non-
empirical (a priori) statements expressing certainties make epistemic practices possible. 
In taking statements expressing certainties to be communal, rather than subjective in the 
Kantian sense, i.e., belonging to each individual subject, Wittgenstein advances, it could 
be argued, a first person plural idealism.  
 The view that Wittgenstein advances a first person plural idealism has been 
suggested and defended by Bernard Williams (1981). On Williams’ view Wittgenstein’s 
transcendental idealism is evident in “[t]he fact that […] everything can be expressed 
only via human interests and concerns, things which are expressions of mind, and which 
themselves cannot ultimately be explained in any further terms: that provides grounds, I 
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suggest, for calling such a view a kind of idealism” (Williams 1981, 153). Williams 
argues that Wittgenstein holds in his later work that our language places constraints on 
our experience of the world; in other words, our language is a condition for the 
possibility of experience and knowledge (Williams 1981, 147). Yet the “our” in this 
context is not an anthropological or particular “we;” rather it is the “plural descendant of 
that idealist I” (Williams 1981, 160). When Wittgenstein says in the remark from On 
Certainty above that we are bound by our science and education, he does not mean, 
according to Williams, that there would be communities that are incommensurable with 
ours given whatever science or education they practice; rather, anything that is 
identified as a community counts as “we.” If we can conceive of something as a 
community, then it already belongs to “we”, for if they were genuinely 
incommensurable with us, we would not identify them as community at all, not even as 
a different community (Williams 1981, 160). As Williams puts it, “[i]f they are groups 
with which we are in the universe, and we can understand the fact (namely, that they are 
groups with a language, etc.), then they also belong to ‘we’” (cited by Bolton 1982, 278; 
Williams 1981, 160).  
However, this transcendental idealist reading is possible only if we interpret 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the non-empirical as the Kantian a priori, which has 
subjective genesis. In order to clarify this point, it is important to keep in view that 
Williams relies on the a priori status of the “we” in question – it is not an item in the 
world, it is not an empirical or anthropological “we” – and language relates to the “we” 
in a manner analogous to the way that Kant’s categories relate to the transcendental ego. 
As Derek Bolton (1982) points out, the “we” is “transcendental […] namely, in that our 
language has a non-empirical status, and reaches right to the limits of what is 
comprehensible to us” and as he explains later, this non-empirical status is being 
understood by Williams as tantamount to the a priori (279, 280). For Williams to be 
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able to read Wittgenstein as an idealist, he needs to view language as something 
anchored in us. Language belongs to how the world is constituted and therefore cannot 
be conceived as anything but subjective, whether the subjective is understood as the 
singular I of a transcendental ego or the plural we of a linguistic community. 
Let me explain why these grounding considerations are essential for an idealist 
account. We saw above on realist accounts the source of language or any other 
phenomenon such as experience is the world or reality itself (conceived as mind-
independent). Idealism aims to undercut this thesis, but in order to do so, it must show 
us that the ground of the target phenomenon is not reality, but an inner domain, whether 
understood as a singular I, like Kant’s transcendental ego, or a plural we, like William’s 
conception of a linguistic community. It is only if we understand the community as 
some kind of inner realm that the idealist thesis can be substantiated. If, for instance, the 
community is conditioned by reality as such – a natural occurrence, as it were – then the 
idealist thesis collapses. Central to the idealist position, then, is the view that the non-
empirical features of our language point to something inner or to the a priori as Kant 
conceives it. A grounding of language or an explanation of the nature of our community 
as turning on idealism is problematic, however, given what Williams’ himself says: 
“everything can be expressed only via human interests and concerns, things which are 
expressions of mind, and which themselves cannot ultimately be explained in any 
further terms” (Williams 1981, 153). It is not clear, however, whether human interests 
and concerns can be understood as “expressions of mind” 65 – especially, given that 
human interests and concerns are not further explicable, any such grounding of these 
interests and concerns in the mind seems unjustified. If we take human activity and 
concerns to be beyond further explication, as William’s himself suggests, we are not 
warranted, contrary to Williams, to provide further grounding of these features either in 
                                                
65 Lear also takes human activity to be an expression of mindedness.  
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realism or idealism.  
Let us return to the role of the a priori in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and 
compare it with the above. If Wittgenstein’s conception of the non-empirical is 
tantamount to Kant’s we cannot explain how statements that once had the status of 
certainties can also come to lose this status as we saw in the context of the riverbed 
analogy (OC 96-99; OC 108).  A Kantian pure a priori, as being grounded in the 
subject, could not similarly be displaced because of its absolute independence from 
experience and thus from contingency and change. If we want to remain within the 
Kantian paradigm, the only other option we have would be to interpret certainties as an 
impure a priori, that is, as instances of inductive generalization (CPR B2). But 
Wittgenstein explicitly argues against the notion that we arrive at certainties through a 
process of induction (OC 287). As statements expressing certainties are not knowledge 
claims, they cannot be put together from empirical observations. Thus, neither the pure 
nor the impure a priori can adequately capture the a priori with which Wittgenstein is 
concerned. It cannot be ignored that Wittgenstein does not use the word a priori 
throughout the text, but suggests that statements expressing certainties can be conceived 
as non-empirical. As we have seen above, considerations that connect the a priori with 
the inner, lead to a philosophical commitment to idealism.  
Traditionally, we conceive of a priori knowledge claims to convey necessary 
truths about, for instance, cognition or experience. The a priori evokes the notion of a 
mysterious kind of knowledge derived outside experience through, for example, rational 
intuition (e.g., BonJour 1998). We hold that the necessity and independence from 
experience that a priori statements embody are features of reality, whether of mind (e.g., 
Kantian idealism) or world (e.g., traditional metaphysics). According to Wittgenstein, 
by contrast, a priori statements do not give us any special kind of knowledge. Instead of 
being a statement that conveys knowledge about reality, a statement expressing 
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certainties is “not a statement about anything [for example, reality, language, cognition] 
but expresses commitment to a form of expression and thought, a rule of language” 
(Kuusela 2008, 104). To take up this last point, according to Wittgenstein, we can 
conceive of a priori statements as grammatical is; they are norms for how we use 
language in a meaningful way that, when, projected into reality are taken to be 
describing it. To illustrate further, let us take Kant’s view that “every event has a 
cause,” which is an a priori knowledge claim. For Kant, this statement conveys a truth 
about the nature of cognition, namely, that causality (as one of the categories) is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of cognition. Statements involving categories, 
according to Kant, belong to the scaffolding of experience and cognition. By contrast, 
the necessity of this statement, for Wittgenstein, does not convey a necessity about the 
object of investigation (i.e., cognition, thinking in terms of cause and effect); rather, it 
belongs, as we saw in the remark above, to how we might use language in a meaningful 
way. Given what we understand by “cause,” “effect,” and “event,” it makes sense to say 
that every event has a cause. In expressing this, we are saying something analogous to 
“2 is a number,” “X is a physical object,” “black is darker than white”  – we are not 
describing the natural or metaphysical necessities about numbers, physical objects, or 
colors, but we are making grammatical remarks about how we speak meaningfully 
about numbers and physical objects (see section 1). For someone, as we saw in Section 
1, who does not speak a particular language, this could serve as a piece of instruction 
about how we use words.  
Wittgenstein describes what he thinks should be done with traditional 
conceptions the a priori in the following way:  
 
The a priori must become a form of examination [Betrachtung; 
deleted alternative: representation; Darstellung]. That is to say, 
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this concept too must be deprived of its nimbus. A proposition a 
priori arises through dressing up a proposition about the mode of 
representation in the form of a proposition about the represented 
objects (cited in Kuusela forthcoming, 147; MS 157b 3v).  
 
This allows us to say that when philosophers employ a priori statements (which, as we 
have seen, are grammatical rules), they are using modes of representation. The necessity 
of the statement that every event has a cause belongs to the mode, returning to the 
example above, to the way in which Kant is asking us to conceive of cognition. The 
further assertion that causality is a necessary feature of cognition as such turns this 
mode of representing cognition into a general and necessary feature of cognition. As 
Kuusela puts it, “when the statement is taken as a principle that determines a mode of 
(re)presentation, rather than as a philosophical/metaphysical claim about propositions, 
the need disappears to insist misleadingly and dogmatically that reality must conform to 
it,” (Kuusela 2013, 112) i.e., the insistence that the principle expressed by “every event 
has a cause” is a necessary feature of cognition. Conceiving of a priori statements that 
express universality and necessity to be features of modes of representation allows us to 
open up cognition to be represented in alternative ways. As we saw in Section 2 of this 
chapter, insisting that cognition must be governed by causality generalizes what might 
be a useful way of seeing cognition into a metaphysical truth about causality and its 
relation to cognition as such. Removing the nimbus of a priori statements and the 
necessity and generality they convey is to see them as the philosopher’s mode of 
representation and not as features of the object of investigation itself.  
 Wittgenstein’s choice of “non-empirical” instead of a priori is telling in On 
Certainty, because it avoids the “nimbus,” that is, the metaphysical halo that attaches to 
the traditional conception of apriority. The first person plural idealism we have seen 
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above, attempts to get rid of Kant’s emphasis on the mind or cognition by merely 
expanding the realm of the a priori or the inner to include human activity or our 
mindedness. 66 Despite this move from cognition to community, however, such attempts 
retain a metaphysical commitment to transcendental idealism. These readings jump to 
the conclusion that whatever Wittgenstein means by “non-empirical” or “human 
activity,” is pointing to something a priori or subjectivist, disregarding the crucial 
contrast Wittgenstein draws between mode of representation and object of investigation, 
a contrast that, as we have seen, prevents us from attributing metaphysical theses to 
Wittgenstein.67   
 In the above we have seen that Wittgenstein offers us a new way of 
understanding the place of necessity, universality and the non-empirical. They belong to 
an object of comparison that allows us to represent our object of study in a particular 
light. If we interpret certainties in this (new and modified) transcendental way, we can 
appreciate that conceiving of some statements as background presuppositions for 
(epistemic) practices allows us to dissolve the skeptical problem and with it the attempt 
to refute the skeptic, opening up transcendental considerations to a new possibility, as 
                                                
66  Sacks (2000) similarly distinguishes between traditional transcendental idealism  (T1) and 
a Wittgensteinian transcendental idealism (T2): 
T1: There are transcendental constraints imposed by the mind on what can count as an object in 
experience, such that we can know (experience) objects only in conformity with these 
constraints (2000, 201). 
T2: Anything that is a possible object of experience is ultimately an expression of our activity – 
where that is taken to include human concerns, interests, actions, beliefs (2000, 206). 
67  Readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of certainties make claims such as the following: 
“For Wittgenstein, these conditions arise from very general but contingent features of 
human life; in contrast, Kant holds, conditions for experience arise from the necessary 
structure of the mind” (Hamilton 2014, 295). This view, similar to Williams does not make 
the important distinction between Wittgenstein’s view that statements expressing 
certainties are not to be conceived as providing a thesis about what conditions human life 
and its sources.  
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being clarificatory. In what follows, I will explain how this transcendental can serve a 
clarificatory role. 
 
5.2 Transcendental Clarification  
We begin with Moore’s mode of representation, his philosophical account, according to 
which statements such as “there is an external world” or “I know I have a hand” are 
knowledge claims. This statement leads us to feel confused, because if I know I have a 
hand, or if the existence of the external world is an epistemic fact, I can also doubt both 
statements. As we saw, what can be known can also be doubted. When I think of 
matters in this way, I begin to realize that I cannot attach any sense to the view that I 
could know (or doubt) that I have a hand or that I know (or can doubt) that there is an 
external world, except in exceptional circumstances, when the statement is a knowledge 
claim, i.e., if I suffer a terrible accident or if I’m suffering derealization as part of a 
pathological condition. As Wittgenstein puts it, when Moore asserts these statements as 
knowledge claims, “[t]he matter strikes one all at once as being unclear and blurred. It is 
as if Moore had put it in the wrong light” (OC 481). Wittgenstein, then, offers us a 
different way of understanding matters, which clarifies what seemed to be unclear and 
blurred.  
 This different way of understanding matters, as I attempted to show, can be 
viewed as transcendental. Wittgenstein’s mode of representation holds that instead of 
taking the statements “I have a hand,” “there is an external world” etc. as tantamount to 
knowledge claims, we should consider these statements as beyond knowledge and 
doubt, that is, as non-epistemic. Further, if we conceive of these statements as being 
necessary, universal, non-empirical and enabling for epistemic practices, our need to 
doubt or justify these statements vanishes. We come to see that we must take something 
as certain, beyond doubt, in order to make any knowledge claim. Conceiving of them in 
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this way allows us to see these statements serve an enabling role. But the point of these 
considerations is not to establish a metaphysical relation between knowledge claims and 
statements expressing certainties. It is to show us an alternative arrangement of concepts 
under which the need for doubting or justifying these statements ceases to have a hold 
on us. This arrangement, I have argued, can be understood as transcendental, since 
statements expressing certainties embody necessity, universality, non-empirical and are 
enabling. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have aimed to bring together insights from Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty (and aspects of his other works) in order to present a new way in which we 
can understand the transcendental as truly non-dogmatic. I began with some features of 
the standard accounts of On Certainty that rightly point out that, according to 
Wittgenstein, propositions that have the status of certainty are not knowledge claims as 
Moore saw them. If we conceive of them as such, they end up being nonsensical, given 
their lack of determination. Wittgenstein, as I aimed to show, did not think that that was 
all there was to be said about Moorean propositions. I then proceeded to argue that they 
had an enabling role with respect to epistemic propositions. So that this enabling role is 
not taken to be a standard philosophical account of what enables epistemic practices, I 
introduced methodological insights crucial to a reading of certainties conceived as 
transcendental. I argued that we can take Wittgenstein’s conception of certainties as an 
object of comparison that is juxtaposed with the object of investigation (a constellation 
of topics, such as, empirical judgments, statements that Moore holds are unassailable, 
and so on) with the aim to clarify philosophical perplexities. When we turned to the 
riverbed analogy in order to examine which kinds of necessity and universality are 
operative in Wittgenstein’s conception of certainties, we saw that readings that do not 
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take account of their role as objects of comparison end up vacillating between an 
attribution of an empirical (anthropological/historical) perspective on certainties or a 
metaphysical reading. Both readings emphasize different aspects of the riverbed 
analogy. Those aspects of certainties that present them as changeable suggest an 
empirical reading and those aspects of certainties that point to certainties as hardly 
changeable or fixed emphasize a metaphysical reading. I argued that both positions run 
into various difficulties and cannot give us a convincing account of certainties that gives 
a place to both aspects. Conceiving of certainties as nontemporal objects of comparison, 
I argued, allows us to resolve this difficulty. As giving us a model for how we can 
conceive of particular statements, Wittgenstein is committed neither to an empirical nor 
a metaphysical account. Rather statements expressing certainties are non-temporal – 
they can only be juxtaposed with the object of investigation in order to clarify a 
problem. Wittgenstein does not claim to give us an account, either empirical or 
metaphysical, but a model with which we can make particular features of our object of 
investigation salient. Conceived as features of the object of comparison, the necessity 
and universality of certainties cannot be transposed into the object of investigation and 
thus is protected against dogmatism. Finally, I turned to Wittgenstein’s suggestion that 
statements expressing certainties can be viewed as non-empirical. I argued against the 
view that Wittgenstein’s conception of the non-empirical is tantamount to a 
commitment to apriority in the Kantian sense, according to which the genesis of the a 
priori is in us. Commitment to this notion of apriority leads Kant to advance 
transcendental idealism: since the enabling features of experience are a priori (i.e., have 
their genesis in the subject) the subjective or the inner is necessary for the possibility of 
experience. As I argued, Wittgenstein’s conception of the non-empirical cannot be 
treated as identical to Kant’s a priori. Returning the key methodological insight that 
guides my argument, I contended that Wittgenstein is, in fact, opposed to a conflation 
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between the a priori as a mode of representation and the represented object, which 
seems to be required for a transcendental idealist account.  
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Chapter 5 
Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Description 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will bring together the descriptive transcendental accounts of Merleau-
Ponty and Wittgenstein explored in Part II in order to examine whether their accounts 
circumvent the problems associated with transcendental arguments discussed in Part I of 
the thesis. While there are substantial differences between these thinkers, I will argue 
that they offer fruitful resources for a new non-metaphysical account of the 
transcendental that helps restore its non-dogmatic impulse. I will contend that both 
thinkers manage to overcome the challenges faced by transcendental arguments because 
they index transcendental claims to contexts or contingencies. Merleau-Ponty indexes 
the transcendental to the phenomenal field, an unfolding situation for the embodied 
subject, which contributes to the phenomenological constitution of the subject; and 
Wittgenstein indexes philosophical accounts by treating them as modes of 
representation that aim to clarify a philosophical problem by comparative and 
contrasting illustrations.  
 Thematically, this chapter falls in two parts. The first part of comprises three 
sections where I will compare Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on the topics of 
necessity, universality and apriority with a view to whether they can circumvent the 
challenges to these notions raised in the epistemological context of anti-skeptical 
transcendental arguments. The second part of the chapter, its fourth section, will explore 
the notion of “transcendental description” as characterizing the new conception of the 
transcendental that emerges from the various modifications to classical transcendental 
considerations that have been discussed so far. In order to bring this new conception 
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into sharp relief, I will discuss three criticisms that can be directed against a 
combination of the transcendental and the descriptive from the perspective of 
dogmatism. First, the essentialist inclination of the transcendental, which aims towards 
the general and the fundamental, makes it difficult to reconcile the transcendental with 
the descriptive, which attends to the particular and the concrete (Westerlund 2014). In 
other words, it is not entirely clear how particular or concrete cases can yield insight 
into essences, and thus, if this move is not adequately explained, the claim that essential 
features of all phenomena of the kind X can be determined from a few cases is 
unwarranted and dogmatic, in the sense explored in Chapter 4. Second, the subjectivism 
that is often associated with a transcendental account dogmatically privileges subjective 
acts over objects of experience. Addressing this issue will lead us back to themes from 
the critical discussions of Gardner’s transcendental idealist interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty in Chapter 3 and of Williams’ transcendental idealist interpretation of 
Wittgenstein in Chapter 4. Third, transcendental claims are usually committed to a 
model of simple conceptual unity, namely, that all instances of X can be unified under 
necessary conditions for their possibility (Kuusela 2008b). However, the assumption 
that the interlocutor also accepts this model of simple conceptual unity is dogmatic, 
because it could be denied that conceptual unity centers on a set of shared features, i.e., 
there are other, more complicated, ways that conceptual unity could be understood (e.g., 
family resemblance). As I will argue, however, given the modification of the 
transcendental explored in Part II, transcendental description overcomes these three 
challenges so that the new transcendental can be understood as genuinely non-
metaphysical and non-dogmatic, and in this sense as critical. 
 
1. Transcendental Arguments and Necessity  
The problem of necessity has long dominated the discussion of transcendental 
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arguments in epistemology. We saw in Chapter 1 that a transcendental argument cannot 
rely on necessary conditions without addressing the kind of necessity that is operative in 
it. The idea that the skeptic is forced to accept the conclusion of the transcendental 
argument assumes that the skeptic assents to the modal notions operative in the 
argument. Recall the case of ambitious transcendental arguments and their centerpiece, 
the inference from facts about us to facts about reality. Ambitious transcendental 
arguments assume, since facts about us do not warrant claims about metaphysical reality 
without further support, that the inference from facts about us to facts about reality is 
backed by metaphysical, non-causal and non-logical, necessity. This assumption, 
however, is unwarranted. We saw that the skeptic would be free to reject metaphysical 
necessity, that is, the necessary involved in inferences with respect to reality as such, 
where this includes, for example, the basic metaphysical structure of reality, language, 
or mind.  
Metaphysical necessity, however, is only the most obvious example of a 
problematic form of necessity for anti-skeptical purposes. A skeptic could also deny the 
anti-skeptical effect of a transcendental argument on any other conception of necessity. 
The skeptic could argue, for instance, that the source of necessity is merely convention, 
resulting in the anti-skeptical transcendental argument losing its force, because this 
argument could only demonstrate that our conventions make it necessary for us to 
believe there is an external world, not that there is, indeed, such a world. Note that 
conventionalist explanations of necessity can be metaphysical in their own right, since 
they purport to explain the real nature of concepts as grounded in convention. This gives 
the skeptic even less reason to go along with any notion of necessity, and does further 
disservice to ambitious transcendental arguments. An ambitious transcendental 
argument does not make metaphysical claims about ourselves, but metaphysical claims 
about reality; it purports to demonstrate, for instance, that other minds exist or that there 
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is an external world. Conventionalist necessity would undermine the “world-directed” 
or “reality-directed” character of an ambitious transcendental argument by pushing it 
back onto facts about ourselves. Our conventional belief that there is an external world 
does not prove that there is, in fact, such a world. On weaker notions of necessity, 
therefore, the inference that the ambitious transcendental argument makes between facts 
about ourselves – self-consciousness – and facts about reality – the external world 
necessarily exists – does not even reach its target.  
 A modest transcendental argument might claim to circumvent the inference to 
reality and associated troubles with necessity by remaining within the ambit of facts 
about ourselves. The modest argument would hold that it is necessary for self-
consciousness, for instance, to be conditioned by something the skeptic denies, say 
belief in the existence of the external world. The skepticism, in this case, is distinct from 
the standard Cartesian skepticism, which ambitious transcendental arguments attempt to 
refute, because in this case it is not the ontological or metaphysical existence of the 
external world that is the target, but, roughly, what we are entitled to believe. The 
skeptic might doubt that our belief in the external world is not licensed in light of the 
usual ways in which we justify our beliefs, i.e., through induction, perception, or 
memory. This skeptic is concerned with doxastic structures or doxastic norms and 
attempts to question our justifications for what we believe internally, without moving to 
the actual existence of objects in the external world. The transcendental argument in this 
case would hold that something the skeptic denies – e.g., belief in the existence of the 
external world – is necessary for what the skeptic takes for granted – e.g., self-
consciousness. As we saw in Chapter 1, however, this modest case also involves 
metaphysical commitments, because it holds that what the skeptic doubts is a necessary, 
universal and a priori condition for self-consciousness such that the claim, while not 
about external reality, is nevertheless a claim about the metaphysical nature and source 
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of doxastic norms. So remaining within the range of facts about ourselves does not 
automatically entail metaphysical parsimony. Kantian metaphysics of mind and 
traditional metaphysics are, in this sense, only different if we argue that metaphysical 
claims about the mind (or, indeed, doxastic norms, language, etc.) are more modest than 
metaphysical claims about reality. The discussion in Chapter 1 pointed out that this 
intuition cannot be defended, because while the subject matter of the former and the 
latter differ, the modal force of both claims is equally strong, that is, both appeal to 
immutable, universal, that is, metaphysical features. Changing their topic from the 
existence of the external world to doxastic norms cannot neutralize the problematic 
metaphysical charge of transcendental arguments. What is needed, rather, is a 
comprehensive revision of the combined notions of necessity, universality, and a 
priority at play in transcendental arguments. Ultimately, we saw that the view that 
transcendental arguments are self-standing and do not turn on any additional 
philosophical commitment cannot be defended.  
 Unwarranted metaphysical elements enter the picture in three ways: first, by 
making direct metaphysical claims about the reality or existence of the external world or 
other minds; second, by making metaphysical claims concerning the essence or real 
nature of, for example, mind, world, or language; third, a metaphysical claim has 
certain problematic features of its own, that is, it offers an immutable sempiternal 
account of the object of investigation that is supposedly true for all times and places. 
While ambitious transcendental arguments fall under all three points, modest 
transcendental arguments fall under the second and third point. This tells us that all anti-
skeptical transcendental arguments struggle with charged notions of necessity and with 
a tendency to essentialize. To see which direction a revision of these notions and 
tendencies has to take, I will now turn to an examination of whether Merleau-Ponty's 
and Wittgenstein’s transcendental account falls prey to similar metaphysical problems.  
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1.1  Merleau-Ponty and Necessity 
As we saw in Chapter 3, Merleau-Ponty holds that structural aspects of perception, such 
as the fixed perspective of the body and other structures like the body-schema, the 
intentional arc, and temporality are transcendental. Let us now address the question 
whether Merleau-Ponty makes a metaphysical inference with respect to the necessity of 
these phenomena. It is important to keep in mind, in addressing this question, that 
metaphysical inferences are necessitated by the kind of philosophical account one 
wishes to offer; ambitious transcendental arguments have to appeal to metaphysical 
necessity because they aim to refute, for instance, Cartesian skepticism or skepticism 
about other minds. These types of skeptical doubts, and attempts to refute them, are 
directed at the ontological/metaphysical existence of the external world and other minds 
respectively. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, does not have comparable metaphysical 
concerns. He does not attempt to legitimize or validate the existence of the world or 
other subjects, because the aim of his phenomenology is not to prove whether 
phenomena are metaphysically real, but to describe how phenomena appear. Merleau-
Ponty’s account, therefore, begins with the world instead of working towards it (“we 
must not […] wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the 
world is what we perceive” PP lxxx). What epistemological skepticism obscures, as 
Carman has argued with respect to skepticism about other minds, is how others and the 
world outrun or elude us, the lived “mystery of other selves,” and the world (Carman 
2008, 136-137). Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not seek to prove anything; rather, his aim is 
to give a phenomenological account of the experience, whether of other minds or the 
world. For this, we do not need an account that is directed at demonstrating the 
existence of other subjects or external things; rather, we need an understanding of our 
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relations to others and to our environment – that are always already there.68 It seems, 
then, that the problematic inference from facts about us to facts about reality suggested 
by the modalized premise of ambitious transcendental arguments is absent in Merleau-
Ponty's account, because Merleau-Ponty, instead of validating or legitimizing the 
existence of the world and others, appeals to what can be termed a primordial or an 
original connection between subjects and their environment that is always already in 
place. As Marie McGinn puts it, “Scepticism about the existence of others, like 
skepticism about the external world, is countered by the fact that our relations to others 
is deeper than – prior to – any individual or uncertain judgment that we express 
concerning them: 'Our relationship to the social is, like our relationship to the world, 
deeper than any express perception or any judgment’” (McGinn 1998, 51; PP 379). 
Because lived experience is crucial to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, our experience 
of others does not leave room for doubts about the existence of other minds and the 
external world. To the extent that necessity plays into these phenomenological 
considerations, it does not involve an inference from facts about us to facts about the 
ontological or metaphysical existence of other minds or the external world. 
 However, although Merleau-Ponty is not making metaphysical clams in this 
ambitious sense, that his account is not metaphysical in a different sense also needs to 
be ruled out. As we saw, modest transcendental arguments involve metaphysical 
commitments, because they purport to establish something necessary about the reality 
(real nature or essential structure) of language or mind, for example. Prima facie 
Merleau-Ponty claims similarly that the structures of perception are metaphysically 
necessary (e.g., the fixed perspective of my body is a metaphysical necessary PP 93); 
                                                
68  Merleau-Ponty's elaborate account of intersubjectivity follows his view on our relation to 
the world: the self is interlaced with others and the world; and the communion between the 
self and the other consists, prior to inferential or analogical reasoning, of bodily co-
existence (PP 369 – 372). 
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and his account, accordingly, seems to say something essential about the nature of 
embodied subjectivity and its relation to others and the world. It could, then, be argued 
that like proponents of modest transcendental arguments, Merleau-Ponty is committed 
to claims about the real nature, or underlying metaphysical structure, of embodied 
perception. His claim would be metaphysical if he were to purport to give us 
sempiternal conditions for phenomena and we have seen in previous chapters 
(especially Chapter 1 and 2) why such a claim is problematic. An attempt to establish 
the essence of phenomena for all times and places makes an unwarranted leap from 
what appears to us to the real and unchanging nature of or behind what appears. This 
would amount to a move from phenomenology to metaphysics and would, indeed, place 
Merleau-Ponty on par with the views he criticizes under the rubric of objective thought, 
“a view of the world as composed of determinate entities [whose existence or 
nonexistence can be established with specifiable properties] that stand in external 
relations to one another” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011, 19). This perspective, which 
Merleau-Ponty associates with empiricism and intellectualism, does not stop at 
phenomena, but claims to find the unchangeable and sempiternal law underneath what 
is given (e.g., PP 40). Interpreted in this way, the body-schema, the intentional arc, and 
other structures of embodiment would amount to a sempiternal law of embodied 
perception.  
The crucial move that prevents Merleau-Ponty from making such a claim is his 
notion of the phenomenal field, the field of perception and lived experience, and the 
situatedness of philosophical reflection within this field. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account of necessary structural features of intentionality is indexed 
to the phenomenal field. The phenomenal field as, for Merleau-Ponty, the 
transcendental field, is an open-ended and indeterminate field of that is “the space of 
possibilities, impossibilities, and necessities constitutive of our perceptual world” 
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(Carman 2008, 82). The field is distinguished from a traditional transcendental domain 
insofar as the field is open-ended and unfolding, while the latter is fixed and immutable. 
The result of placing transcendental reflection at the level of the phenomenal field is 
that the necessity which enables embodied experiences cannot be rendered static or 
reified as underwriting conditions that hold true for all times and all places. As Merleau-
Ponty emphasizes, the word “field” “signifies that reflection never has the entire world 
and the plurality of monads spread out and objectified before its gaze, that it only ever 
has a partial view and a limited power” (PP 62). From this perspective, that is, from this 
partial view, transcendental conditions that reflection reveals are always provisional and 
indeterminate; they do not set down the immutable law of embodiment and they can 
always be modified in light of what shows itself (Dillon 1991, xvi). As we saw, such an 
open-ended account cannot be used in an anti-skeptical context, because conditions with 
anti-skeptical import must be fixed and unchanging in order to gain any purchase 
against skepticism. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology shows a different way of 
employing necessary enabling conditions. He envisages them to shape our possibilities 
of encountering a dynamic world in which we are dynamically situated. This gives the 
world itself the transcendental status of a constitutive condition for how we can 
experience it. Due to the co-constitutive character of enabling conditions, which 
involves both body-subject and world, the necessity with which our perceptions and 
engagements are conditioned does not reduce to one single source. In this way, 
Merleau-Ponty liberates transcendental conditions and claims from the static 
metaphysical fixity that plagues the transcendental arguments of analytic epistemology. 
 
1.2 Wittgenstein and Necessity 
Let us now turn to Wittgenstein in order to examine whether his position, as I have 
portrayed it in Chapter 4, is committed to metaphysical inferences like those involved in 
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transcendental arguments. The approach to the transcendental that can be gleaned from 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty has non-metaphysical outcomes that resemble the 
conclusions we could draw from Merleau-Ponty’s take on the transcendental. For 
Wittgenstein, one of the problems with Moore's anti-skeptical position is the latter's 
attempt to argue from subjective certainty to objective certainty, from the subjective or, 
one could say, psychological “I know that the earth has existed for thousands of years” 
to the objective (and in Wittgenstein's view logical) “the earth has existed for thousands 
of years” (OC 15, 16, 137).69 Wittgenstein's objection to Moore echoes the central 
objection against the metaphysical inference of ambitious transcendental arguments, 
namely an inference from how things appear subjectively to how things must be 
objectively. Wittgenstein, additionally, like Merleau-Ponty, does not aim to refute or 
undermine skepticism by presenting proofs or arguments for the existence of the 
external world and so on. Rather, Wittgenstein holds both skepticism and an attempt to 
refute it to be equally confused philosophical undertakings. In order to clarify this 
confusion, Wittgenstein presents us with statements expressing certainties as a mode of 
representing Moorean propositions and epistemic practices. Seen from this new 
perspective, neither skepticism nor the attempt to refute it gains any foothold.  
Let us now turn to whether Wittgenstein, like proponents of modest 
transcendental arguments, establishes something necessary about the real nature of 
epistemic practices (or other objects of investigation like linguistic meaning). 
Wittgenstein’s mode of representing Moorean propositions constitutes a model to be 
used as an object of comparison. The necessity and universality that Wittgenstein takes 
                                                
69 Especially relevant here is OC 137: “Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that 
he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only 
that he believes he knows. That is why Moore's assurance that he knows... does not interest 
us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are 
indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but 
because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.” 
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these statements to possess is not to be projected into the object of investigation 
(epistemic practices and what they involve). Rather, in treating these statements as 
necessary and universal, Wittgenstein attempts to compare them to the object of 
investigation in order to dissolve a philosophical confusion that results from modes of 
representation (like Moore’s) that give these statements an epistemic status, that is, treat 
them as knowledge claims. Thus, Wittgenstein does not make necessary and universal 
claims about the nature of epistemic practices as such; rather he asks us to conceive of 
these statements in a new light, as necessary and universal, so that we are relieved from 
perplexities that arise once we take an epistemic view of these statements. This 
comparison involves, for example, taking statements such as “there is an external 
world” as a necessary and universal statement and juxtaposing it with the Moorean 
proposition, i.e., in Moore’s view the knowledge claim that “there is an external world.” 
In doing so, Wittgenstein attempts to give us an alternative picture of these statements 
under which the skeptical problem and attempts to refute it does not arise. This 
alternative picture, however, is not a philosophical account about the actual nature of 
knowledge claims and what they involve. Thus, the necessity and universality operative 
in statements expressing certainties do not belong to the nature of epistemic practices as 
such. Wittgenstein is rather asking us to conceive of a different way of looking at 
things, not the actual or the only way, that releases us from the grip of a philosophical 
perplexity. Thus, while statements expressing certainties are necessary, universal, non-
empirical and enabling, viewing them in this way serves to open us up to a different, 
and arguably more plausible, way of understanding Moorean propositions and their 
relation to epistemic practices. Wittgenstein, therefore, does not take statements 
expressing certainties as articulating unchanging metaphysically real structures; 
statements expressing certainties are indexed to a mode of representation and geared at 
clarifying the philosophical problem in such a way that the problem is dissolved. 
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  Now we can also take stock of some crucial convergences between 
Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective takes on necessity. Merleau-Ponty 
cannot be said to be treating his own account as a mode of representation or an object of 
comparison; rather, he holds himself to be speaking about the nature of perception, 
though granted that, as we saw above, he does not think we can say anything 
metaphysical about it, because of our partial perspective on the world. However, if we 
bracket the methodological aspects of Wittgenstein’s position, we can see that his 
characterization of certainties shares features with Merleau-Ponty’s approach. For 
Wittgenstein, as for Merleau-Ponty, the structural features that underpin our 
engagements with the world and with each other are not static, but dynamic, as 
exemplified by the riverbed analogy. Like Merleau-Ponty Wittgenstein holds that 
certainties are not inner mental presuppositions; the non-empirical, in their case, is not 
of the order of the a priori in the traditional transcendental sense, i.e., in the sense of the 
transcendental idealist notion that enabling structures have their genesis in the subject. 
Additionally, like Merleau-Ponty, for Wittgenstein, skeptical doubts about the external 
world and other minds do not gain any purchase; our attitude, for instance, towards 
others is visceral, prior to “what we might call intellectual or judgemental” – that is, 
prior also to philosophical doubt (McGinn 1998, 54). Eventually, neither Wittgenstein 
nor Merleau-Ponty invoke any inference from facts about us to facts about reality when 
they speak about necessity with respect to their own accounts, though how they avoid 
making these inferences involves different strategies.  
 
2. Universality and Uniqueness 
Kant’s transcendental idealism is wedded to an all-encompassing systematic ambition: 
to provide an account of necessary conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge 
that is valid for all times and places, which, for Kant, makes these conditions universal. 
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As we saw in Chapter 2, the view that a given set of conditions uniquely organizes or 
reflects phenomena is directed at validating concepts such as causality against 
skepticism.70 A transcendental argument or claim with this anti-skeptical purpose is 
forced to rule out alternative conditions that could take the place of the condition that is 
being legitimized or validated. As we discussed in Chapter 2, this uniqueness condition, 
the view that a condition cannot be replaced by an alternative, is difficult to defend. We 
cannot legitimately rule out the possibility of conceptual schemes different than ours 
that could be necessary for our experiences or engagements with the world. As Koerner 
(1967) who advanced this argument points out, we cannot flout the historical truth that 
at different times, different conditions seem salient to us as enabling our experience. 
The question is whether claims to universality, as they are bound to arise in the context 
of transcendental conditions, can genuinely be separated from the notion of uniqueness. 
It is clear from Kant’s ambition to state for all times and places which enabling 
conditions for empirical knowledge obtain that for him, as for contemporary proponents 
of transcendental arguments, universality and uniqueness have to go hand in hand. Let 
us now turn to whether this is also true of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. 
 
2.1 Merleau-Ponty and Unique Conditions 
It would seem that Merleau-Ponty would be open to the uniqueness charge, because he 
believes that perception universally requires certain structural features like embodiment 
as a condition of its possibility; disembodied perception, by contrast, would either be 
                                                
70  For Kant, the attempt to provide unchanging features of our cognitive apparatus was 
directed not only at providing an answer to Humean skepticism that challenged the validity 
of concepts such as causality, but also to provide an immanent metaphysics of mind, which 
as a priori and necessary, for cognition and experience cannot be replaced by any other 
conditions, given its metaphysical ambitions. In this sense, it could be said, that 
metaphysics in its traditional sense rules out pluralism. In giving us the order, to echo 
Wittgenstein, metaphysics does not accept other ways of conceiving of things is possible.  
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impossible or parasitic on embodied perception. It is difficult, however, to square 
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental phenomenology with uniqueness, because Merleau-
Ponty does not seem to hold that alternative ways of understanding experience are 
outright incorrect; rather, he tends to call accounts which take an alternative perspective 
on shared subject matters incomplete. In taking them to be incomplete, Merleau-Ponty 
allows that the way they conceive of various phenomena is (at least partially) justified.  
 Let us illustrate Merleau-Ponty’s approach through an example, Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological account of the phantom limb phenomenon, a condition in 
which an individual can still sense an amputated limb, that is, experience its presence 
despite its physical absence (PP 78). This includes, for instance, feeling pain in the 
amputated arm or sensing that the physically absent leg is placed in some specific 
position. Now, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the phantom limb phenomenon features 
two accounts that are alternatives to each other (and to Merleau-Ponty’s own account), 
namely physiology and psychology. The physiological account holds that the phantom 
limb results from physiological conditions; the patient’s sensory conductors, at the site 
of the amputation, remain active and produce these sensations. The psychological 
account, by contrast, holds that the patient’s condition arises from the patient’s personal 
history, wishes, desires and so on; in some cases, for instance, the patient only feels the 
phantom limb when she is psychologically prompted (e.g., experiencing something that 
reminds her of her injury). Both accounts, however, are incomplete. For the 
physiological account cannot explain why, if the condition is purely physiological, 
something non-physiological, like psychological prompting can give rise to the phantom 
limb in an amputee. Further it cannot be explained from a purely physiological 
perspective how the phantom limb gradually disappears as the patient comes to terms 
with the mutilation psychologically. The psychological account, which depends on 
emotions, desires, etc., cannot explain why the phantom limb, if the phantom limb is 
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purely psychological, disappears once the sensory conductors at the site of the 
amputation that run to the brain are severed (PP 79). Merleau-Ponty’s aim, in this case, 
is to find what is common to both accounts; how in other words, the physiological and 
psychological come together to yield the phantom limb.  
If Merleau-Ponty’s intention were to give us the unique conditions for all 
perception, he would be forced to rule out these alternatives altogether. Acknowledging 
alternative conditions is tantamount to acknowledging that one’s own scheme is not 
unique. Rather than rejecting the physiological and the psychological explanation, 
Merleau-Ponty in fact accepts both, arguing that phenomenology can allow us to 
understand how the physiological might come together with the psychological in the 
phantom limb phenomenon. After all, Merleau-Ponty uses concepts such as repression 
from psychoanalysis as insightful and accurate (PP 80). Further, he never denies the 
physiological dimension of the phantom limb. Merleau-Ponty accepts the sensorimotor 
circuits that lead from the stump to the brain play a role in producing the phantom limb 
phenomenon. What he rejects, however, is an understanding of this physiological 
dimension as reductively explaining everything about the phenomenon. In his view, 
“sensorimotor circuits stand out all the more clearly insofar as one is dealing with more 
integrated existences, and reflex, in its pure state, is hardly ever found in man, who has 
not merely a milieu (Umwelt), but also a world (Welt)” (PP 89). In other words, the 
physiological dimension only makes sense if we conceive of the various dimensions of 
existence as integrated or linked and take into account the milieu and world, which 
gives our physiological dimension its mode of expression. As Merleau-Ponty puts it 
with respect to the historical a priori, “clothing, jewelry, and love transform the 
biological needs from which they are born” (PP 90). This example shows that Merleau-
Ponty does not make uniqueness claims on behalf of his position. Uniqueness 
conditions aim to give an account that rules out any alternatives; Merleau-Ponty, by 
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contrast, accepts the truth of alternative views – physiology and psychology in the case 
above. In addition to this, with respect to the constitution of the situated and embodied 
subject, the phenomenal field, discussed in the previous section, cannot supply unique 
conditions. We cannot determine what is unique, without any alternatives, if we are in a 
field that is unfolding and only gives reflection, as we saw, “a partial view and a limited 
power”  (PP 62). 
 
2.2 Wittgenstein and Unique Conditions 
Like Merleau-Ponty, though for different reasons, Wittgenstein does not make any 
claims to uniqueness as understood in the context of transcendental arguments. 
Wittgenstein’s aim, as we saw, is not to give us “the order (PI 132),” that is, in the 
context of my transcendental reading of statements expressing certainties, he does not 
intend to indicate unique enabling conditions of epistemic practices that cannot have 
alternatives because they supply the actual way in which epistemic practices operate. As 
I argued in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein attempts to give us a different way of 
ordering things, a different arrangement of concepts, under which Moorean propositions 
as knowledge claims, do not arise. Instead of imposing a unique set of conditions under 
which the object of inquiry can be seen or understood, Wittgenstein opens the object of 
inquiry to alternatives. Thus, Wittgenstein is not taking his task to consist of supplying 
the unique conditions that Moore’s account overlooked; rather, he is aiming to give us 
an alternative arrangement under which skepticism and the attempt to refute it do not 
arise. To have a better grasp of what Wittgenstein might mean with reordering or 
rearranging facts, let us examine an analogy.71   
Let me use an example to illustrate this point. Suppose I am in charge of a 
                                                
71  I adapt the example of museums as illustrating Wittgenstein’s conception of re-ordering or 
re-arranging facts for clarificatory purposes from Kuusela (2017)  
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museum’s collection and my task is to reorder and rearrange pieces from the exhibition. 
One section of the museum looks at similarities between the art movement known as 
Primitivism and so-called ethnographic art, that is, artifacts from non-Western societies. 
This mode of representing arranges these works in a way that brings to prominence the 
formal similarities between these artifacts and works by Primitivist artists. Let us say, I 
want to offer a new way of seeing things and thus introduce a new arrangement of these 
works. Suppose I place these artifacts under the title of “history of appropriation,” 
highlighting what might have been, at times, questionable ways in which these artifacts 
were taken, commodified, and assimilated into the Western artistic tradition.  In doing 
so, I want to bring into sharp relief a way of looking at the artifacts and their relation to 
artworks that does not obscure the historical and ideological situation in which they 
came to be together. This new mode of representation asks us to understand the relation 
between Primitivism and non-Western artifacts in a different way. While the first mode 
of representation saw this relation as formal, I want to draw attention to ideological and 
historical aspects of the relation. Seeing these objects in a new light gives us a 
perspective. But it would be strange to argue that there is no other way in which such a 
relation can be understood. While capturing an important dimension of the relation, my 
mode of representation does not claim to be unique. In the case of On Certainty, this 
new way allows us to have a different perspective on a particular kind of statements that 
caused perplexity when conceived as knowledge claims (i.e., Moorean propositions) so 
that the perplexity vanishes; in the case of my example, spectators might come to 
appreciate in light of the reorganized exhibits, a new mode of representation, that 
Western art has a deeper and more problematic history which is obscured if we focus on 
purely formalistic comparisons. As the mode of representation introduces an object of 
comparison, which has a logical role, and not an empirical one, conceptually speaking, 
our new perspective is non-temporal. It is of course indexed historically, but the model 
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itself does not make an empirical claim or metaphysical claim, but offers a way of 
seeing things. We can maintain that Wittgenstein’s methodological considerations, 
similar to Merleau-Ponty’s embodied experience, provide us with conditions which are 
not unique and for this reason do not meet with the problems that beset anti-skeptical 
transcendental arguments.  
 
3. The A Priori and Transcendental Idealism 
If anything is characteristic of a transcendental claim, it is its distinction from empirical 
claims. Empirical statements are a posteriori whereas transcendental conditions are a 
priori. What makes traditional notions of apriority especially thorny is their debt to a 
metaphysical thesis about subjective-genesis. Due to their contrast with contingent 
empirical claims, concerns with apriority traditionally imply deeper theses about 
idealism and realism. Kant’s transcendental idealism holds that the structures of 
experience are a priori insofar as they have their genesis in us, the subject or the 
intellect. If transcendental arguments want to refute the skeptic by beginning with what 
the skeptic takes for granted, they cannot help themselves to notions such as the a priori 
without explaining its potential metaphysical implications.  
 
3.1 Merleau-Ponty and the A Priori 
Merleau-Ponty, owing to his employment of a priori considerations, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, has been interpreted as advocating a form of idealism.  However, what is 
often neglected is the transformation of apriority in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. 
First, it is clear that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body-subject and embodied 
perception does not allow us to posit a purely subjective a priori along Kantian lines. 
Since the embodied subject is conceived as “being in the world” (etre au monde), the 
world cannot be separated from the subject; a priori structures of embodiment can no 
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longer be understood as a priori structures of the intellect, that is, as having their genesis 
in a subject that is separate and cut-off from the world and constitutes the world 
unilaterally. Second, as Merleau-Ponty sees it, perception is the result of co-constitution 
between embodied subject and world. The latter, as Dillon (1987, 1988) points out, has 
a transcendental status and its own a priori. Once this move is appreciated, it becomes 
clear that co-constitution makes metaphysical commitments either to idealism or to 
realism impossible. It is also worth pointing out that the phenomenal field, as we 
addressed above, which is the transcendental field for Merleau-Ponty, is neither internal 
nor external, neither ideal nor real (PP 56-59), but involves the body-subject and its 
“living communication with the world” (PP 53). An idealist conception of the a priori 
would need to take perception to be at least partially constituted by a subject; but to 
maintain an idealist position, this subject could not be enmeshed in the world in such a 
way that no principled distinction can be made between subject and world.  To rephrase 
this point, since the subject is so deeply and fundamentally enmeshed in the world for 
Merleau-Ponty, it is not longer possible to claim that a structure belongs to an inner 
domain or to an isolated subject.  
 
3.2 Wittgenstein and the Non-Empirical 
For Wittgenstein, like for Merleau-Ponty, a priori necessities are not grounded on 
metaphysical constructs such as Kant's faculty psychology. According to Wittgenstein, 
as we saw, a priori statements are grammatical rules disguised as descriptions of reality. 
Statements expressing certainties, as we saw, are not a priori in the traditional sense. 
Statements that express certainties are modes of representation and qua modes of 
representation they express something necessary, universal and non-empirical. When 
they are used as objects of comparison, they are brought into contact with the object of 
inquiry (epistemic practices and Moorean propositions). Through comparisons with the 
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object of inquiry, they aim to clarify a philosophical problem by presenting the object of 
inquiry in an alternative picture under which the philosophical problem is dissolved. 
The aim, thus, is not to establish some necessary truth about the object of inquiry, but to 
clarify a philosophical perplexity. Therefore, as we saw, attempts to attribute idealism to 
Wittgenstein that base this attribution on the role of non-empirical considerations in his 
work make these considerations out to be tantamount to the Kantian a priori. The 
assumption guiding such a picture is that non-empirical considerations, like Kant’s a 
priori, point to something inner or subjective. If, on this reading, propositions 
expressing certainties are similarly a priori and subjective, and, as we saw, enable 
epistemic practices, Wittgenstein comes to be seen as arguing that the subjective is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of the object and thus making a commitment to 
transcendental idealism. Confusions of this kind are clarified once we establish that 
Wittgenstein’s non-empirical statements are not a priori in the full Kantian sense. As 
explained in Chapter 4, Wittgenstein is not advancing a philosophical account in order 
to establish metaphysical theses; rather, he is asking us to consider a different 
perspective that contrasts with Moore’s in order to remove the perplexities that arise 
from viewing Moorean propositions as knowledge claims.  Thus neither Wittgenstein 
nor Merleau-Ponty are committed to idealism or realism, because both transform what 
has traditionally been assumed of the a priori.  
 
4. Transcendental Description 
In the last two chapters, I made the case for interpreting Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein as offering transcendental accounts that while removed from traditional 
transcendental thought in their anti-metaphysical perspective, retain crucial elements of 
transcendentalism. We saw that the contemporary epistemological context takes 
transcendental claims to be metaphysically parsimonious, but tacitly trades in unrevised 
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notions of necessity, universality, and apriority that are ultimately metaphysical. 
Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein give us an alternative picture of the transcendental, one 
that has emancipated itself from metaphysical commitments because of its different 
treatment of necessity, universality, and apriority. One fundamental reason for which 
they are able to provide us with this non-metaphysical alternative, and to which I now 
turn, is their respective turn to description. Description means different things for 
Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. Merleau-Ponty holds that the phenomenological 
dedication to “pure description” goes hand in hand with the rejection of both, “reflective 
analysis” (intellectualism) and “scientific explanation” (empiricism) (PP lxx). This has 
to do with the fact that as “direct description,” phenomenology does not try to answer 
questions of “psychological genesis” and “causal explanations” (PP lxxi). However, as 
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc suggests, a principled distinction between description and 
explanation cannot always be maintained with respect to Merleau-Ponty, since he 
“offers us many theories and explanations of the phenomenal field, and puts forward 
many theories about the world and consciousness” (2011, 33). That is, his account can 
be viewed as an alternative explanation that arrives at its conclusion through careful 
descriptions of lived experience. 
Wittgenstein upholds an explicit commitment to description when he says, for 
example, that “[w]e must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take 
its place” (PI 109). For Wittgenstein, as we have seen, explanation is replaced with a 
description that gives us an alternative reordering, sometimes by introducing new 
concepts, of the object of our inquiry. However, this alternative is not to serve as an 
alternative theory. It aims to show us, rather, that what seemed to us an inexorable way 
of looking at things can plausibly be seen in a different way. The aim, as we also saw, is 
not to provide an alternative philosophical thesis, as philosophical accounts typically 
aim to, but an alternative model, which clarifies the philosophical problem. These 
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differences between Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein notwithstanding, their respective 
takes on description are sufficiently close to each other so that we can say that for both 
thinkers description asks us to attend to particular examples, in Merleau-Ponty's case 
concrete examples of embodied perception (sometimes in pathological contexts) and in 
Wittgenstein's case examples for how we use language. It might, thus, be rightfully 
asked how the transcendental thrust and descriptive intent come together.   
 
4.1 Subjectivism and Essentialism 
It has been argued that there are a number of difficulties in combining the descriptive 
approach with claims that seem to surpass or exceed description, i.e., the necessary, 
universal, and a priori claims in the transcendental context. These problems have been 
raised in a recent paper by Frederik Westerlund (2014). Westerlund explores what 
seems to be a contradiction between the descriptive thrust of phenomenology and what 
he calls the subjectivist and essentialist thrust of transcendental thought. The 
subjectivist tendency is embodied in the view that “in order to grasp the meaning of 
things, we need to turn from the objects themselves to how we experience them” 
(Westerlund 2014, 262), what we have discussed as the subjective genesis of the a priori 
in Kant. The essentialist aspect is the claim that we can determine the essential structure 
of a phenomenon in general from a set of particular cases (i.e., the essence of perception 
is embodiment). The problem with subjectivism as a starting point is, according to 
Westerlund, a “dogmatic tendency to privilege the subjective acts of experience over the 
objects experienced” (Westerlund 2014, 263). There are no grounds of postulating a 
subject as an “absolute starting point” which, from a descriptive point of view, distorts 
“the natural direction of experience” which does not terminate in subjective acts but in 
an experience of the world (Westerlund 2014, 263). In other words, in Westerlund's 
view, by turning to subjective acts of constitution instead of a mere description of the 
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experience, transcendental description dogmatically privileges the subjective. He argues 
that Husserl's egological and foundationalist perspective on constitution as well as 
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein ultimately belong under the subjectivist or idealist 
paradigm. Westerlund suggests, however, that transcendental description can be rid of 
its subjectivism, in principle. Although he does not detail how such a possibility for 
transcendental description can be worked out, as we have seen, the turn to co-
constitution amounts to a rejection of the view that the subject is the ultimate source of 
the constitution of experience in Merleau-Ponty’s case. In Wittgenstein’s case, 
statements expressing certainties are considered in a non-empirical way to bring out 
their transcendental relation to epistemic practices in a mode of representation that 
serves clarificatory purposes. Again, no appeal is made to something exclusively 
subjective. The mistake underlying this objection, as we saw in the previous chapter, is 
to conflate Wittgenstein’s non-empirical with the Kantian a priori; both are independent 
from empirical experience, yet only the Kantian a priori is grounded in the subject. 
Even if Westerlund were to concede that the subjectivity charge against 
transcendental description fails, he could still insist that transcendental description is 
perpetually hampered by its claim to “generality and fundamentality,” or, in other 
words, transcendental description always involves essentialism (Westerlund 2014, 266). 
The combination of description and essentialism, he argues, is problematic because it 
involves a leap from concrete cases to “claiming that these features constitute the 
necessary determinations constituting this kind of matter of experience;” but this 
general claim cannot be “motivated by a concrete description of a particular experience” 
(Westerlund 2014, 269). In other words, on Westerlund’s view, we are not entitled to 
move from the particular cases, say of perception, that are under description to the 
general claims of the transcendental perspective about what is necessary for all cases of 
our object of investigation. The few cases we examine do not warrant the attribution of 
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necessity to claims about perception as such, because there could always be other cases 
that do not fit our paradigm, but still count as perception. Westerlund's critique against 
essentialism shares features with Koerner's argument against uniqueness, the view that a 
condition is unique and alternatives to it are inconceivable. The uniqueness condition is 
then not only present in transcendental accounts in epistemology, but also in how 
phenomenology describes connections between types of experiences. As Westerlund 
recalls, many phenomenologists hold that it is necessary for an experience of memory to 
be connected to perception necessarily, so that if we deny that memory is enabled by 
perception, then we are not talking about memory at all (Crowell 2003, 108). 
Westerlund rightly points out “these structures [perception] do not necessarily hold for 
all factical experiences of this same kind [memory]” (Westerlund 2014, 270).  
At first glance, it might seem troubling to see this objection against the 
epistemological account of transcendental arguments reappear in the context of 
transcendental description, which I have argued overcomes such objections. However, 
the upshot of abandoning the anti-skeptical enterprise is that there is room for maneuver 
in order to overcome these difficulties. In response to Westerlund’s charge of 
essentialism, we can draw on Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion to index transcendental 
conditions to the phenomenal field. This indexing ensures that universal and necessary 
claims are provisional; as we saw in Chapter 3, this allows him to connect the 
universality of transcendental conditions to what is actually the case, to how, in other 
words, phenomena are presented to us given the facticity of our situation. Concrete 
cases can point to transcendental structures with greater generality in a manner that 
reveals important aspects of phenomena. If these structures are indexed to what actually 
appears, given the facticity of our situation, the transcendental is open to revision and 
rearticulation. The essentialism implicated by Westerlund is problematic in a dogmatic 
sense only if it bars any possible alternatives to the current structures, because it makes 
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an unwarranted claim that a few cases can tell us the final truth about what is 
fundamental and essential to phenomena of a particular kind. The open-endedness and 
the unfolding of the phenomenal field blocks, as I have argued, such an unwarranted 
move. Wittgenstein’s case is even clearer in light of the discussion from the previous 
chapter and above, because he is not giving us the one and only essential order, but 
recognizes that his descriptive account is just one mode of representation among others 
that invites us to look at phenomena in a particular way in order to clarify philosophical 
confusions. 
 
4.2 Essentialism and Simple Conceptual Unity 
A more challenging and deeper version of the essentialism objection is one that charges 
transcendental claims with tacitly employing a model of simple conceptual unity. 
Transcendental claims can be construed as treating of perception, cognition, or meaning 
by looking at what is involved in having a unified concept “perception,” “cognition,” or 
“meaning.” Kuusela, for example, contends that transcendental arguments only take off 
because they underhandedly operate with a particular understanding of conceptual 
unity, what he calls “simple conceptual unity,” which is the view that “conceptual unity 
depends on a feature common to all instances falling under the concept” (Kuusela 
2008b, 62). So, on this construal, the concept “perception” would come to reflect an 
essential feature of all instances of perception. In turn, as transcendental claims state 
necessary conditions, in conjunction with the simple conceptual unity model, necessary 
conditions come to “define,” as Kuusela (2008b, 59) puts it, what is common to all 
cases of a given kind of phenomenon, experience, or engagement. In the example 
adapted from Crowell (2003) above, the claim that perception is necessary for the 
possibility of memory can be construed to tacitly trade on a simple model of conceptual 
unity in the following way: the concept of memory consists of cases that share 
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something in common, namely all instances of memory are necessarily connected with 
perception; otherwise, we are not describing memory at all. As a consequence, Kuusela 
argues, traditional transcendental arguments cannot maintain their aspirations to a kind 
of critique that is sensitive to the interlocutor's starting point, because they tacitly rely 
on the simple model of conceptual unity, which the skeptic is free to reject (2008b, 62-
63). Before we assume on the basis of necessary conditions that certain cases fall under 
the designation of memory and certain cases do not fall under it, we must first justify 
the model of simple conceptual unity that is underlying our assumption. This step is 
required because the mere fact that particular instances of memory have certain 
necessary conditions does not allow us to argue that all instances of memory must be 
defined exclusively in this way. If we omit this step while engaging in an anti-skeptical 
setting, we are not genuinely arguing with the skeptic; we are trying to corner her by 
suggesting that there is something essential about the concepts that we are using without 
defending the implicit model of conceptual unity that we have employed. We first 
delimit the concept of memory in a convenient way, extend our delimitation to all its 
instances by presupposing simple conceptual unity, and then force the skeptic due to our 
underlying essentialism about concepts to adhere to our delimitation of the concept of 
memory. This strategy disregards cases of memory that could be unified without appeal 
to a common feature (i.e., perception as a necessary condition) shared by all instances of 
memory. An example of this would be the unification of concepts by family 
resemblance (more on this topic later). As long as we cannot ensure that transcendental 
claims are independent from simple conceptual unity, we have to contend with the 
problem that the skeptic is forced to assent to this undeclared assumption of simple 
conceptual unity without her knowledge. This test case shows us that because the 
skeptic’s assent is elicited behind her back, transcendental claims turn out to be 
dogmatic.  
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 Kuusela examines a number of possible defenses for the simple model of 
conceptual unity. One way of justifying the model of simple conceptual unity is arguing 
any concept must fit the model of conceptual unity if it is to be considered as a concept 
at all. This approach fails, because family resemblance concepts do not share a common 
feature, so there are other modes of understanding conceptual unity (Kuusela 2008b, 
65). One could argue, further, that some concepts require a simple model of conceptual 
unity by demonstrating that rejecting such a model gives rise to contradictions or counts 
as a deviation from how the concept is actually used (Kuusela 2008b, 65). But, as 
Kuusela points out, in both cases, showing what counts as a deviation from a certain use 
of a concept or what counts as “employing the concept in contradictory ways” requires 
that one has a prior conception of what a concept is (Kuusela 2008b). Only then is it 
possible to determine that a certain use is a deviation or a contradiction. Thus, such a 
defense ends up begging the question: it presupposes that the skeptic and her 
interlocutor are in agreement about what a concept is.   
 What, however, is the relation between transcendental description and the 
assumption of conceptual unity? In the transcendental arguments setting, the anti-
skeptical claim is to begin with facts that the skeptic acknowledges and to show her that 
she cannot uphold the skeptical thesis, given what she implicitly takes for granted. Now 
it is obvious, as with necessity, universality, and apriority before, if we exceed what the 
skeptic takes for granted by tacitly invoking the simple model of conceptual unity, this 
inclusive claim is a pretense. The problem of conceptual unity, however, also occurs 
outside the dialectical situation of anti-skeptical transcendental arguments. It draws 
attention to a general dogmatic problem of transcendental thought, namely, to “impose 
on someone a philosophical dogma to which this person is not committed by anything 
she says or thinks, and so on” (Kuusela 2008b, 62). Compare Kuusela's conception of 
dogmatism to what Nozick believes philosophical arguments aim at: “A philosophical 
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argument is an attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants to 
believe it or not” (Nozick 1981, 4). The coercion that philosophical arguments exercise 
comes from various directions. In the transcendental case, the coercion may be said to 
be motivated by the underlying fear that, for transcendental arguments, there is no 
common ground with the skeptic and thus no chance of convincing her that her own 
stance is self-undermining; for transcendental description, as Crowell might see it, the 
coercion may be said to motivated by the underlying fear that we make experience 
unintelligible if we sever structural enabling connections such as that between memory 
and perception.  
 Kuusela’s Wittgensteinian solution is to make a distinction between general and 
specific transcendental arguments (2008b, 68). The former refers to transcendental 
arguments in the traditional context, which give conditions for experience or perception 
in general, and therefore must conform to the simple model of conceptual unity. The 
latter, on the other hand, singles out particular cases of perception or specific areas of 
experience where certain necessary conditions hold. Significantly, specific 
transcendental arguments on this understanding are indexed to the context of particular 
philosophical problems and cannot be generalized beyond the particular philosophical 
problem they attempt to address. So a specific transcendental argument aims to address 
the conditions for a phenomenon, such as knowledge or perception, within the specific 
setting of the philosophical problem at hand. Kuusela contends that one of the upshots 
of such an argument is that it resolves the problem of uniqueness posited by Koerner; 
because the argument is specific to the set of cases it attempts to clarify and, 
additionally, it is indexed to the philosophical context in question, it leaves open the 
possibility of alternative conceptual schemes.  
 The question that emerges from this discussion is whether transcendental 
description dogmatically assumes the simple model of conceptual unity. Although 
 207 
transcendental description is not meant to target epistemological skepticism and thus 
does not run the risk of imposing implicit conceptual unity claims on an opponent, its 
advantages over the anti-skeptical approach to the transcendental stand and fall with its 
metaphysical parsimony. Therefore, transcendental description cannot afford the 
residual essentialism that comes with an implicit reliance on simple conceptual unity.  
Let us consider Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in turn. Although conceptual 
unity is not explicitly discussed by Merleau-Ponty, I would like to turn to his account of 
space in order to address whether he is committed to such a conceptual model. Merleau-
Ponty holds that from the phenomenological point of view, that is, from the perspective 
of lived experience, the notion of objective space, that is, the geometric, homogenous 
and indivisible space of mathematics, is not fundamental but derivative (PP 301-302). 
Objective space and objective time, according to Merleau-Ponty, are not experienced 
but are products of reflection (PP 302). These conceptions of space and time are 
parasitic on our original experience of space and time; to start with, the space of lived 
experience is oriented given the situatedness and embodiment of the subject (e.g., PP 
253-265). Because objective space depends on lived and oriented space for its 
intelligibility, the latter is a transcendental condition for the former. Further, Merleau-
Ponty advances the view, based on lived experience, that there are multiple spaces: the 
space of dreams, the space of mythology, the space of schizophrenia, etc. To justify this 
multiplicity, Merleau-Ponty says:  
 
In order to drain mythical experience, dream experience, or 
perceptual experience of all positive value, that is, in order to 
reintegrate these spaces into geometrical space, we must, in short, 
deny that one ever dreams, that one is ever a madman, or that one 
ever truly sees. As long as we acknowledge the dream, madness, 
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or perception as, at the very least, absences of reflection – and how 
could we not if we want to maintain a value for the testimony of 
consciousness, without which no truth is possible – then we do not 
have the right to level out all experiences into a single world, nor 
all modalities of existence into a single consciousness. In order to 
do this, we would need to have available a higher authority to 
which one could submit perceptive consciousness and fantastical 
consciousness, a me more intimate to myself than me who thinks 
my dream or my perception when I limit myself to dreaming or to 
perceiving, a me who possesses the true substance of my dream 
and of my perception while I only have the appearance of this. But 
this very distinction between appearance and the real is made 
neither in the world of the myth, nor in the world of the patient or 
the child. The myth fits the essence into the appearance; the 
mythical phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine 
presence (PP 303). 
 
The quote above, although not directly related to conceptual unity and 
dogmatism, can shed light on Merleau-Ponty's attitude with respect to these themes. 
Merleau-Ponty holds, in the above, that from the phenomenological point of view which 
is directed at doing justice to lived experience, imposing an objective space as “real” 
and subsuming other “unreal” experiences under objective space and thus denying their 
self-standing reality, would suggest that, as he says elsewhere, the reflecting subject 
“knows what the dreamer and the schizophrenic experience better than the dreamer or 
the schizophrenic himself” (PP 302). The phenomenological perspective aims to uphold 
a pre-reflective description of lived experience without enforcing a picture, for instance, 
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of spatiality that would obscure or outright deny an alternative experience. To bring 
everything under a “single world” or “consciousness,” as Merleau-Ponty says in the 
quote above, would involve subsuming these multiple lived experiences of space under 
one homogenous objective space; to argue that one notion of spatiality should be 
subsumed under another, because, for instance, this other notion is “truly” how 
consciousness experiences the world would be to contend that there is “a me more 
intimate to myself than me who thinks my dream or my perception when I limit myself 
to dreaming or to perceiving, a me who possesses the true substance of my dream and of 
my perception while I only have the appearance of this” (PP 303). This makes clear that 
Merleau-Ponty allows that there can be multiple ways of experiencing space. The space 
of dreams is not a continuation of, or homogenous with, the space of wakefulness. As 
Stephen Priest remarks, we may conceive of still other numerically distinct spaces, e.g., 
cinematic space on the screen, which I can visually perceive, but not travel to (Priest 
1998, 115). All of these, according to Merleau-Ponty, would count as modalities of 
spatial experience.  
 To bring these thoughts to bear on the notion of simple conceptual unity and 
dogmatism, if the example of spatiality above is paradigmatic of how Merleau-Ponty 
treats experiences, he implicitly attacks the dogmatic notion that we can determine the 
limits of a concept or a phenomenon such as space in abstraction from lived experiences 
of spatiality. In his remarks above, he urges that we take first person experiences of 
spatiality in their diversity instead of imposing one way of experiencing or 
understanding space as fundamental or genuine and downgrade the rest as derivative or 
unreal. If, for Merleau-Ponty, lived and oriented space is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of perception, it is not restricted to a unifying definition of space but open to 
diverse modalities of our experience of spatiality. Merleau-Ponty’s principle is that 
human experience should guide what we take to be a necessary condition; this, in 
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essence, is the openness of transcendental description. Suppose, then, that there are 
reports of experiences in which subjects claim to have perceptions or experiences that 
cannot be characterized as spatial or temporal.72 Transcendental description then would 
be required to distinguish between different modes of experience in order to make room 
for phenomena that do not involve the proposed transcendental condition. These 
phenomena might entail structures that are different from experiences, which are 
conditioned by space and time. Because, finally, Merleau-Ponty's conception of the 
transcendental is indexed to the phenomenal field, the scope of space and time is not 
prescribed by the unchanging features of the subject (i.e., space and time as a priori 
forms of intuition). If, indeed, reflection is always situated, and we do not have, as the 
word field signifies for Merleau-Ponty, an absolute perspective, questions of application 
of conditions of experience remain open to what actually appears. This view is further 
complemented by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological commitment to description, 
which remains attuned to particular cases. Counter-examples to proposed transcendental 
conditions, to echo Kuusela, are not indications of defects in transcendental description; 
they confirm that the latter is, in principle, open to difference. Unlike the anti-skeptical 
transcendental arguments we have explored, which are required to give us strong and 
unchanging conditions given their validatory ambitions, transcendental description is 
not geared at providing unassailable proof in the face of skepticism. Transcendental 
description in its phenomenological sense may be said to reveal basic structures of lived 
experience, which can shift and evolve as lived experience and our situation in the 
world unfolds.  
 Kuusela's take on the transcendental and his concerns with conceptual unity are 
inspired by Wittgenstein (2008b, 75 fn26). The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
                                                
72 According to self-reports of mystical experiences, perception can be highly distorted and is, 
at times, described as nonspatial and nontemporal (Stace 1960). 
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certainties, which I have endorsed, following Kuusela, gives us a mode of comparison 
with which an object of investigation can be juxtaposed within the context of the skeptic 
and her interlocutor. The account of certainties and their transcendental relation to 
knowledge does not give us an independent account of how knowledge as such is 
possible. Wittgenstein does not, therefore, take certainty to be a unifying feature of all 
(epistemic) practices, because his account aims to clarify a philosophical problem, and 
not to give us the general features of knowledge as such. Furthermore, Wittgenstein 
often considers the unity of concepts to be one that is centered on family resemblance, 
as opposed to a common feature that runs through all cases of that kind (PI 65). On this 
picture, any given concept, for instance, epistemic statements or statements expressing 
certainties, might have overlapping features instead of one common feature. For 
example, X1 might have the features a, b, and c; X2 might have the features a, d, and e; 
X3 might have the features d, f, and g (Ahmed 2010, 67). This view is exemplified in 
the following remark: 
 
There are, however, certain types of case in which I rightly say I 
cannot be making a mistake, and Moore has given a few 
examples of such cases. 
I can enumerate various typical cases, but not give any common 
characteristic. (N.N. cannot be mistaken about his flown from 
America to England a few days ago. Only if he is mad can he 
take anything else to be possible.) (OC 674) 
 
Wittgenstein remarks that while that one “cannot be mistaken” is a feature of particular 
cases, it cannot be extended to all cases as a “common characteristic.” While it is 
sometimes important to be able to provide some features that at least many cases share 
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for systematic purposes, Wittgenstein himself does not take statements expressing 
certainties to share one essential feature, as the simple mode of conceptual unity would 
require. That is, Wittgenstein refrains from both claiming that all statements expressing 
certainties enable all knowledge, as a metaphysical account would, and that all such 
statements share one feature (e.g., that it is beyond doubt, justification etc.). The 
possibility of exceptions cannot be ruled out.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein circumvent the 
problems associated with the concepts of necessity, universality and apriority operative 
in anti-skeptical transcendental arguments. My comparison of the two thinkers should 
not, however, mask various differences. One major difference between Merleau-Ponty 
and Wittgenstein that emerged in this chapter concerns their respective notions of a 
philosophical account. While Merleau-Ponty does not differentiate between the 
philosophical account and what it aims to describe, Wittgenstein’s recognition of 
philosophical accounts as various modes of representing the objects of our inquiry and 
of statements expressing certainties as objects of comparison suggests that a 
philosophical account does not give a description of reality (understood here as the 
object of investigation) itself, but is a model with which reality can be compared. This 
strategy allows Wittgenstein to steer clear from metaphysical commitments. Merleau-
Ponty’s account, for distinct reasons, does not fall into metaphysics; by indexing his 
account to the phenomenal field, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology avoids commitments 
to metaphysical structures with their requisite sempiternality and generality. Finally, I 
turned to the charge of essentialism and subjectivism that can render transcendental 
description dogmatic. I argued that the charge of essentialism could be avoided if we 
consider Merleau-Ponty’s indexing of his account to what appears in the phenomenal 
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field and to a mode of representation, among others, that uses its claims as objects of 
comparison in Wittgenstein’s sense. Owing to the pluralistic and open-textured 
perspectives of both these philosophers, I argued, the third challenge of an assumed 
model of simple conceptual unity can also be rebutted. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to make a case for uses of the transcendental that are non-
metaphysical and, relatedly, non-dogmatic in their orientation. I have argued that the 
epistemological treatment of transcendental claims enforces a narrow perspective on 
their scope and application that is fraught with undeclared metaphysical commitments 
due to its anti-skeptical purpose. Despite their intention to begin with a common starting 
point, transcendental arguments fail to meet this critical standard. We could see that 
transcendental arguments, while seemingly inclusive, are backed by metaphysically 
charged conceptions of necessity, universality, and apriority, which remain 
unannounced. Throughout the chapters, the dogmatism of these unannounced 
metaphysical presuppositions has remained an obstacle for transcendental arguments. 
However, given the anti-skeptical context, transcendental arguments cannot help but 
advance precisely these strong conditions in order to gain purchase against skepticism. 
The dogmatism of this tendency is, as I hope the preceding chapters have clarified, 
opposed to a critical spirit that remains open to phenomena, because apart from 
presuppositions that it does not reveal to the skeptic, it also insists on a metaphysical 
perspective, claiming authority over the one true nature of phenomena (cognition, 
language, perception etc.). 
 In order to break from the epistemological concerns that have dominated recent 
discussions of the transcendental, and in this way to take steps towards retrieving the 
critical impulse of the transcendental, I turned to descriptive philosophies that can be 
shown to reject problematic metaphysical commitments and the dogmatism associated 
with them. By allowing for an understanding of transcendental conditions that does 
justice to the many facets and the open horizon of our lived experience, these 
 215 
descriptive philosophies pluralize the transcendental. In this way, as I have argued, the 
transcendental can be reclaimed for a non-dogmatic perspective from which 
philosophical criticism could take its cues.  
 Classical formulations of the transcendental are bound up with a claim to 
necessity, universality and apriority that are metaphysically charged. This charged claim 
is passed on to transcendental arguments in the contemporary epistemological 
discussion. We could see that both ambitious and modest transcendental arguments rely 
on an unwarranted inferential move from facts about us to facts about the unchanging 
metaphysical nature of reality or the self (Stern 1999; 2000) (Chapter 1). The associated 
view of universality, which holds that only one set of conditions can organize 
experience, I argued, is ultimately indefensible (Chapter 2).  This might give us the 
impression that the transcendental should be discarded as a philosophical approach 
because it is wrought with too many difficulties. But this pessimistic conclusion seems 
premature. I suggested that if the transcendental can be made workable in a descriptive 
setting without tacit metaphysical commitments, then these difficulties can be 
adequately addressed.  
It might seem paradoxical that the transcendental can be made amenable to a 
descriptive reading because of its traditional association with a validatory or 
legitimizing project. My contention was that this project unduly curbs the scope of the 
transcendental. Therefore, I argued that if the operative notions of necessity, 
universality and apriority are adequately revised, the tension between the transcendental 
and the descriptive can be resolved (Chapter 5). Merleau-Ponty holds that the 
transcendental is not an immanent aspect of the ego and the necessity and universality it 
furnishes are indexed to the phenomenal field. Because, on this understanding, the 
transcendental does not belong to an internal realm that is immune from change, it is 
open to modification. It responds to the contingency of experience or the facticity of 
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meaningful practice. While some commentators have understood such a move to blend 
the a priori with the empirical (Smith 2005; Inkpin 2017), I have contested the 
traditional view that underlies their assessment, that is, the view that contingency 
belongs exclusively to the domain of the empirical. The phenomenal field is contingent, 
insofar as we cannot rule out that things could be otherwise; given, however, the 
actuality and facticity of the phenomenal field for embodied experience, certain 
necessities emerge. As I have insisted, it is crucial to understand that these necessities 
are not grounded in the metaphysical reality of the world or self. This latter point is 
especially important, because the open-ended transcendentalism that we encounter in 
Merleau-Ponty should not be conflated with transcendental idealism either (Gardner 
2015). Merleau-Ponty replaces Kant’s unchanging intellectual ego with a body-subject 
that is in and of the world, and the world is not tantamount to empirical reality, but an 
open horizon in which transcendence has a genuine place. Thus, although there is 
nothing necessary about being embodied as such, given that we are embodied, we can 
identify necessary, universal, and a priori enabling structures. These necessities are not 
grounded in metaphysics, but indexed to the facticity of the phenomenal field, which is 
open to contingency and change. 
Wittgenstein’s work is an even clearer case of a non-metaphysical orientation, 
because he does not, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty, give us conditions for knowledge or 
perception as a philosophical account, but only in light of a clarificatory philosophical 
task which distinguishes between the mode of representation, which consists of a 
revised notion of the transcendental, and the object of investigation, that is, language, 
epistemic practices, cognition etc. Modes of representation differ from conventional 
philosophical positions in that they are not designed to make a systematic 
pronouncement on an issue but to clarify a philosophical problem by offering an 
alternative picture under which the problem does not arise. However, Wittgenstein’s 
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rejection of metaphysics and the positive role he accords to change and contingency 
should not be interpreted as a turn towards the empirical (anthropological, historical 
etc.) (Kuusela 2008a, 2017). By indexing necessity, universality, and apriority to a 
mode of representation or a philosophical model, Wittgenstein ensures that we do not 
predicate of the phenomenon what belongs to our mode of representation and thus avoid 
a projection that is at the heart of metaphysical positions. This results in a 
transcendental that is embedded in a philosophical model and its potential to remove 
unclarities that give rise to philosophical problems. Wittgenstein’s treatment of 
certainties is a striking example for this strategy. Statements expressing certainties 
emerge as useful tools in dissolving skeptical quandaries, by showing us that what the 
skeptic doubts is a necessary condition for epistemic claims. This is not a refutation of 
skepticism, because it rejects both doubt and justification with respect to certainties. If 
we accept this model, statements such as “there are mind-independent objects” are 
simply not open to epistemic evaluation. On Wittgenstein’s view, certainties are 
necessary and universal with respect to the epistemic practices they enable, not because 
they are sempiternal like Kant’s transcendental constraints on knowledge, that is, true 
for all times and places, but precisely because statements expressing certainties, like 
other logical features of our language games, are non-temporal and therefore are neutral 
with respect to time or change. 
This attempt to establish a non-metaphysical alternative to the familiar Kantian 
transcendental, however, will rightly meet objections. First, it could be argued that the 
transformation of the transcendental, which I have suggested undermines objectivity 
and collapses into relativism. Second, it could be argued that if the transcendental 
requires such radical revisions, why should it be retained at all.  
First it is the specter of contingency that, according to some, vitiates the relation 
of the transcendental with objectivity and results in relativism (Sacks 2000). For if it is 
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allowed that transcendental conditions for knowledge or perception are not fixed “there 
is nothing […] that is such that in principle it could not change; all construals seem only 
relatively stable, subject to brute shifts to the way human practice – as well as 
changeable forces of nature – have shaped them” (Sacks 2000, 193). As a result, we 
lose any conception of a “fixed objective world” (Sacks 2000, 193). Recall that 
Merleau-Ponty grounded necessity on contingency of facticity. If both necessity and 
universality are indexed to what appears in the phenomenal field, we seem to put the 
objectivity of our picture of the world at risk. Wittgenstein’s view that necessity and 
universality are indexed to the philosophical account or the mode in which we are 
representing the object of our investigation can be open to a similar critique. For if the 
object of investigation can be understood in countless ways, our perspective on the 
objective world comes adrift. A troubling result of this picture is that anything goes – in 
other words, we end up with relativism and that makes critique, the fundamental reason 
for which I have argued that the transcendental should be retained, impossible. 
 It is important to point out, however, that Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein do 
not hold, as relativists might, that in some sense all ways of understanding the world are 
incommensurable with each other, yet when it comes to validity they all are equivalent. 
Both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein believe that there are better or worse ways of 
understanding the world. Indexing conditions of possibility to a situation, practice, or 
philosophical problem is not tantamount to denying that some ways of looking at the 
world are preferable to others. Rather, indexing transcendental conditions in this way 
can be understood as a manner of expressing that what counts as “better” or “worse” 
cannot be decided once and for all and from nowhere, but is only intelligible in light of 
a task or a context. For example, Merleau-Ponty is critical of the sciences, though he 
does not reject them altogether. He argues that it is their domination in all fields of 
thought (e.g., PrP 35), that is, scientism, which is not a resourceful way of 
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understanding lived experience. Thus, his critique is qualified on the basis of what 
science can and cannot adequately explain; relativist thinking would not be able supply 
such claims, because it might hold science and phenomenology to be incommensurable 
and correct in their own right. Wittgenstein, similarly, does not suggest that there is no 
better or worse way of understanding epistemic practices in the context of skepticism. 
Rather, he holds that once we look at how we use words, the epistemic understanding of 
certainties causes various deep confusions. It is precisely for these confusions that it is 
better to have a non-epistemic understanding of certainties which can be spelled out 
further in transcendental terms. But this will not be salient or resourceful if we do not 
contextualize it with respect to the philosophical problem we are addressing. While 
relativism holds that anything goes, this pluralism retains critical intent.   
It is not clear why plurality should be bartered for objectivity, especially when 
we consider how easily we fall into an uncritical attitude towards the objective. 
Dogmatism claims to have the final word on a “fixed objective world” by ultimately 
appealing to a metaphysical ground (of world or self); and this is more problematic than 
pluralism, because while the latter does not lay claim to a perimeter – from nowhere – 
that brings all experience or practice to convergence, the former illicitly claims that it 
has authority over the true nature of the world or the self. It is a misperception that 
pluralism stands in the way of objectivity. Especially as pluralism does not suffer from 
the relativistic equalization of validity, pluralism and objectivity are compatible with 
each other. Therefore, in light of the above, it is not pluralism that should be discarded 
but perhaps the problematic, fixed, vision of what the objective should be. 
Let us turn to the second objection and some suggestions for prospects for the 
transcendental as I have conceived it. One can raise a deeper concern about the 
transcendental: if the transcendental has to be changed and modified so radically, why 
should it be retained at all as a philosophical tool? One reason for retaining the 
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transcendental is its unrivalled aptitude for a non-empirical examination of background 
structures, which offers an alternative to some forms of naturalistic explanation. 
Transcendental description as I have conceived it, can open scientific inquiry and its 
claims to neutrality to social and political critique by revealing its reliance on 
problematic a priori assumptions. In Merleau-Ponty’s work, for instance, the 
transcendental reveals broadly that our lived experience – which involves our 
ideological situation (PP 137) – is a condition for the possibility of science. This 
descriptive revelation has critical force, because it draws attention to, for example, 
distortions that might result from blanket applications of science to all aspects of human 
experience, by showing how the supposed neutrality of such a position has a 
background in our political and cultural world.  
Relatedly, the transcendental can allow us to appreciate political and social 
phenomena critically (e.g. Apel 1998, Habermas 1975). Because the transcendental in 
this new sense makes room for contingency, it is open to contextualized agency and 
expressions of freedom; it reveals that the a priori conditions which, for instance, make 
social injustices possible are not set in stone. Sacks holds that the transcendental is 
critical, because it reveals that what we take to be objective and independent of us is 
actually, behind our conscious and cognitive backs, introduced by us (Sacks 2000, 194). 
It is our contribution that also makes the world what it is. On this view, transcendental 
conditions can give us the ability to reflect on perceived necessities and in this sense 
allow us to exercise some reflective freedom with respect to them (Sacks 2000). The 
new transcendental perspective I have argued for can take social criticism beyond mere 
reflection on what is metaphysically necessary, because it also has the potential to 
reveal to us that we can transform these conditions. The new transcendental takes the 
co-constitutive and open-ended stance on our engagements with the world seriously. 
We do not have the absolute freedom of metaphysical subjects, but we are also not 
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completely determined by our circumstances. Although showing this in detail is outside 
the remit of this thesis, indexing the transcendental to lived situations or specific 
conceptual problems provides critical thinking with a new footing. It allows us to 
interrogate what we take for granted without having to insist on one and only correct 
vantage point. 
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